Showing papers in "Philosophy of the Social Sciences in 2002"
TL;DR: The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification in this article, where it is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticis...
Abstract: The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticis...
212 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the author draws on arguments from contemporary philosophy of mind to provide an argument for sociological collectivism, and this argument for nonreductive individualism accepts that only individuals exist but rejects methodological individualism.
Abstract: The author draws on arguments from contemporary philosophy of mind to provide an argument for sociological collectivism. This argument for nonreductive individualism accepts that only individuals exist but rejects methodological individualism. In Part I, the author presents the argument for nonreductive individualism by working through the implications of supervenience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in some detail. In Part II, he extends the argument to provide a defense for social causal laws, and this account of social causation does not require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of individuals.
123 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents and argue that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups.
Abstract: In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends.
101 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a conception of national reconciliation based on the building or rebuilding of trust between parties alienated by conflict, but it is by no means obvious what reconciliation between the parties involved in the conflict is about.
Abstract: The authors propose a conception of national reconciliation based on the building or rebuilding of trust between parties alienated by conflict It is by no means obvious what reconciliation between
71 citations
TL;DR: The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space as discussed by the authors, and thus it was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding.
Abstract: The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. —Immanuel Kant
21 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors surveyed and evaluated the consequences of a decline in philosophy's normative mission, which roughly corresponds to the increasing pursuit of philosophy in isolation from public life and especially other forms of inquiry, including ultimately its own history.
Abstract: In the twentieth century, philosophy came to be dominated by the English-speaking world, first Britain and then the United States. Accompanying this development was an unprecedented professionalization and specialization of the discipline, the consequences of which are surveyed and evaluated in this article. The most general result has been a decline in philosophy's normative mission, which roughly corresponds to the increasing pursuit of philosophy in isolation from public life and especially other forms of inquiry, including ultimately its own history. This is how the author explains the increasing tendency, over the past quarter-century, for philosophy to embrace the role of underlaborer for the special sciences. Indicative of this attitude is the longterm popularity of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which argues that fields reach maturity when they forget their past and focus on highly specialized problems. In conclusion, the author recalls the history of philosophy that, following Kuhn's advice, has caused us to forget, namely, the fate of Neo-Kantianism in the early twentieth century.
18 citations
TL;DR: The production skepticism as mentioned in this paper is a form of skepticism that is concerned to deny that we need to appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining the production of art, and it does not coincide with the consumption skepticism that argues that aesthetic value judgments about art really reflect social status rather than being a response to qualities of the works.
Abstract: Aesthetic theories of art refuse to go away. In spite of decades of criticism and derision, a minority of thinkers stubbornly persist in maintaining that we need a general theory of art that makes essential appeal to beauty, elegance, daintiness, and other aesthetic properties. However, those who approach the theory of art from a sociological point of view tend to be skeptical about any account of art that appeals to aesthetic properties in a fundamental way. This skepticism takes two overlapping forms, only one of which I will pursue here. The form of skepticism I am interested in is concerned to deny that we need to appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining the production of art. Let us call this production skepticism. This form of skepticism does not coincide with skepticism about the appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining our experiences and judgments about art. Let us call that consumption skepticism. Examples of consumption skeptics are Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, who think that aesthetic value judgments about art really reflect social status rather than being a response to qualities of the works. In my view, the reasons, such as they are, that Bourdieu and Eagleton put forward in favor of
16 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that Sperberber and Wilson do not firmly distinguish between infra-individualism and sub-intentionality, and that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks.
Abstract: Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson’s theory. Actually, the authors do not explicitly support RCT, and Sperber has even strongly criticized methodological individualism, which most of the time underlies RCT, in favor of infra-individualism. A key point of the argument presented here is to show that Sperber and Wilson do not firmly distinguish between infra-individualism and subintentionality. Only subintentionality is needed.
15 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that although there are crucial gaps in Popper's ontology, it can be augmented to give situational analysis the potential to reach beyond pure logic and rationality and to bring social theory closer to grasping the real world of human action.
Abstract: Popper's version of situational analysis, with its focus on the logic of situations and the rationality principle, fails to provide cogent explanations of the human decisions and actions underpinning social phenomena. It so fails because where he demanded objectivism and formalism in the social sciences, his substantive arguments lost contact with the psychological and subjectivist realities of the human realm. But Popper also devised some key elements of a social ontology. It is argued that although there are crucial gaps in his ontology, it can be augmented to give situational analysis the potential to reach beyond pure logic and rationality and to bring social theory closer to grasping the real world of human action.
15 citations
TL;DR: Veritism defends the universality of correspondence (semantic) truth as well as the universal centrality of correspondence semantic truth to epistemology as mentioned in this paper, and it offers compelling a posteriori grounds for denying what Alvin Goldman calls veritism.
