Showing papers in "Journal of Religious Ethics in 2008"
TL;DR: The authors counters the swift rejection of forgetting and its labeling as a reprehensible act by proposing a critical argument for different forms of forgetting, and concludes with suggestions of how deliberate performative practices of forgetting might benefit communities affected by a genocidal past.
Abstract: “Forgetting” plays an important role in the lives of individuals and communities. Although a few Holocaust scholars have begun to take forgetting more seriously in relation to the task of remembering—in popular parlance as well as in academic discourse on the Holocaust—forgetting is usually perceived as a negative force. In the decades following 1945, the terms remembering and forgetting have often been used antithetically, with the communities of victims insisting on the duty to remember and a society of perpetrators desiring to forget. Thus, the discourse on Holocaust memory has become entrenched on this issue. This essay counters the swift rejection of forgetting and its labeling as a reprehensible act. It calls attention to two issues: first, it offers a critical argument for different forms of forgetting; second, it concludes with suggestions of how deliberate performative practices of forgetting might benefit communities affected by a genocidal past. Is it possible to conceive of forgetting not as the ugly twin of remembering but as its necessary companion?
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a specific research focus on U.S. Catholic and Iranian Shii women that initiated a search for a distinct method of comparative ethics, which focuses on the production of ethical knowledge through the interaction of discursive logics of various moral agents.
Abstract: This article reflects one scholar’s attempt to locate herself within emerging ethical methodologies given a specific concern with cross-cultural women’s moral praxis. The field of comparative ethics’s debt to past debates over methodology is considered through a typology of three waves of methodological invention. The article goes on to describe a specific research focus on U.S. Catholic and Iranian Shii women that initiated a search for a distinct method. This method of comparative ethics, which focuses on the production of ethical knowledge through the interaction of discursive logics of various moral agents, is described. The conclusion turns to how methodological invention can itself become a constructive project through the way it (1) locates the scholar in relation to her subject of study and (2) allows for isolation of tactics within specific moral discourses. THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS ETHICS is particularly exciting for ethicists interested in methodological innovation. Scholars dealing with multiple traditions, investigating distinct genres, and engaged in diverse constructive projects are currently shaping the future of this discipline. However, all this methodological invention can be confusing. Scholars need concrete tools of analysis to employ in our analytical work, and at times the conversation about method becomes so
31 citations
TL;DR: The most interesting and perilous issue at present in comparative religious ethics is comparative ethical judgment as mentioned in this paper, when and how to judge others, if at all, which is the most relevant issue to our work.
Abstract: The most interesting and perilous issue at present in comparative religious ethics is comparative ethical judgment—when and how to judge others, if at all. There are understandable historical and conceptual reasons for the current tendency to prefer descriptive over normative work in comparative religious ethics. However, judging those we study is inescapable—it can be suppressed or marginalized but not eliminated. Therefore, the real question is how to judge others (and ourselves) well, not whether to judge. Instead of bringing supposedly universal moral scoring systems to bear on reified “traditions” and “cultures,” it would be better to focus on the precise details of particular practices, motifs, and theories in various settings, and compare them with an eye to substantive issues of current ethical concern.
24 citations
TL;DR: The Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE) as mentioned in this paper has published five articles on brain death, feeding tubes, sex selection, spiritual counseling, and organ transplantation, which are unusual in the specificity of their topics and their engagement with complex discussions in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.
Abstract: Muslim theologians, jurists, and healthcare workers have been addressing the challenges of modern biotechnology for years. Major textbooks on religion and bioethics cover Islam in one or two articles, offering only a general introduction to these important discussions. The five articles in this issue of the Journal of Religious Ethics, originating from a conference at Pennsylvania State University, are unusual in the specificity of their topics—brain death, feeding tubes, sex selection, spiritual counseling, and organ transplantation—and in their engagement with complex discussions in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. In this essay, I introduce the five articles and consider two larger implications: the changing definition of the human person in light of biotechnological advances and the continuing importance of religious traditions, especially Islam, in legitimizing ethical responses to these advances.
