Journal•ISSN: 0165-0157
Linguistics and Philosophy
Springer Science+Business Media
About: Linguistics and Philosophy is an academic journal published by Springer Science+Business Media. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Philosophy of language & Semantics. It has an ISSN identifier of 0165-0157. Over the lifetime, 875 publications have been published receiving 54521 citations. The journal is also known as: L & P.
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TL;DR: Most of this work has been directed toward cardinality quantifiers and topological quantifiers which are not particularly relevant to natural language, but even so, it has forced logicians to rethink the traditional theory of quantification as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In 1957, the Polish logician Andrej Mostowski pointed out that there are many mathematically interesting quantifiers that are not definable in terms of the first-order ∀, ∃ and initiated study of so-called generalized quantifiers (cf. Mostowski, 1957). Since then logicians have discovered and studied a large number of generalized quantifiers. At last count there were well over 200 research papers in this area. Most of this work has been directed toward cardinality quantifiers (e.g. Keisler, 1969) and topological quantifiers (e.g. Sgro, 1977) which are not particularly relevant to natural language, but even so, it has forced logicians to rethink the traditional theory of quantification.
1,780 citations
Journal Article•
1,086 citations
TL;DR: This dissertation aims to provide a history of web exceptionalism from 1989 to 2002, a period chosen in order to explore its roots as well as specific cases up to and including the year in which descriptions of “Web 2.0” began to circulate.
948 citations
TL;DR: This article presented a novel account of the syntax and semantics of questions, making use of the framework for linguistic description developed by Richard Montague (1974), but it differs from all of its predecessors in one way or another.
Abstract: This paper presents a novel account of the syntax and semantics of questions, making use of the framework for linguistic description developed by Richard Montague (1974). Certain features of the proposal are based on work by N. Belnap (1963), L. Aqvist (1965), C. L. Baker (1968, 1970), S. Kuno and J. Robinson (1972), C. L. Hamblin (1973), E. Keenan and R. Hull (1973), J. Hintikka (1974), Lewis (1975), and D. Wunderlich (1975), but it differs from all of its predecessors in one way or another. I will start with a number of observations which provide the basis for the treatment of questions presented in the second part of the paper and conclude with a summary and a brief discussion of how the proposed description compares with recent transformational analyses.
826 citations
TL;DR: The authors investigated the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives, and showed that the difference between relative and absolute adjectives in the positive form stems from the interaction of lexical semantic properties.
Abstract: This paper investigates the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives. I begin by developing a semantic analysis of the positive form of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives, expanding on previous proposals by further motivating a semantic basis for vagueness and by precisely identifying and characterizing the division of labor between the compositional and contextual aspects of its interpretation. I then introduce a challenge to the analysis from the class of ‘absolute’ gradable adjectives: adjectives that are demonstrably gradable, but which have positive forms that relate objects to maximal or minimal degrees, and do not give rise to vagueness. I argue that the truth conditional difference between relative and absolute adjectives in the positive form stems from the interaction of lexical semantic properties of gradable adjectives—the structure of the scales they use—and a general constraint on interpretive economy that requires truth conditions to be computed on the basis of conventional meaning to the extent possible, allowing for context dependent truth conditions only as a last resort.
767 citations