Abstract: Sixteenth-century Nahua philosophy understands neltiliztli (truth) and tlamitilizli (wisdom, knowledge) nonsemantically in terms of a complex notion consisting of well-rootedness, alethia, authenticity, adeptness, moral righteousness, beauty, and balancedness. In so doing, it offers compelling a posteriori grounds for denying what Alvin Goldman calls veritism. Veritism defends the universality of correspondence (semantic) truth as well as the universal centrality of correspondence (semantic) truth to epistemology.
14 citations
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TL;DR: The histories of Kuhn are above average, as he did not conceal controversy and error as discussed by the authors. Unfortunately, he viewed dissent increasingly as verbal variance, considering general assent to him essential for his becoming a scientific leader.
Abstract: The histories of Kuhn are above average, as he did not conceal controversy and error. Regrettably, he played them down. Unfortunately, he viewed dissent increasingly as verbal variance, considering general assent to him essential for his becoming a scientific leader. He declared obligatory the endorsement of dogmas of scientific leaders, yet he declared agreement with too many contending philosophers as he had no power over them and he never discussed the question, how do leaders achieve it. Following Polanyi, he suggested that the leaders are the best, yet he himself gained power from his mentor, Harvard president James Bryant Conant. His philosophy had many gaps that he filled with commonsense ad hoc. Yet on induction he was in a minority (with Conant and with Popper) and thus contrary to most of the philosophers of science of his day. He also borrowed traditionalism from Polanyi and incommensurability from Duhem. He did not really need it; he had no theory of truth and no alternative to common inductivism, instrumentalism and Einstein’s approximationism, all of which he rejected. His critique of approximationism is his best, but it does not live up to its promise. Nonetheless, his influence was beneficial.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that although Skinner has given us no reason to accept his claim, we can make sense of it by appealing to the idea of a "Cambridge change" and suggest that as long as we are exercising the right kind of concepts, a suitably modified version of Hacking's conclusion can be retained.
Abstract: This article seeks to answer the following questions: is Quentin Skinner right to claim that actions in the past should not be described by means of concepts not available at the time those actions occurred? And is Ian Hacking right to claim that such descriptions do not merely describe but actually change the past? The author begins by arguing that it is not clear precisely what Skinner is claiming and shows how, under the pressure of criticism, his methodological strictures collapse into trivialities. The author then argues that, although Hacking has given us no reason to accept his claim, we can make sense of it by appealing to the idea of a “Cambridge change.” The author concludes by suggesting that as long as we are exercising the right kind of concepts, a suitably modified version of Hacking’s conclusion can be retained.
TL;DR: In this paper, the idea that norms (or normative principles) explain actions or regularities in actions has been criticised, and it seems that there are many ways of going wrong.
Abstract: It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normative principles) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems that there are many ways of going wrong ...
TL;DR: In this article, Lachapelle critique the notion de reductionnisme ontologique, ainsi que les concepts de causalite and explication, definis par l'auteur, d'une part, mais reconnait partager avec lui la notion du pluralisme explicatif, d´autre part.
Abstract: En reponse a un article de J. Lachapelle consacre a «l'evolution culturelle, (au) reductionnisme dans les sciences sociales, et (au) pluralisme explicatif», l'A. critique la notion de reductionnisme ontologique, ainsi que les concepts de causalite et explication, definis par l'auteur, d'une part, mais reconnait partager avec lui la these du pluralisme explicatif, d'autre part.
TL;DR: In this article, the author argues that the psychic state of subjection should not be understood as a constellation of ideas, beliefs, or other representations, but along de-essentialized Heideggerian/Aristotelian lines as a "habit" of the soul.
Abstract: This article interprets the state of “subjection,” which Foucault took to be characteristic of the modern subject of power/knowledge, as an abiding psychic disposition analogous to Heidegger’s “inauthentic self-understanding.” The author begins by arguing, against prevailing orthodoxy, that in Discipline and Punish, Foucault is already centrally concerned with the power effects of forms of psychic self-relation. He then argues that the psychic state of subjection should not be understood as a constellation of ideas, beliefs, or other “representations” but along de-essentialized Heideggerian/Aristotelian lines as a “habit” of the soul—the effect of training and technology rather than ideology.
TL;DR: The authors consider three prominent recent works in the philosophy of race: Mills's The Racial Contract, Outlaw's On Race and Philosophy, and McGary's Race and Social Justice, and argue that the conclusions at which they arrive are subject to different shortcomings.