21 citations
TL;DR: Kierkegaard's discussion of patience in some of his Upbuilding Discourses, and its connection with his understanding of the nature of selfhood as it appears both in the Discourses and in The Sickness unto Death as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: This paper examines Kierkegaard's discussion of patience in some of his Upbuilding Discourses, and its connection with his understanding of the nature of selfhood as it appears both in the Discourses and in The Sickness unto Death. That understanding stresses that selfhood is not simply given, but is a task to be achieved—although a task that can only be achieved by the self that is formed in the process of undertaking it. For Kierkegaard, an account of the self that recognizes its essential temporality must give a crucial role to patience as a virtue necessary for the formation and maintenance of personal identity. However, although the self is essentially temporal for Kierkegaard, it is also essentially such as to participate in eternity, and this complexity and tension in his concept of the self gives his understanding of patience a particular character—one that presents an important challenge to some of the dominant assumptions of recent and contemporary philosophy in both the analytic and the continental traditions.
20 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors move through three major stages in the historical development of just war thinking, examining a critical phase in the formation of the classical idea of just cause as the responsibility to maintain justice, then discussing the shift, characteristic of the modern period, to an idea of sovereignty as connected to the state and the prioritization of defense of the state as just cause for use of force.
Abstract: What is, or should be, the role of defense in thinking about the justification of use of armed force? Contemporary just war thinking prioritizes defense as the principal, and perhaps the only, just cause for resorting to armed force. By contrast, classic just war tradition, while recognizing defense as justification for use of force by private persons, did not reason from self-defense to the justification of the use of force on behalf of the political community, but instead rendered the idea of just cause for resort to force in terms of the sovereign's responsibility to maintain justice, vindicating those who had suffered from injustice and punishing evildoers. This paper moves through three major stages in the historical development of just war thinking, first examining a critical phase in the formation of the classical idea of just cause as the responsibility to maintain justice, then discussing the shift, characteristic of the modern period, to an idea of sovereignty as connected to the state and the prioritization of defense of the state as just cause for use of force, and lastly showing how this conception of the priority of defense became part of the recovery of just war thinking in the latter part of the twentieth century. The paper concludes by noting recent changes in thought on international law that tend to emphasize justice at the expense of the right of self-defense, suggesting that the roots of just war thinking imply the need for a similar rethinking of contemporary just war discourse.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors trace classical Islamic notions of death and the soul, the modern definition of death as "brain death", and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition, and argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future.
Abstract: The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub-traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and the soul, the modern definition of death as "brain death," and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre-modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans-cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years.
16 citations
TL;DR: Gillian Rose was a philosopher, social theorist, memoirist, and Jewish convert to Christianity who died an untimely death in 1995 as discussed by the authors, who offered a novel account of faith, which grows out of her Hegelian philosophical background inflected by her reading of Kierkegaard and her rediscovered Jewish heritage.
Abstract: Gillian Rose was a philosopher, social theorist, memoirist, and Jewish convert to Christianity who died an untimely death in 1995. She offers a novel account of faith, which grows out of her Hegelian philosophical background inflected by her reading of Kierkegaard and her rediscovered Jewish heritage. For Rose, faith is a mode of social practice. Rose's conception of faith is here reconstructed by translating her obscure jurisprudential idiom into the language of social practices and norms. The conception of secular faith developed by Rose is shown to have implications for contemporary discussions of ethics and politics. The contemporary relevance of Rose's work is made clear through comparison with recent work by Robert Brandom, Robert Adams, and Patrick Deneen.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a comparison of Muslim and non-Muslim discourses and practices is made, and the authors conclude that both groups tend to overemphasize the uniqueness of Muslim legal and practical responses to bioethical challenges, because they restrict their purview to legal opinions, ignoring larger dynamics of legitimacy.
