Showing papers in "Kant-studien in 2018"

Kant-Bibliographie 2016

Abstract: ABG Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte (Hamburg) AdPh Archives de Philosophie (Paris) AGPh Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin/New York) BrJHPh British Journal for the History of Philosophy (London) CTK Con-Textos Kantianos (Madrid) [online] DZPh Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (Berlin/New York) EstKant Estudos Kantianos (Marília, SP) [online] EuJPh European Journal of Philosophy (London) JPh The Journal of Philosophy (London) JHPh Journal of the History of Philosophy (Baltimore) KRev Kantian Review (Cardiff) KS Kant-Studien (Berlin/New York) KSb Kantovskij Sbornik (Kaliningrad) REK Revista de Estudios Kantianos (Madrid) RevMet The Review of Metaphysics (Chicago) RivFil Rivista di Filosofia (Bologna) RF Revista de filosofie (Bucureşti) RStF Rivista di Storia della Filosofia (Milano) SJPh Southern Journal of Philosophy (Memphis, TN) StPhK Studia philosophica kantiana (Prešov) StKa Studi Kantiani (Pisa) StudKant Studia Kantiana (Santa Maria, RS, Bras.) [online] TF Tijdschrift voor Filosofie (Leuven) ThPh Theologie und Philosophie (Freiburg u. a.) ZphF Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (Frankfurt a.M.) ZDPhE Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik (Hannover)

Natural Beauty, Fine Art and the Relation between Them

Abstract: Abstract: We defend three principal claims concerning natural beauty, artistic beauty and the relation between them. 1) Aesthetic pleasure in nature is typically and paradigmatically occasioned by the spatial form of natural kinds. 2) Breaking with a long-standing tradition, Kant claims that the presentation of such beautiful natural forms is not the end of the representational visual arts. Most art presents aesthetically the idea of humanity in our person. This is Kant’s Copernican revolution in the philosophy of fine art. 3) Although the representation of nature is not a sufficient condition of beauty in the representational visual arts, it is nonetheless a necessary condition of it.

A Tale of Two Conflicts: On Pauline Kleingeld’s New Reading of the Formula of Universal Law

Abstract: Abstract Pauline Kleingeld’s “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, published in this journal in 2017, presents a powerful challenge to what has become the standard (‘practical’) reconstruction of the categorical imperative. In this response to Kleingeld, I argue that she is right to emphasise the ‘simultaneity requirement’ - that we must be able to will a proposed maxim and ‘simulataneously’, ‘also’ or ‘at the same time’ the maxim in its universalised form - but I deny that this removes the categorical imperative test from the world of universalisation because the agent must be understood as part of that world. There are two distinct types of conflict: a contradiction that results from non-universalisability and Kleingeld’s ‘volitional’ conflict, located within the will of the immoral agent. The standard ‘practical’ reconstruction of the categorical imperative remains largely intact.

The Ideal Character of the General Will and Popular Sovereignty in Kant

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I examine Kant’s reception of and solution to the problem of the unity of the political will. I propose that Kant distances himself from the modern paradigmatic foundations of sovereignty principally with his theses of the ideality of the general will (section II) and of the apriority of the justification of popular sovereignty (section III). My interpretative hypothesis is that Kant solves the problem by grounding sovereignty in a conceptual element which is new in the history of political philosophy, i. e. the a priori unified omnilateral will. In section IV, I explain why my reading of the ideality of the general will can respond to seemingly plausible objections arising from Kant’s own texts and how it works in the face of concrete political states of affairs.

Descartes’s Legacy in Kant’s Notions of Physical Influx and Space-Filling: True Estimation and Physical Monadology

Abstract: Abstract: This paper examines Kant’s pre-Critical distinction between the capacity of an immaterial simple substance to occupy space by having a spatial location and the sphere of its activity, in contrast to the power of material compound bodies to fill space by their extension and solidity. I highlight some important features of Descartes’ metaphysical and physical models of the contingent locality of simple unextended substances and challenge the recently articulated view that Henry More’s model of extended but metaphysically indivisible spirits is an archetype for, or at least a precursor to, Kant’s dynamic monads. I claim that, contra More and the Newtonians, Kant is indebted to Descartes for this idea of how simple substances take up space and can be extended in an ‘analogous’ way by means of the effects of their activity.

Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies - Kant’s Refutation of Pure Rational Psychology

Abstract: Abstract: According to Kant, the arguments of rational psychology are formal fallacies that he calls transcendental paralogisms. It remains heavily debated whether there actually is any formal error in the inferences Kant presents: according to Grier and Allison, they are deductively invalid syllogisms, whereas Bennett, Ameriks, and Van Cleve deny that they are formal fallacies. I advance an interpretation that reconciles these extremes: transcendental paralogisms are sound in general logic but constitute formal fallacies in transcendental logic. By formalising the paralogistic inference, I will pinpoint the error as an illegitimate existential presupposition. Since - unlike transcendental logic - general logic abstracts from all objects, this error can only be detected in transcendental logic.

Der Grund der Verbindlichkeit. Mendelssohn und Kant über Evidenz in der Moralphilosophie (1762/64)

Abstract: Abstract: The paper discusses the concepts of obligation and moral evidence in Mendelssohn’s and Kant’s prize essays. I argue that Mendelssohn departs in significant ways from Christian Wolff’s position, and that Kant intends to overcome Wolffian philosophy with Newtonian methodology while still owing a lot to Wolff and to the project of an ethics within the limits of metaphysics. Although quite akin to Francis Hutcheson’s philosophy, it becomes clear that Kant intended to lay the foundation of an innovative concept of obligation, which shares some similarities with Christian August Crusius’s interpretation of it.

The Metaphysical Deduction and the Shadow of Humean Skepticism

Abstract: Abstract I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD does not establish the objective validity of the categories, it cannot establish their a priori origin either. The MD is nevertheless an indispensable part of Kant’s project because it lays the argumentative groundwork for the proof structure of the TD and because it provides the systematic plan for the future metaphysics of experience.

Was ist Aufklärung? Beobachtungen zur Kantischen Antwort

Abstract: Abstract: Kant’s essay on enlightenment (1784) is a concealed appeal to prepare the republican order of the civil state under the remaining protection of the king. And: The problem of women and coloured people to become active citizens.

Pleasure and Purpose in Kant’s Theory of Taste

Abstract: Abstract: In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors of these principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty.

Nachruf auf Hariolf Oberer (1933-2017): von Gerhard Seel (Bern)

Abstract: Ein Nachruf ist ein zwiespältiger Text, der sich der Absicht des Schreibenden ver­ weigert. Eigentlich würde man ihn gerne an den Weggegangenen richten, diesem sagen, wie viel er einem bedeutet, ihm danken, ihn vielleicht auch um Verzeihung bitten. Aber das kann dieser nun nicht mehr hören. Nachrufe kommen zu spät. So sieht sich der Schreibende gezwungen, – will er nicht schweigen – andere Adres­ saten zu suchen. Er wendet sich an die, die den Verstorbenen gekannt haben, sowie möglicherweise an einige, die zum ersten Mal von ihm hören. Es gibt ja Dinge, die sie über ihn wissen sollten und die man selber deshalb am besten weiß, weil man mit ihm ein Stück des Weges gegangen ist. Doch damit droht der persönlichste und privateste aller Texte zu einem sachlichen und öffentlichen zu werden. So geht es mir mit Hariolf Oberer. Ich verdanke ihm viel. Es war er – nicht Hans Wagner –, der mich zur Philosophie gebracht und mir als erster das Phi­ losophieren beigebracht hat. Er hat mir auch gezeigt, wie man Bilder betrachtet und wie man Musik hört. Als ich ihn kennenlernte, war er – nach seiner Promo­ tion in Würzburg – Assistent von Hans Wagner in Bonn. Damals war die Philo­ sophie in Deutschland durch Nicolai Hartmann und Martin Heidegger geprägt. Hans Wagner war einer der wenigen, die – zwischen den beiden und gegen sie – die Tradition des Neukantianismus und Husserls zu Gehör brachten. Aber man konnte angesichts Hartmanns und Heideggers den Neukantianismus nicht einfach fortsetzen. Beide hatten den an der Geltungsproblematik orientierten Kri­ tizismus überwinden und – der eine durch Ontologie, der andere durch Existen­ tialismus – ersetzen wollen. Damit war die Frage nach der Rolle des Menschen, dessen, was man damals die ‚konkrete Subjektivität‘ nannte, gestellt. Wie hat man sich das Verhältnis des Menschen zu den Geltungsansprüchen der Erkennt­ nis, der Moral und der Ästhetik zu denken? Diese Frage bestimmte das Philosophieren Hariolf Oberers in dieser Zeit. Er schrieb damals – im Ausgang von Manfred Brelages Habilitationsschrift ‚Trans­ zendentalphilosophie und konkrete Subjektivität‘ und als eine Art Bericht über diese – eine der Entwicklung der Philosophie in Deutschland – vom Neu kan­ tia nis mus bis zu Heidegger – gewidmete Studie. Wie der Titel ‚Transzendental­ sphäre und konkrete Subjektivität‘ (ZPhF 23, 1969) schon deutlich macht, geht