Abstract: This review essay considers three prominent recent works in the philosophy of race: Mills’s The Racial Contract, Outlaw’s On Race and Philosophy, and McGary’s Race and Social Justice. Each of these books has played an important role in convincing social and political philosophers to take race more seriously as a category for theoretical analysis rather than simply as a subject related to certain applied moral and political problems such as affirmative action. Each of these works also wrestles with the question of whether the dominant theoretical traditions in modern Western political philosophy, and particularly liberalism, are capable of addressing the wide range of forms of social injustice that are linked to racism. The author indicates a number of differences between the books’ approaches and argues that the conclusions at which they arrive are subject to different shortcomings. The author also shows that all three books raise sharp challenges to the liberal tradition at the same time that they remain ambivalent about the risks of departing altogether from that tradition.
TL;DR: The need to reconcile secure meanings with changes in context and meanings was seen by Karl Popper, W. R. v. O. Quine, and Mario Bunge.
Abstract: Philosophers have tried to explain how science finds the truth by using new developments in logic to study scientific language and inference. R. G. Collingwood argued that only a logic of problems could take context into account. He was ignored, but the need to reconcile secure meanings with changes in context and meanings was seen by Karl Popper, W. v. O. Quine, and Mario Bunge. Jagdish Hattiangadi uses problems to reconcile the need for security with that for growth. But he mistakenly insists that all problems are mere contradictions and artificially separates rigid from flexible aspects of meanings. In order to resolve the conflict we must (1) replace the quest for rigid terms with techniques for improvement, (2) use plausible arguments to uncover confused meanings, (3) use frameworks to choose problems and to regulate meanings, and (4) employ a bootstrap approach that uses frameworks to improve meanings and refined meanings to improve frameworks.
TL;DR: The authors examines facilitated communication and other examples of suspended trials from the perspective of an economics of science and game theory, which is consistent with recent evolutionary approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences and with recent contributions to an economic understanding of science.
Abstract: Most approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences are based on completed scientific investigations. However, there are many important cases in science in which testing is incomplete. These cases are termed suspended trials and are particularly significant in biomedical and allied health fields. Initially, the authors' interest in suspended trials was piqued by a controversial method for assisting autistic children known as facilitated communication. This article examines fac litated communication and other examples of suspended trials from the perspective of an economics of science and game theory. The model is consistent with recent evolutionary approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences and with recent contributions to an economic understanding of science.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present 23 case studies of the ways in which entirely different ethnic communities form their categories about nature and culture, life and death, dwellings and building, growing things and planting things, animate and inanimate beings, and so on.
Abstract: This long book of ethnography is written with elegance and grace. It is a pleasure to read from cover to cover for the sheer wealth of readably presented information. It is unfortunately rare that ethnographical stories are presented in such a pleasurable manner. The book consists of 23 different case studies of the ways in which entirely different ethnic communities form their categories about nature and culture, life and death, dwellings and building, growing things and planting things, animate and inanimate beings, and so on. Ingold’s erudition, both of ethnographic information and of the current literature about it, is as breathtaking as the engaging prose in which he presents it all to the reader. But it is surprising that Ingold appears unacquainted with the neuroscientific and evolutionary philosophy literature that could throw much light on his presentations and interpretations. However this may be, there is an underlying theme or message; and it this message that any reviewer, no matter how engaging the ethnographic presentation, must address and assess in the light of the literature that Ingold appears to have neglected. The message is that our modern Western ways of distinguishing between nature and culture, buildings and dwellings, animate and inanimate beings, to mention just three examples, are neither as absolute as we take them to be nor all that useful and commendable because they are insensitive to man’s experienced place in the environment. They betray a rigidly rational habit of mind that comes from seeing man opposite nature and the environment rather than as an integral part of it. So-called primitive people, by contrast, are more realistic because they see themselves embedded in their environment. Instead of having a science of nature, they are capable of a “poetics of dwelling” (p. 110). In
TL;DR: The author defends the thesis that on any plausible construal of the assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory, it cannot provide a plausible basis for deviations from rationality.
Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that evolutionary game theory provides a basis for doing without rationality. The author defends the thesis that on any plausible construal of the assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory, it cannot provide a plausible basis for deviations from rationality. But on any plausible construal of rationality, evolutionary game theory cannot provide an alternative that coincides with the outcomes dictated by considerations of rationality either.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the pragmatically oriented history of science focuses on scientists' circumstantial attempts to fix beliefs without discussing the scientific importance of the beliefs in the first place, leading historians of science to engage in pointless exercises and making them mute about crucial aspects of the development of science.
Abstract: The author argues that the pragmatically oriented historiography of science that recently has been so strongly recommended has fallen into the mistake of focusing on scientists’ circumstantial attempts to fix beliefs without discussing the scientific importance of the beliefs in the first place. This mistake has led historians of science to engage in pointless exercises, made them mute about crucial aspects of the development of science, and, above all, prevented them from avoiding, in a satisfactory way, the ghost of “triumphalism.” On the other hand, so-called traditional historiography of science is not vulnerable to any of these charges.