Abstract: People everywhere search for answers by using the resources of their traditions. They wish to do so in a legitimate way, and so they consult official institutions, specialists, and skilled individuals for their opinions; regardless of religious or cultural contexts, the common aim of these experts is to produce security, unity, and trust. Therefore, the norm-finding processes in Islamic and Western contexts share fundamental similarities: the problem of finding a final ground for judgment, the strategies of constructing coherence and of organizing consensus, and the difficulties of obtaining legitimacy. What makes one debate “Islamic” and the other one “Western” is the different semantic materials, the different authorities, the different languages, and the different juridical frameworks. In my comparison of Muslim and Western discourses and practices, I conclude that Muslim and non-Muslim scholars tend to overemphasize the uniqueness of Muslim legal and practical responses to bioethical challenges, because they restrict their purview to legal opinions, ignoring larger dynamics of legitimization.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that without understanding such irony, we are unlikely to reflect in morally comprehensive ways on past, present, or future wars, and propose an alternative to moralism and political realism that better explains the irony of war.
Abstract: The American experience of war is ironic. That is, there is often an intimate and unexamined relationship between seemingly contrary elements in war such as morality and politics. This article argues that without understanding such irony, we are unlikely to reflect in morally comprehensive ways on past, present, or future wars. Traditional schools of thought, however, such as moralism and political realism, reinforce these apparent contradictions. I propose, then, an alternative—“ethical realism” as informed by Reinhold Niebuhr—that better explains the irony of war. Through an ethical realist examination of the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and the Iraq War, I consider how American political interests have been inextricably linked with deep moral concerns. Ethical realism charts a middle path that ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism. Ethical realism provides a conceptual framework for evaluating these other frameworks—a distinct form of moral-political deliberation about war.
10 citations
TL;DR: Forgiveness is defined as "rewarding, punishment, repentance, and reconciliation" in the context of Northern Ireland as mentioned in this paper, and it relates to gratitude, hopeful patience, forgiveness-as-compassion, and public penitence.
Abstract: The Peace Process in Northern Ireland is about to reach another milestone: the Consultative Group on the Past is due to publish a report in the autumn of 2008 on “the best way to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland” and to support the building of “a shared future.” It is timely therefore to think again—and further—about what political expression forgiveness might find, using the concrete case of Northern Ireland today as grist for our conceptual mill. This essay opens with two preliminaries: an account of what forgiveness is and how it relates to resentment, punishment, repentance, and reconciliation; and a brief summary of the “Troubles.” It then proceeds to caution that reconciliation will have to be realized in the midst of persistent enmity; to explore what a Truth Commission might achieve, and the limits of it; to consider whether the discovery of fresh truth should issue in further judicial proceedings, and how far these will disturb the Peace Process; and to suggest that the British Government could erect public memorials to the dead on all sides. It concludes that in addition to Government action, there is need for the popular exercise of certain virtues—including grateful, hopeful patience, forgiveness-as-compassion, and public penitence.
TL;DR: It is found that the ethical appropriateness of tube feeding at the end of life is not as clear-cut as it may seem, and Muslim scholars ought to favor insertion of a feeding tube in patients who can no longer respond to assisted feeding.
Abstract: Cases of dementia present us with difficult ethical dilemmas as we strive to care for those unable to care for themselves. In this article, I review the relevant Islamic texts on caring for the ill, alleviating suffering, and feeding the hungry—all in light of the modern clinical environment. I find that the ethical appropriateness of tube feeding at the end of life is not as clear-cut as it may seem. My analysis, however, suggests that Muslim scholars ought to favor insertion of a feeding tube in patients who can no longer respond to assisted feeding. Nonetheless, several important issues require further clarification in this clinically important but neglected area of ethical inquiry.
TL;DR: The authors examines three collections of essays providing comparative perspectives on these topics, two recently authored studies of Buddhism and Islam in relation to war, and a compendious collection of texts on Western moral tradition concerning war, peace, and related issues from classical Greece and Rome to the present.
