Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1990"
75 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the dualism of the first book of De Anima is probably best characterized as dualism, and argue that it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical substances.
Abstract: In this paper I will argue that Aristotle's position on the mind-body problem is probably best characterized as dualism. The question of whether dualism is true divides into three questions: Are there immaterial, non-physical substances? Are there non-physical mental events? Are there non-physical mental properties? Since Aristotle's position is clearer with regard to the first two issues than the third, I will confine the discussion to an examination of Aristotle's position on those questions. Section I deals with Aristotle's commitments in relation to the question about substance and section II deals with the issue in relation to events. An alternative account of Aristotle's position on the second issue is examined and rejected in section III. I will argue that, with reservations, it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical substances. On the question of mental events, I will argue that Aristotle's position is at odds with both the dualist and the physicalist views, but since in this case too it is plausible to say that Aristotle accepts the existence of non-physical events, his overall position is best classified as dualist. The evidence drawn on occurs largely in the comparatively neglected first book of De Anima. Many have thought, correctly, that Aristotle's views on the intellect commit him to some sort of dualism with regard to the rational soul, but reject this as an accurate representation of his position for other types of soul sensitive, nutritive, etc. My argument in section 1 rests on no assumptions about the soul peculiar to the intellect. Aristotle's dualism regarding the soul holds for any kind of soul, including the souls of plants. However, section II deals only with psychic events which have the soul as a subject. Digestion and other actualizations of the nutritive soul are not mental events because the proper subject of digestion, for example, is the body alone.
51 citations
TL;DR: Le lien entre Platon and la politique pythagoricienne a partir d'une analyse de la Cinquieme Lettre is discussed in this paper.
Abstract: Le lien entre Platon et la politique pythagoricienne a partir d'une analyse de la Cinquieme Lettre
33 citations
TL;DR: The distinction between Socrates and Plato which the view requires does not need to be a distinction between the historical Socrates and the historical Plato as discussed by the authors, since the distinction between an earlier and later Plato will do just as well.
Abstract: ' White 1976, p.3, emphasis added; see also Grote 1875, pp. 291-296, Lutoslawski 1897, pp. 207-210, Robinson 1953, p. 19, Guthrie 1975, p. 241, Thomas, 1980, pp. 10-12, and Sharples 1985, p. 6. 2 See, for example, Shorey 1903, Burnet 1920, and Taylor 1951. The distinction between Socrates and Plato which the view requires does not need to be a distinction between the historical Socrates and the historical Plato. A distinction between an earlier and later Plato will do just as well. In my view these two ways of drawing the distinction amount essentially to the same thing, since I believe that the 'Socrates' of the early dialogues (in alphabetical order: Ap., Chrm., Cr., Euthd., Euthp., Gorg., H.Ma., H.Mi., Ion, La., Lys., Prot., and Rep. I) is representative of the historical Socrates and I accept Vlastos' 'grand methodological hypothesis' that "Plato puts into the persona of Socrates only what at the time he himself considers true." (Vlastos 1988, p. 373 and n.39.) None of the subsequent argument, however, depends upon this. In placing the Meno chronologically after the above thirteen dialogues I follow Guthrie 1975 (except for Rep. I), Irwin 1977 (again, except for Rep. 1), Kahn 1981 (again, except for Rep. I), Vlastos 1983 and 1985, and a host of others. Some may balk at placing one or all of the Euthydemus Lysis, Hippias Major, and Republic I prior to the Meno. No part of the subsequent argument, however, depends essentially on their chronological position. 3 Bumet 1920 and Taylor 1951 do find more than one view in the dialogues, but the Platonic view does not get displayed until later dialogues like the Parmenides and Sophist. On their view the view displayed in the early Socratic dialogues is identical with the view displayed in such dialogues as the Phaedo, Republic, and most importantly for
30 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a view about animal phantasia in the Stoics which has the best possible credentials', and is likely to become an orthodoxy, and yet I hope that somehow it can be resisted, because if it is true, I believe the Stoic will be in deep trouble, while if it was false they will be clear.
