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Showing papers in "Journal of Management Accounting Research in 2000"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between organization size, product life cycle stage, market position, and balanced scorecard (BSC) usage and organizational performance and found that larger firms make more use of a BSC.
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between organization size, product life‐cycle stage, market position, balanced scorecard (BSC) usage and organizational performance. Using financial and nonfinancial measures, the BSC appraises four dimensions of performance: customers, financial (or shareholders), learning and growth, and internal aspects. Based on a survey of 66 Australian manufacturing companies, the paper suggests that larger firms make more use of a BSC. In addition, firms that have a higher proportion of new products have a greater tendency to make use of measures related to new products. A firm's market position has not been found to be associated significantly with greater BSC usage. The paper also suggests that greater BSC usage is associated with improved performance, but this relationship does not depend significantly on organization size, product life cycle, or market position.

1,052 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article presented an extensive review of laboratory studies on financial incentives and examined the relations between type of task and type of incentive scheme, respectively, and task performance. But, a large body of empirical evidence indicates that financial incentives frequently do not lead to increased performance (e.g., Young and Lewis 1995; Jenkins et al. 1998).
Abstract: Management accounting information plays an important role in motivating individuals to improve performance (cf., Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young 1997). This role tends to be operationalized by linking compensation to performance, typically through the provision of financial incentives. Theoretically, financial incentives motivate people to exert additional effort, which in turn should improve task performance. However, a large body of empirical evidence indicates that financial incentives frequently do not lead to increased performance (e.g., Young and Lewis 1995; Jenkins et al. 1998). Consequently, it is important to examine variables that may interact with financial incentives in affecting task performance. This paper presents an extensive review of laboratory studies on financial incentives and examines the relations between type of task and type of incentive scheme, respectively, and task performance. We posit that performance in tasks of varying types (which we view as a surrogate for the gap bet...

389 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the interaction effects of national culture and contextual factors (nature of the knowledge and the relationship between the knowledge sharer and recipient) on employees' tendency to share knowledge with co-workers.
Abstract: This study examines empirically the interaction effects of national culture and contextual factors (nature of the knowledge and the relationship between the knowledge sharer and recipient) on employees' tendency to share knowledge with co‐workers. Quantitative and open‐ended responses to two scenarios were collected from 142 managers (104 from the U.S. and 38 from the People's Republic of China). These two nations were selected due to their divergence on salient aspects of national culture, as well as their global political and economic importance. The focus on interaction effects was aimed at providing a more powerful test of culture's effects than simple comparisons of means typical of prior related research. Consistent with culture‐based expectation, the quantitative results indicated that Chinese vs. U.S. nationals' openness of knowledge sharing was related to their different degrees of collectivism—the relative emphasis on self vs. collective interests—as well as whether knowledge sharing involved a ...

389 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work identifies congested days using the distribution of patient admissions for each hospital‐year combination and uses the rate of Caesarian sections as the proxy for the cost of congestion, finding that congestion does not increase C‐section rates.
Abstract: We investigate the cost of system congestion using data from 225,473 maternity admissions at 30 hospitals in the state of Washington. We identify congested days using the distribution of patient admissions for each hospital‐year combination and use the rate of Caesarian sections (C‐sections) as the proxy for the cost of congestion. We use two separate logistic regressions to investigate the relation between congestion and the decision to operate. The first regression includes data from the full sample of patients. Contrary to expectations, we find that congestion does not increase C‐section rates. We estimate the second regression using data only from those patients classified as being at risk for a C‐section and find that congestion does lead to increased C‐section rates. The difference obtains because our full sample analyses do not control for physician incentives to classify patients as being “at risk,” and whether the patient is “at risk” is included as a control in the regression. The nature of our ...

29 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine two types of uncertainty: first-order (uncertainty about outcomes) and second-order uncertainty about the probability distributions of outcomes, and find that an accounting information system that lowers secondorder uncertainty halves the time bargainers need to reach agreement and decreases the premium paid to the bargainer bearing increased risk by 43 percent.
Abstract: Bargaining costs have been identified as a key determinant of the organization of economic activity, and accounting information plays a significant role in contracts created through bargaining. Properties of accounting information systems can increase or decrease the uncertainty associated with accounting‐based payoffs; we show in a bilateral bargaining setting that increased uncertainty leads to increased delays in reaching agreement and increased premiums for the party bearing the uncertainty. We examine two types of uncertainty: first‐order (uncertainty about outcomes) and second‐order (uncertainty about the probability distributions of outcomes). At a moderately high level of first‐order uncertainty, we find that an accounting information system that lowers second‐order uncertainty halves the time bargainers need to reach agreement and decreases the premium paid to the bargainer bearing increased risk by 43 percent. The fact that bargaining efficiency gains can arise from accounting systems that reduc...

22 citations