Abstract: In contrast to the period when the Journal of Religious Ethics began publishing, the study of religion in relation to war and connected issues has prospered in recent years. This article examines three collections of essays providing comparative perspectives on these topics, two recently authored studies of Buddhism and Islam in relation to war, and a compendious collection of texts on Western moral tradition concerning war, peace, and related issues from classical Greece and Rome to the present.
TL;DR: The work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's “Thomism,” I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy.
TL;DR: The authors argue that both books developed from profound dissatisfaction with the empiricist presuppositions that dominated their fields into the 1970s and that both should be associated with the revival of American pragmatism that is currently driving a reinterpretation of ethics as a social practice embedded in historically contingent discourse about agency, virtue, and social organization.
Abstract: Mary Douglas's Purity and Danger and Herbert Fingarette's Confucius: The Secular as Sacred have had a continuous impact on cultural anthropology and the study of ancient Chinese thought, respectively, but neither has typically been read as a contribution to comparative religious ethics. This paper argues that both books developed from profound dissatisfaction with the empiricist presuppositions that dominated their fields into the 1970s and that both should be associated with the revival of American pragmatism that is currently driving a reinterpretation of ethics as a social practice embedded in historically contingent discourse about agency, virtue, and social organization. This pragmatic turn results in a shift of comparative ethics away from issues of methods and metaethics in the direction of history and fieldwork as the preconditions for useful comparison.
TL;DR: The recent work of students of Stanley Hauerwas on matters related to political theology is reviewed in this paper, where they stress a kind of political embodiment of Christ in the practices of particular communities, beginning with the Christian Church, but including also medicine, economy, and family.
Abstract: In this review essay, I consider the recent work of students of Stanley Hauerwas on matters related to political theology. Eight books (and scattered articles) are treated in two groups: one more theoretical, the other more practically oriented. Of special interest is whether and how Jeffrey Stout's concerns about Hauerwas's negative political “influence” apply. I suggest that while sometimes narratives of decline dominate overmuch, these works rightly and creatively seek to expand our political imagination beyond the narrowness of modern nation-state politics and its attending capitalist assumptions. Moreover, in all cases, Hauerwas's students stress a kind of political embodiment of Christ in the practices of particular communities, beginning with the Christian Church, but including also medicine, economy, and family. Spread out, this embodiment combats a pervasive modern Gnosticism, trains us in patience and hope, and gives room for a more truthful description of Church and world.
TL;DR: The authors argue that realist versions of pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion, using William James's pragmatic approach as a primary example.
Abstract: Pragmatism is often thought to be incompatible with realism, the view that there are knowable mind-independent facts, objects, or properties. In this article, I show that there are, in fact, realist versions of pragmatism and argue that a realist pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion. Using William James's pragmatism as my primary example, I show (1) that James defended realist and pluralist views in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, and (2) that these views not only cohere with his pragmatism but indeed are basic to it. After arguing that James's pragmatism provides a credible and useful approach to a number of basic philosophical and religious issues, I conclude by reflecting on some ways in which we can apply and potentially improve James's views in the study of religion.
TL;DR: In this paper, a Neo-Confucian answer to the question, "Why should I be moral?" is presented, and the authors argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition.
Abstract: In this article, I present a neo-Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo-Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self-interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self-interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self-interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self-interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa.
TL;DR: The authors argues that a totally egalitarian moral universe, encompassing all human relations, becomes an infinite, totalizing universe, which can easily become the ideological justification (ratio essendi) of a totalitarian regime.