Abstract: There is a view about animal phantasia in the Stoics which has the best possible credentials', and is likely to become an orthodoxy. And yet I hope that somehow it can be resisted, because if it is true, I believe the Stoics will be in deep trouble, while if it is false they will be in the clear. According to this view, animal phantasia is rudimentary. It is not propositional in form. Its closest analogue is perhaps Plato's account of the senses in Theaetetus 184D-187B. The soul uses the senses, according to Plato here, for perceiving such qualities as whiteness, but cannot use them for hitting on something's being the case (ousia) or the truth (aletheia). If this is all that phantasia supplies to animals, on Stoic theory, how can we explain all that they do in the world? Typically, an animal that follows a scent does not merely perceive the scent in isolation, but perceives it as lying in a certain direction, and otherwise would not go in the right direction for it. But this already involves predication: the scent is connected with a direction. We can put this by saying that the animal has the perceptual appearance that the scent comes from that direction, or the perceptual appearance of it as coming from there (these are not sharply distinguished by the Stoics). I shall describe such appearances as propositional, meaning no more than that one thing is predicated of another. I have argued elsewhere2 that the narrowing of perception posed no problem for Plato, because he did not, on the whole, deny animals doxa, belief. Even in
20 citations
TL;DR: Socrates gives as his leading premise in the Crito that one should do nothing wrong (obaCg bet &6Itxiv, 49b8) and then proceeds to argue that it would be wrong for him to try to escape from gaol, thus evading the death penalty he had been sentenced to as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Socrates gives as his leading premise in the Crito that one should do nothing wrong (obaCg bet &6Itxiv, 49b8). (He says, indeed, that he has lived his whole life in obedience to this premise, 49a-b.) He then proceeds to argue that it would be wrong for him to try to escape from gaol, thus evading the death penalty he had been sentenced to. But a central problem in interpreting the dialogue is that the arguments he offers for this conclusion appear to be designed to establish a very much stronger conclusion: it would always be wrong for any citizen of Athens to disobey any law of Athens. Such a conclusion is in itself distinctly unappealing, and apparently not consistent with the leading premise, for presumably a law might be an unjust law commanding the doing of what is wrong. Moreover, in the Apology Socrates apparently reports one such case and envisages another. At 32c-d he says that he did not obey an order from the Thirty Tyrants because what was ordered was wrong (&6.x6v xt, 32d5); and at 29c-d he says that he would not obey a court order to cease philosophising, evidently on the same ground (though he does not here use the word 6Lxov, or a synonym). Here, then, it seems to be admitted that a law, or anyway a legally authoritative order,1 may command one to do wrong, and that if so it should not be obeyed. This sets our problem: is it possible so to interpret the Crito that it does not enjoin obedience to any and every law? I propose and criticise three lines of interpretation which attempt to avoid this 'authoritarian' reading of the dialogue. They differ from one another most notably
19 citations
TL;DR: The Timaeus' explicit claim that nous is the only immortal part of the human soul is a major obstacle to my interpretation, since the assertion appears to contradict explicitly the notion of an everlasting tripartite soul as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Although the question of whether the soul in its true nature is simple or composite has been extensively debated, the position of the Timaeus on this issue is generally regarded as uncontroversial. The Timaeus, which is Plato's only sustained effort at providing a cosmology and a cosmogony, discusses the formation (by the Demiurge) of the World Soul and nous, the divine part of the human soul.' The other parts of the human soul were fashioned by the lesser gods and, unlike nous, are mortal. Since we are explicitly told that nous is the only immortal part of the soul, scholars have assumed that nous alone will escape the cycle of rebirth.2 I shall challenge the accepted view by contending that the tripartite soul is everlasting (albeit not immortal) and that there is no escaping the cycle of rebirth. This is not offered as the definitive interpretation of the Timaeus; my goal is to cast doubt on the accepted view, thereby provoking discussion and encouraging new lines of investigation. The first step will be to deal with the assertion that only nous is immortal (e.g. 41c-d, 69c-d and 90a). The Timaeus' explicit claim that nous is the only immortal part of the soul is a major obstacle to my interpretation, since the assertion appears to contradict explicitly the notion of an everlasting tripartite soul. However, referring to the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul as mortal does not entail that they will perish, given that they are united with what is divine. Timaeus, repeating the speech of the Demiurge, states:
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TL;DR: This book has been an unconscionable time arriving. But it has come out at last: and the wait has been worthwhile as mentioned in this paper, and it is, quite simply, a magnificent piece of work.
