Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1995"
TL;DR: The double signification accordee a l'animal politique revele le lien theorique which articule l'oeuvre biologique and l'soeuvre politique d'Aristote.
Abstract: L'A. etudie la conception zoologique de l'expression zoon politikon dans la «Politique» et l'«Histoire des animaux» d'Aristote. La double signification accordee a l'animal politique revele le lien theorique qui articule l'oeuvre biologique et l'oeuvre politique d'Aristote. L'A. en tire les consequences du point de vue de la sociabilite de l'homme
103 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a veritable theorie de l'identite chez les Stoiciens and en expose les fondements materialistes, avant de soulever divers problemes concernant l'individuation des hommes en fonction de la quasi identite âme-corps acceptee dans cette theorie.
Abstract: L'A. montre qu'il existe une veritable theorie de l'identite chez les Stoiciens et en expose les fondements materialistes, avant de soulever divers problemes concernant l'individuation des hommes en fonction de la quasi identite âme-corps acceptee dans cette theorie
56 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyse le traite de la generation des animaux ou, apres un bref apercu des conceptions biologiques dans l'Antiquite, il detaille en quoi consiste la theorie aristotelicienne de la reproduction of animaux.
Abstract: L'A. analyse le traite «de la generation des animaux» ou, apres un bref apercu des conceptions biologiques dans l'Antiquite, il detaille en quoi consiste la theorie aristotelicienne de la reproduction des animaux. En particulier, l'A. s'interesse a la maniere dont il definissait la semence et envisageait la transmission de l'espece
48 citations
TL;DR: The relation entre la connaissance de l'esprit (νου~) and l'intelligence cosmique, a pouvoir d'identifier les substances physiques, is discussed in this article.
Abstract: L'A. etudie le rapport entre la connaissance de l'esprit (νου~) et son pouvoir de controle sur toutes les choses qui possedent une âme et sur la revolution cosmique, tel qu'il est defini dans le fragment 12 d'Anaxagore. Au-dela de la connaissance, l'intelligence cosmique a le pouvoir d'identifier les substances physiques
22 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the definition of aristotelicienne des sens de la perception en fonction de the determination of leur objet propre, dans le «De anima» (II, 6).
Abstract: Etude de la definition aristotelicienne des sens de la perception en fonction de la determination de leur objet propre, dans le «De anima» (II, 6). L'A. montre que la these aristotelicienne, selon laquelle les objets propres et les sensibles communs sont perceptibles καθ'αυτα, alors que les objets accidentels ne le sont pas, releve de sa conception generale de la perception
21 citations
TL;DR: Analyse du traitement de la notion d'akrasia dans la philosophie stoicienne representee par Chrysippe as discussed by the authors, l'exemple de Medee, l'A.
Abstract: Analyse du traitement de la notion d'akrasia dans la philosophie stoicienne representee par Chrysippe. A travers l'exemple de Medee, l'A. montre que la psychologie stoicienne admet que la raison soutienne des propositions contradictoires, sans remettre en question ni la these de l'unite de l'esprit (harmonie de l'âme), ni le principe moral de la responsabilite de l'action
16 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle as mentioned in this paper argued that when one party is removed to too a great distance, as in the case of a god, friendship is no longer possible, and this presents a curious riddle that commentators have often found difficult to understand.
Abstract: ? 1. It is a fact of common experience that friends need to share something. They must have common concerns, something they both take delight in; and it is also a fact of everyday life that if the distance between friends (we may think of 'distance' in many different ways!) has become too great and too much of this common ground is lost, friendship itself becomes more and more difficult. Some degree of equality, then, seems to be necessary for friendship. Having raised the question of what degree of equality exactly is necessary, Aristotle states that when one party is removed to too a great distance, as in the case of a god, friendship is no longer possible, and this presents a curious riddle that commentators have often found difficult to understand (1 159a5-12):
14 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyse le passage du Protagoras de Platon ou est decrit l'usage des punitions dans l'education morale (324a6-b7)
Abstract: L'A. analyse le passage du «Protagoras» de Platon ou est decrit l'usage des punitions dans l'education morale (324a6-b7)
11 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the definition-demonstration andudiee par Aristote dans les Seconds Analytiques (II, 8) doit andre comprise comme l'enchainement de de two types de syllogismes: le premier, a fonction explicative, releve du domaine scientifique de la demonstration, le second, servant a l'identification de ce qui est defini, n'appartient pas a la methode proprement scientifiques
Abstract: L'A. defend la these selon laquelle la definition-demonstration etudiee par Aristote dans les «Seconds Analytiques» (II, 8) doit etre comprise comme l'enchainement de deux types de syllogismes: le premier, a fonction explicative, releve du domaine scientifique de la demonstration, le second, servant a l'identification de ce qui est defini, n'appartient pas a la methode proprement scientifique
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors penche sur les trois questions les plus commentees concernant le passage de Platon sur la faussete dans "Le Sophiste" en 263, qui sont: 1) comment Platon parvient-il a ce passage, 2) quelle est la nature du probleme concernant the fausset auquel s'attache Platon?, and 3) quell conclusion sur la predication negative peut-on tirer de ce dialogue, s'il y a lieu d'en tirer une
Abstract: L'A. se penche sur les trois questions les plus commentees concernant le passage de Platon sur la faussete dans «Le Sophiste», en 263, qui sont: 1) comment Platon parvient-il a ce passage, 2) quelle est la nature du probleme concernant la faussete auquel s'attache Platon?, et 3) quelle conclusion sur la predication negative peut-on tirer de ce dialogue, s'il y a lieu d'en tirer une?