The Spinozan-Wolffian Philosophy? Mendelssohn’s Philosophical Dialogues of 1755

Abstract: Abstract: Mendelssohn’s Philosophische Gespräche (Philosophical Dialogues), first published in 1755, represents his first philosophical work in German and rather surprisingly for a debut, in the first two dialogues of that work Mendelssohn attempts nothing less than a defense of the legacy of the most controversial philosopher of his day, Benedict de Spinoza. In this paper, I attempt to enlarge the context, and if possible to raise the stakes, of Mendelssohn’s discussion in order to bring out what I take to be a much more ambitious project on Mendelssohn’s part, namely, not only the rehabilitation of a fellow Jewish thinker but also the rehabilitation of metaphysics as such by means of a thorough accounting of the Spinozan elements in the Wolffian philosophy. As I will show, framing the project of the Gespräche too narrowly is responsible for obscuring much of what I take to be most original and insightful in Mendelssohn’s use and interpretation of Wolff’s thought, as well as his ultimate purpose in resolving what he regarded as an ongoing crisis in metaphysics that is responsible to no small extent for its widespread neglect.

On Kant’s Derivation of the Categories

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I put forth a novel interpretation of how the third categories under each heading in the table of categories (totality, limitation, community, and necessity) are derived. Drawing on a passage from the first Critique and a letter to Schultz, I argue that in order to derive these categories, a special act of the understanding is required. I propose that we interpret this special act as consisting of an application of the third logical function under the corresponding heading that unites the combination of the first and second categories (under that same heading) so as to produce the third.

Gottlob Ernst Schulzes skeptizistische Kant-Kritik in ihrer Relevanz für Arthur Schopenhauers Systemkonstitution

Abstract: Abstract: In 1792, Gottlob E. Schulze published one of the most important treatises in the era of the early critical reception of Kant’s transcendental philosophy: the skeptical treatise Aenesidemus. One of Schulze’s later students was the young Arthur Schopenhauer, whose examination of Kant’s philosophy was significantly influenced by Schulze. In this paper, it shall be established that this influence isn’t limited solely to the details of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian thinking, but rather extends to the systematic unfolding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a whole. In this respect, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation can be understood as a direct, positive answer to the questions left open by Schulze’s debate on the internal problems of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Über drei Deduktionen in Kants Moralphilosophie - und über eine vierte, die man dort vergeblich sucht. Zur Rehabilitierung von Grundlegung III