Abstract: Jewish ethics like Judaism itself has often been charged with being “particularistic,” and in modernity it has been unfavorably compared with the universality of secular ethics. This charge has become acute philosophically when the comparison is made with the ethics of Kant. However, at this level, much of the ethical rejection of Jewish particularism, especially its being beholden to a God who is above the universe to whom this God prescribes moral norms and judges according to them, is also a rejection of Christian (or any other monotheistic) ethics, no matter how otherwise universal. Yet this essay argues that Jewish ethics that prescribes norms for all humans, and that is knowable by all humans, actually constitutes a wider moral universe than does Kantian ethics, because it can include non-rational human objects and even non-human objects altogether. This essay also argues that a totally egalitarian moral universe, encompassing all human relations, becomes an infinite, totalizing universe, which can easily become the ideological justification (ratio essendi) of a totalitarian regime.
TL;DR: The duty to love one's neighbor as oneself is at the core of Kierkegaard's Works of Love as mentioned in this paper, and it is the only valid form of true love that can be expressed.
Abstract: The duty to love one's neighbor as oneself is at the core of Kierkegaard's Works of Love. In this book, Kierkegaard unfolds the meaning of neighborly love and claims that it is the only valid form of true love. He contrasts between neighborly love and preferential love (which includes romantic love and friendship) and criticizes the latter for being nothing but a form of selfishness. However, in some contexts, Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge the significance of preferential love relationships, and does not disallow them. Therefore, his understanding of preferential love
TL;DR: A dialogical approach to understanding Islamic ethics rejects objectivist methods in favor of a conversational model in which participants accept each other as rational moral agents as mentioned in this paper, which enables the coexistence of multiple religious ethical visions while insisting upon the need to protect and nurture essential human abilities.
Abstract: A dialogical approach to understanding Islamic ethics rejects objectivist methods in favor of a conversational model in which participants accept each other as rational moral agents. Hans-Georg Gadamer asserts the importance of agreement upon a subject matter through conversation as a means to gaining insight into other persons and cultures, and Jurgen Habermas stresses the importance of fairness in dialogue. Using human rights as a subject matter for engaging in dialogue with Islamic scholars, Muslim perspectives on issues such as democracy, toleration, and freedom of conscience emerge. A capabilities approach to human rights, such as that developed by Martha Nussbaum, enables the coexistence of multiple religious ethical visions while insisting upon the need to protect and nurture essential human abilities.
TL;DR: A framework for pastoral intervention based on aspects of the Islamic tradition is developed and elaborate this framework by addressing clinical contexts and cases.
Abstract: The neglect of psycho-spiritual needs of patients as they traverse the modern healthcare system has been a featured theme in medical literature over the past decade. This literature, which often highlights in-patient palliative care, as well as acute and critical care settings, influences practice guidelines and protocols of doctors and nurses. In this essay, I review some of the pertinent issues raised in the literature and examine the validity of placing an ethical perspective on this issue. I also compare Islamic theocentric perspectives with secular, non-theistic perspectives on restoring psycho-spiritual care for patients. I then develop a framework for pastoral intervention based on aspects of the Islamic tradition and elaborate this framework by addressing clinical contexts and cases. The essay is an exposition based upon a review of the modern medical literature, an analysis of some of the traditional Islamic written sources, and the observations of the investigator, a practicing physician and an American Muslim.
TL;DR: The body politics of Hauerwas's body politics must become a politics of bodies as mentioned in this paper, and the body politics in the Church must be a theopolitical alternative to the nation-state's politics of violence.