Abstract: This book' has been an unconscionable time arriving. I first heard tell of it a decade ago as an Oxford undergraduate; rumours of its imminence (in that geological sense of imminence peculiar to academic publishing) reached me while a student in Cambridge a couple of years on; and I saw samizdat pages from some of its parts a little later still (when, I was reliably informed, it was virtually in the press). And, so I discovered, the saga of the Great Work on Herophilus had been going on for a good deal longer than that. All that was at least five years ago for a while it seemed as though the rest was going to be silence (although by this time, naturally, the book was turning up in various bibliographies as 'forthcoming'; usually, infuriatingly, with titles different from that under which it finally forthcame). So, when Heinrich von Staden himself assured me a couple of years ago, while sipping a beer on a Madrid pavement at an unofficial and hence particularly pleasant session of a conference on Galen, that the book's debut was indeed only a matter of months away, it is perhaps understandable that I viewed this assurance with a certain scepticism. But it has come out at last: and the wait has been worthwhile. This is, quite simply, a magnificent piece of work; ground-breaking and painstaking scholarship combined with judicious interpretation and an enviable knowledge of the vast corpus of ancient medicine to create something which is in the best sense of the word definitive. We will not need another edition of Herophilus for a long time to come.
TL;DR: In this article, Demokrits Atome prallten wenn auch nicht praktisch, so doch grundsatzlich berechenbar in ganz bestimmten Winkeln und Geschwindigkeiten voneinander ab and gehorchten dabei Gesetzen einer StoBmechanik.
Abstract: Wenn von Demokrit die Rede ist, fallt alsbald das Stichwort 'mechanistisch', und das liegt ja auch nahe genug. Die wahre Wirklichkeit, die den Erscheinungen zugrundeliegt, besteht bekanntlich nach seiner Lehre aus winzigen unterschiedlich geformten Korperchen, die im leeren Raume in standiger Bewegung sind, sich stoBen, von einander abprallen. Hort man das, so stellt man sich unwillkurlich vor, Demokrits Atome prallten wenn auch nicht praktisch, so doch grundsatzlich berechenbar in ganz bestimmten Winkeln und Geschwindigkeiten voneinander ab und gehorchten dabei Gesetzen einer StoBmechanik. Eigentlich weiB man genau, daB das so nicht stimmen kann. Es fehit bekanntlich bei Demokrit nicht nur jeder auch noch so kleine Ansatz zu einer mathematischen Berechnung von Atombahnen, sondern auch jeder Versuch zur Formulierung allgemeiner Bewegungsgesetze. Das kann auch nicht anders sein. Die Atome sind nach ihm unsichtbar und ihre Bewegungen nur erschlossen. Nur dann, wenn sich sehr viele Atome in die gleiche Richtung bewegen, konnen wir Bewegung wahrnehmen. Dabei geht Demokrit nicht davon aus, daB die Urbewegung einzelner Atome mit der Bewegung sichtbarer Korper in jeder Hinsicht gleichartig ist. Wie hatte er Beobachtungen anstellen sollen uber das, was unbeobachtbar ist. Bei all seiner plastischen Vorstellungskraft, die ihn das Denken als eine feinere Form der Wahrnehmung verstehen lieB, konnte er uber die Bewegung der Atome doch nur wenig Prazises sagen. Wir horen, daB kleine und kugelformige Atome besonders beweglich sind und leicht aneinander vorbeikommen. Atome mit Haken verflechten sich und halten sich fest. Feine Poren sind nur fiir sehr kleine Atome passierbar. Dergleichen ist zwar einleuchtend, aber nicht eigentlich das, was wir unter Bewegungsgesetzen verstehen. Was daruber hinausgeht, ist, soweit zu erkennen, schlicht falsch. Es fehlt vor allem eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen aktiver und passiver Bewegung. Die Seelenatome sind sehr klein und kugelformig, deshalb sind sie sehr beweglich und bewegen
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the Gorgias teaching does not fit with Socrates' teaching on the nature of man's good, and they argue that he avoids a clash by making virtue not subordinate to our good but identical with its sovereign component.