TL;DR: Little as mentioned in this paper suggests that the philosophy of science should be conducted in close proximity to the theoretical and empirical practice of working scientists, but does not specify exactly what this close proximity entails.
Abstract: Daniel Little opens this book with some advice for philosophers of science, advice as to how they might best do philosophy of science. According to Little, the philosophy of science (including social science) “needs to be conducted in close proximity to the theoretical and empirical practice of working scientists” (p. vii). Nowhere, however, does Little specify exactly what this “close proximity” entails. It probably does not mean that philosophers of science must do their work elbow to elbow with scientists in their labs. I doubt if anyone, Little included, would sleep soundly knowing that the operators of particle accelerators had to deal with philosophers underfoot. A proper understanding of Little’s advice requires careful attention to the purpose that the philosophy of science should serve. This purpose suggests that there are right and wrong ways to attain this close proximity, ways that improve the practice of philosophy of science and ways that do not. Little’s own conception of this close proximity, as demonstrated by his own practice of the philosophy of social science, displays some serious flaws. However, to the extent that his advice may lead philosophers of social science toward the right conception, his work provides a valuable service. Science, like the philosophy of science, consists of behavior directed toward a purpose. I shall take for granted the existence of such a purpose and explore the nature of this purpose later. Experience has shown in many contexts that self-conscious, critical examination of purposive behavior can improve that behavior so that it better achieves the purpose at which it is directed. It does so by breaking down the overall task into smaller subtasks that contribute to the larger task. The subtask typically lends itself more easily to self-conscious performance and sustained practice than the larger task. If necessary, subtasks can be divided into sub-subtasks, and so forth, for the same reason. This all is very abstract, but examples abound. A basketball coach, for example, analyzes dribbling, shooting, teamwork, and so forth with an eye to how best to perform them so as to succeed at the grand task— winning the game. A“natural” player might shoot well purely by chance, but a good coach knows that improved play follows identifying and improving
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TL;DR: Motterlini as mentioned in this paper describes a lecture course of Lakatos on the philosophy of science that offers hardly any light on his philosophy not available in his published corpus, and the same can be said of his correspondence with Feyerabend that offers an interesting picture of two leading intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century.
Abstract: Motterlini’s 1999. For and against method reproduces nearly in full a lecture course of Lakatos on the philosophy of science. It offers hardly any light on his philosophy not available in his published corpus. The same can be said of his selection from his correspondence with Feyerabend that offers an interesting picture of two leading intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century. They were terribly intelligent, educated, hyperactive and aggressive. They repeatedly exchanged much-needed moral support, in repeated efforts to cheer up each other, driven by unbounded ambition. They worked hard despite pain and anguish. They reported regularly on extended periods of deep depression. Chronic depression bespeaks poor self-image. The two resented Kuhn’s having outdone them. All three sang to the gallery and won tremendous applause and came for curtain calls. Lakatos rightly appreciated his own work on mathematics; for the rest, they all knew, the worth of all their productions was limited. They worked hard, carefully deliberating about impact, hoping to narrow gaps between repute and worth.
TL;DR: Bourdieu is one of the handful of leading contemporary social theorists and arguably the most innovative social theorist of human activity in recent decades as discussed by the authors, and is familiar fare to most philosophers interested in social theory.
Abstract: Pierre Bourdieu is one of the handful of leading contemporary social theorists and arguably the most innovative social theorist of human activity in recent decades. He is familiar fare to most philosophers interested in social theory. His renown among Anglo-American philosophers, by contrast, is scant or nonexistent. Whence the ostensible aim of the recent Bourdieu installment in Blackwell’s series of Critical Readers:
TL;DR: The first biography of Karl Popper was published by as mentioned in this paper, which is the first book devoted to the study of the author's entire life span, which is more than 92 years, many of them employed in hard work.
Abstract: When I saw first the title of this book, I knew that I should read it from the beginning to the end. It will be required reading for anyone interested in Popper, at least for the foreseeable future. It is the first biography of Karl Popper. Surely it will not be the last. Hacohen writes, “Rumor has it that Professor Brian Boyd of Auckland University, New Zealand (biographer of Vladimir Nabokov), has been entrusted by the executors with the writing of Popper’s official biography” (p. 12). I have been able to confirm the rumor. Boyd is working on a Popper biography. He has done already much work, travelling around some 20 countries. However, the biography is still quite some time off. This is easy to understand if we consider that Boyd achieved fame with the 1,400-page biography of novelist Vladimir Nabokov. If Popper is going to be represented in similar vein, we have to wait. Hacohen’s book covers half of Popper’s life and has 610 pages. Boyd’s biography will cover Popper’s entire life span, which means 92 years, many of them employed in hard work: writing. The material existing in Popper’s archives comprises 463 boxes, and surely there is more material forthcoming. We can assume that Boyd’s biography cannot be written rapidly.