Abstract: Today dominative power operates apart from, and exterior to, those state governmentalities that the “body politics” of Stanley Hauerwas disavows as “constantinian” entanglements such as military service, governmental office, and conspicuous expressions of civil religion. This is especially true with respect to those biopolitical modalities David Theo Goldberg names as “racelessness,” by which material inequalities are racially correlated, thereby allowing whiteness to mediate life and ration death. If, as Hauerwas contends, radical ecclesiology is indeed a theopolitical alternative to the nation–state's politics of violence, then it must prove itself resistant to such racialized violence. However, inasmuch as the (largely) uncontested fact of ecclesial segregation recapitulates these broader stratifications and exclusions, the church functions as a passive civil religion and itself participates in the politics of “nonviolent violence.” Thus, Hauerwas must do something that he has been reluctant to do. He must talk about race and racism more directly, specifying how his ecclesiological theopolitics resists such forms of violence; more importantly, he must demonstrate how actual ecclesial congregations instantiate such resistance. In short, to be truly nonviolent, Hauerwas's body politics must become a politics of bodies.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an argument for how Christian ethics may handle the moral problems of spying and do so by looking at the morally troubling tactics used by spies through the eyes of those who played an important role in shaping Christian theology and philosophy and have become normative in Christian moral thinking on the use of force.
Abstract: Spies, like soldiers, do a job and employ tactics that need justifying. I offer an argument for how Christian ethics may handle the moral problems of spying and do so by looking at the morally troubling tactics used by spies through the eyes of those who played an important role in shaping Christian theology and philosophy and have become normative in Christian moral thinking on the use of force. I argue that spying may be justifiable when we conceive the profession as a kind of use of force that is governed by the just war criteria. Spying is a particular kind of use of force that takes its moral character from those who authorize it, with what justification, to what ends, and with what methods. Particular attention is given to the tactics of disregarding the rules of war, the telling and living of lies, running covert operations, and assassinating military and political leaders.
TL;DR: In the absence of a clear religious text on the subject, scholars seem inclined to legitimize sex selection, and in so doing they appear strongly influenced by social attitudes as mentioned in this paper, which exemplifies a key aspect of Muslim ethical discourse.
Abstract: Selecting the sex of a fetus has been a desire of parents in many different cultures. Modern Muslim religious scholars have identified advantages and disadvantages of this practice, permitting it in certain cases while forbidding it in others. In general, they do not appear to desire that selection of sex become a common practice, yet they are willing to allow it for personal reasons. This case-by-case approach exemplifies a key aspect of Muslim ethical discourse. After an overview of justifications for fetal sex selection in different cultures, I turn to a discussion of authoritative Islamic sources. I then analyze the reasoning of several modern authorities who deal with the issue. In the absence of a clear religious text on the subject, scholars seem inclined to legitimize sex selection, and in so doing they appear strongly influenced by social attitudes.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors connect their parallel approach to ongoing obstacles and solutions within the prolific development of comparative religious ethics, especially its urgent pursuit of common moral grounds sufficient to support peaceful coexistence and living.
Abstract: After the publication of my book and various articles about comparative religious ethics, obstacles in the field's further development seemed to mount as swiftly as practical issues seemed to trumpet the need for global ethics more loudly. Driven by impatience, I wondered if I were fiddling in unending discussion while the planet burned. As others persevered and evolved productively in addressing developmental issues in the field directly, I began to work through the lens of a less direct, but complementary, perspective: ideologies and critical thought. The following essay seeks to connect my parallel approach to ongoing obstacles and solutions within the prolific development of comparative religious ethics, especially its urgent pursuit of common moral grounds sufficient to support peaceful coexistence and living.
TL;DR: Forgiving enemies in Ireland as mentioned in this paper is a typically lucid, provocative, and timely contribution to debates on the "Troubles" and their legacies, and it can vouch for both the continuing sensitivity and the emotion that exists on many of the questions that he raises.
