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Showing papers in "Midwest Studies in Philosophy in 1990"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an alternative account that those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal (roughly, their walking alongside each other), and explore the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes's.
Abstract: The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal (roughly, their walking alongside each other). The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis that social groups are plural subjects, and the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes's, are briefly explored.

341 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

95 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

24 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, happiness is achieved by prudence: prudence is found in right actions: a right action is one that, once pedormed, has a probable justification.
Abstract: Happiness is achieved by prudence: prudence is found in right actions: a right action is one that, once pedormed, has a probable justification. - Arcesilaus

19 citations








Journal ArticleDOI
Hilary Putnam1

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use the social contract argument to explain how a state's creation and maintenance is the result of each subject's contractual consent to it, which is a wildly inaccurate explanation of virtually every state's origin and continued existence.
Abstract: How do governments originate? How are they maintained? These are two causal questions about how states originate and persist through time that have always been of interest to anthropologists and historians. To answer them, however, one also needs to know the answer to a conceptual question “What is a state?” This chapter attempts to answer all three questions by using ideas drawn from the social contract tradition. Together the answers constitute what I will call an explanation of the state. It may seem fantastic to some that the social contract argument could provide plausible answers to the two causal questions. Doesn't the contract argument make the state's creation and maintenance the result of each subject's contractual consent to it? And isn't this a wildly inaccurate explanation of virtually every state's origin and continued existence? As Hume wryly observes: [W]ere you to ask the far greatest part of the nation, whether they had ever consented to the authority of their rulers, or promis'd to obey them, they wou'd be inclin'd to think very strangely of you, and wou'd certainly reply, that the affair depended not on their consent but that they were born to such obedience. In response to such ridicule, supporters of the contractarian methodology have tended to back away from claiming that their contract talk has any explanatory import.