Abstract: Socrates teaches in the Gorgias that human goodness or virtue includes concern for the good of others, while at the same time asserting that no one should act except for the sake of his own good. The simplest way of avoiding incompatibility between these doctrines of altruism and egoism is to interpret Socrates as holding that virtue, including concern for others, is an instrumental means to our own good. Looked at in this light the doctrine of altruism in question is not at odds with that of egoism but forms part of it. However, while this is the simplest way of avoiding incompatibility, it does not fit with Socrates' teaching on the nature of man's good. In this paper I shall first recall briefly that Socrates does teach the doctrines I have referred to. I shall then go on to argue that he avoids a clash by making virtue not subordinate to our good but identical with its sovereign component. '
TL;DR: In this paper, the traite de la ciel (D.C) is described as a "science de la nature" and the realit6s naturelles who forment le ciel sont ing6nerables and incorruptibles.
Abstract: Le traite Du ciel (D. C.), parmi les oeuvres d'Aristote, se presente d'embl6e comme un expose qui se rattache A la "science de la nature" (I,1,268 a 1). Ce n'est qu'au passage qu'il evoque les realites extra-celestes situees hors du temps et de l'espace (I,9,279 a 18-22). Mais il ddmontre que les realit6s naturelles qui forment le ciel sont ing6nerables et incorruptibles. C'est pourquoi le Des parties des animaux designe ce genre d'etude comme "la philosophie relative aux rdalit&s divines" (1,5,645 a 4). De fait, le D. C. tient expressement pour "divins" le ciel, les astres et le cinquibme el6ment dont ils sont form6s.1 Une telle fa?on de parler ne suffit pas evidemment A prouver qu'en ecrivant le D.C., Aristote professait une theologie cosmique ou siderale. Le corps celeste ou les corps c6lestes (incorruptibles) ont un caractere que la tradition prete aux dieux (immortels). II ne s'ensuit pas qu'Aristote enseigne A reconnaitre dans les corps en question les veritables dieux dont la tradition n'avait qu'une vague intuition. C'est pourtant ce qu'on a cru. Et fort de l'hypothese selon laquelle la philosophie aristotelicienne aurait evolue de maniere trds sensible au cours du temps, l'on a suppose que le D. C. representait un moment privi1&gid dans le developpement des id6es th6ologiques du philosophe, un moment proche encore des theories de jeunesse du dialogue perdu Sur la philosophie,2 mais que depasseront les
TL;DR: The question of whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties has been extensively discussed in recent years.
Abstract: These lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the 'traditional' interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things. Many recent commentators have tried to 'rescue' Aristotle from the alleged committment to such Stoutian particulars.' Their strategy has been to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean 'cannot exist without something to contain it',2 and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance. The task I've set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-tr;odden path. Instead I shall look at what the ancient commentators on
TL;DR: In the Theaetetus, the authors leave clues for their readers to decipher in the passages concerning philosophical method as mentioned in this paper, where the lesson is so subtle that we have to suppose that Plato was deliberately leaving clues for his readers to decode.
Abstract: Aficionados of the Theaetetus will enjoy learning about another passage that reveals Plato's subtle ingenuity. Throughout this work, although what the characters say in the dialogue is obviously part of its meaning, how they say it is at least as important, especially in the passages concerning philosophical method. Sometimes the lesson is so subtle that we have to suppose that Plato was deliberately leaving clues for his readers to decipher.