Abstract: Abstract: Since H. J. Paton’s famous commentary from 1947, Kant’s interpreters have considered a ‘deduction of the categorical imperative’ a challenge. This is quite puzzling since Kant himself never talks about such a deduction - and the famous ‘deduction’ he does mention in Groundwork III.4 is, as a close reading shows, not at all the deduction of a law but the deduction of a concept, of the idea of a pure lawgiving will: Only the reality of this idea can explain the possibility of - prima facie impossible - categorical imperatives and thus of morality as autonomy. The presupposition of the validity of the moral law, however, was already a cornerstone of Kant’s critical metaphysics in 1781: Moral theology (which replaces all speculative proofs of immortality and of God’s existence) depends on the moral law’s being an undisputed datum without any need for philosophical justification (‘deduction’). While in the Groundwork (1785) Kant tried to show the practical reality of the idea of a pure will with the help of a speculative deduction of freedom (which a reviewer described as being ‘uncritical’ in May 1786), in the second Critique (1787/88) the reality of that very idea, and with it the idea of freedom, depends (as did immortality and God’s existence in 1781) on the aforementioned practical datum, which, from that point on, Kant called a “Factum der reinen Vernunft” [fact of pure reason].

Truth, Knowledge, and “the Pretensions of Idealism”: A Critical Commentary on the First Part of Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours

Abstract: Abstract: Whereas research on Moses Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours has largely focused on the proofs for the existence of God and the elaboration of a purified pantheism in the Second Part of the text, scholars have paid far less attention to the First Part where Mendelssohn details his mature epistemology and conceptions of truth. In an attempt to contribute to remedying this situation, the present article critically examines his account, in the First Part, of different types of truth, different types of knowledge, and the case against idealism. The examination stresses potential but overlooked strengths of his account (e. g., a conception of immediate knowledge that is both far broader than the sensory field and distinctive for having change as its object), questions of ambiguity if not inconsistency in his concepts of existence and substance, and the potential import of these questions for the role he assigns to common sense.

Kant und der praktische Syllogismus. Zu Rüdiger Bittners Einwänden gegen Kants 'Theorie' des Handelns nach Grundsätzen.

Abstract: According to Bittner, Kant has established a theory of action that is untenable because it attempts to explain action on the basis of a theory of practical syllogisms. This article defends Kant’s view (developed in GMS II, AA 04: 412.26–30) by explaining the meaning in which actions can be ‘deduced’ from practical laws or from maxims.

Chemical Dissolution and Kant’s Critical Theory of Nature

Abstract: Abstract Kant conceives of chemical dissolutions as involving the infinite division and subsequent blending of solvent and solute. In the resulting continuous solution, every subvolume contains a uniform proportion of each reactant. Erich Adickes argues that this account stands in tension with other aspects of Kant’s Critical philosophy and his views on infinity. I argue that although careful analysis of Kant’s conception of dissolution addresses Adickes’ objections, the infinite division inherent to the process is beyond our human cognition, for Kant. Nevertheless, such infinite division may be considered as an idea of reason to make comprehensible chemical reactions, revealing reason to play a pivotal role in the foundations of chemistry.

Kant und der praktische Syllogismus

Abstract: Abstract According to Bittner, Kant has established a theory of action that is untenable because it attempts to explain action on the basis of a theory of practical syllogisms. This article defends Kant’s view (developed in GMS II, AA 04: 412.26-30) by explaining the meaning in which actions can be ‘deduced’ from practical laws or from maxims.

Arthur Liebert im Exil

Abstract: Abstract Arthur Liebert was the managing director of the Kant Society and co-editor of Kant-Studien for over 20 years, until 1933. Despite his lifetime of achievement and the challenges he faced as an emigrant, his story remains all but forgotten today. Using archival sources, this essay reconstructs the biographical details of his emigration, focusing on his final years from 1933 to 1946.

Des Herrn Professors Kants Paradoxon des Comoedianten

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this study is to show the importance of theatre and theatrical theory in Kant’s philosophical thought by reconstructing his relationship to the dramatic arts and how they shaped his thinking - that is, how he developed a theory of acting which is central to understanding not only his conception of society but also the role played by pragmatic anthropology in his critical system. Indeed, one can say that his theory of the art of acting leaves nothing to be desired in comparison with Diderot’s philosophical program as expressed in the “Paradox of the Actor”, which is considered one of the most important texts on acting in the history of aesthetics.