Abstract: Nigel Biggar's analysis of forgiving enemies in Ireland is a typically lucid, provocative, and timely contribution to debates on the "Troubles" and their legacies. Like Biggar, I am a theologian from England, and having lived and worked in Northern Ireland for the last seven years on a Masters program in Reconciliation Studies, I can vouch for both the continuing sensitivity and the emotion that exists on many of the questions that he raises.4 Northern Ireland is a society in which religious beliefs and thinking shape social values and political behavior much more obviously than in other more secular western European societies. Political issues are often influenced by religious concerns in direct and sometimes dramatic ways. For example, an attempt to restore the devolved assembly foundered in December 2004 in part because the Rev. Ian Paisley, who was then the leader of both the Democratic Unionist Party and the Free Presbyterian Church, demanded a public show of repentance through "sackcloth and ashes" from his political opponents in Sinn Fein, before he was willing to enter a working relationship with them. By the time that the St. Andrews agreement of November 2006 finally brokered a new working relationship, which would permit Paisley to serve as First Minister alongside Martin McGuinees of Sinn Fein as Deputy First Minister, Paisley had become more cautious in his public calls for signs of repentance by his former enemies. After briefly raising the subject of repentance one more time, he allowed it to drop and did not push it further. However, nobody can ignore that even if Paisley was finally willing to accept that there can be a form of political reconciliation without public repentance, there are many of his supporters in the Protestant community who cannot or will not accept this, and many of them base their opposition on what they see as Christian convictions and biblical teaching on the relationships between repentance and forgiveness. In this brief response to "Forgiving Enemies in Ireland," I first wish to affirm the value for debates here in Northern Ireland of the conceptual distinction that Biggar offers on the two "moments of
TL;DR: The works of Augustine may offer new ways of thinking through the categories of this debate as mentioned in this paper, and their early treatments of war locate the saint as detached sage doing only good, and immune from evil suffered.
Abstract: Many contemporary scholars debate whether war should be conceived as a relative evil or a morally neutral act. The works of Augustine may offer new ways of thinking through the categories of this debate. In an early period, Augustine develops the distinction between evil done and evil suffered. Augustine's early treatments of war locate the saint as detached sage doing only good, and immune from evil suffered. In a middle period, he develops a richer picture of the evil suffered on the occasion of the loss of historical goods but fails to develop the implications of this picture as concerns war. Finally, without abandoning emphasis on the avoidance of doing evil, Augustine comes to highlight how evil suffered in war prevents us from speaking simply of good wars. Augustine's ability to hold together senses of evil and their moral significance provides a useful avenue for new thought on this issue.
TL;DR: In this paper, Biggar's essay bears all the hallmarks of the morally rich and elegantly argued proposals that invariably edify readers of his work: detailed recommendations; a political ethic; and a fundamental moral framework.
Abstract: We can distinguish three strands in Nigel Biggar's essay: (1) detailed recommendations; (2) a political ethic; and (3) a fundamental moral framework. His essay moves from the last to the first, but I both reverse the order in the following comments and concentrate attention on the last. Although the essay is a coherent whole, it is possible to accept much in (1) and (2) while worrying about (3). A response like the following is most helpful if it focuses on questions or disagreement rather than on the many points of agreement, but if this were a review rather than response, it would give fuller reason for why the first and last word is one of appreciation. Nigel Biggar's essay bears all the hallmarks of the morally rich and elegantly argued proposals that invariably edify readers of his work. I want to say a little about the detailed recommendations. One additional factor to take into account in judging the effectiveness of a Truth Commission is the small geographical area of Northern Ireland, something that also bore on the wisdom (leaving aside the moral propriety) of the early release of prisoners who had engaged in partisan acts of violence. In the streets of Belfast, the capital city, the only sizable city in Northern Ireland and smaller than the largest cities in England and Scotland, you can bump into someone convicted of the murder of a family member. Northern Ireland has two universities, though one of them has more than one campus. An ex-policeman, a member of the old Royal Ulster Constabulary, had to be removed from an examination room in one of the universities, because it was found that he was in close proximity to a murderer whom he had helped put away, himself sitting a university examination. Within the six counties that make up Northern Ireland, whoever tells the truth in public can never be far away from you, if all are residing in the North. It is a factor that counts against a Truth Commission inspired by the practice in South Africa, although it is only one factor in the reckoning. I will not comment on public memorials. One reason for this is that the discussion in Biggar's paper includes the phrase "keeping forgiving, compassionate faith, if you like, with naive, misguided, ill-fated