8 citations
TL;DR: Au-dela de la dichotomie moderne entre le bien intrinseque et l'bien instrumental, fondee sur la theorie humienne de la causation, l'A. montre que la theoryie aristotelicienne des genres du bien repose sur the theorie causale and sur la metaphysique de l'acte et de la puissance developpees par Aristote en un sens raidcalement non-humien et non-kantien.
Abstract: Au-dela de la dichotomie moderne entre le bien intrinseque et le bien instrumental, fondee sur la theorie humienne de la causation, l'A. montre que la theorie aristotelicienne des genres du bien repose sur la theorie causale et sur la metaphysique de l'acte et de la puissance developpees par Aristote en un sens raidcalement non-humien et non-kantien
TL;DR: In this paper, the fourteen books of metaphysics were brought into their present arrangement by editors after Aristotle's death, and they were placed at the start of the main discussion of the metaphysics.
Abstract: We are told that the fourteen books of Metaphysics were brought into their present arrangement by editors after Aristotle's death. Book A, which they set at the beginning, describes the aim of philosophy as the removal of surprise and perplexity by supplying "knowledge of original causes," and assesses the work of Aristotle's predecessors in that field. After the short book designated a, B outlines a set of '"perplexities," most of which get examined, more or less directly, in the rest of the treatise. F thus stands, by the traditional ordering, at the start of Aristotle's main discussion of metaphysics; it announces its subject-matter in the first chapter; and its argument is hardly more dependent on what has preceded than on other parts of Aristotle's works.'
TL;DR: In this article, a lower level theory concerning desire which could be consistent with the dominance view that Penner endorses at the higher level of desire is presented. But it is not clear to me that this theory is the underlying structure of the kinds of desires that we find Penner describing on his dominance theory.
Abstract: A footnote and several comments from my article "The Socratic Theory of Motivation" (Apeiron, xxv, no. 3, Sept. 1992) were recently the subject of an appendix to Penner and Rowe's article "The Desire for the Good: Is the Meno Inconsistent with the Gorgias?" (Phronesis xxxix/l, 1994). The authors argue that I am mistaken in stating that there is a consistency between Penner's and Santas' views of desire for the good as expressed by Socrates in the Meno, 77B-78B. I am happy to grant that this most recent article makes eloquent and clear sense of Penner's dominance view of the object of desire and that Santas' interpretation of the Meno passage does contain an assumption about the separability of what Penner calls the "insides" and the "outsides" of the object of desire which is in sharp and direct contradiction to the theoretical apparatus expressed by Penner and Rowe's dominance view. I would, however, like to clarify my own views concerning the way desire works (and could indeed be working for Socrates) which the authors also argue against in their appendix. I will argue that in my article I describe a lower level theory concerning desire which could be consistent with the dominance view that Penner endorses at the higher level. I do not wish to imply that Penner does or should hold my view concerning what can or should underlie his dominance view, only that it is plausible that this is the underlying structure of the kinds of desires that we find Penner describing on his dominance theory. It is my contention that in objecting to several locutions that I make concerning the connection between a desire and its object, Penner mistakenly compares a relatively sophisticated level of desire (which is the level necessary for the dominance view) with a much more basic level of desire (which is the level that I have in mind in stating the locutions to which he refers). While there is every reason to believe that Penner and I disagree about this more basic level of desire (it is not clear to me that Penner has, as yet, a theory concerning what underlies the sophisticated sort of desire to which he refers), I do believe that, starting with my more basic theory, I can build just the kind of sophisticated desire to which Penner refers on his dominance model. I also agree with Penner that it makes sense to think that this dominance theory is how Socrates would have resolved the issue of desire for the good when faced with the kinds of examples that Penner discusses (see his Helen and the ice cream examples, pp. 5, 8-9, 25). Since Penner does not address the issue of the nature of beliefs and desires, it
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors look at the differences between these passages in P and S dealing with Empedocles and Stobaeus (S) dealing with the exegesis of the divine names Hera and Aidoneus.
Abstract: Though Peter Kingsleys paper contains a number of suggestions that are not without some value, his reconstruction of the doxographical traditions concerned with Empedocles four elements is not good enough Anyone who compares psPlutarch (P) as a whole with Daibers German version of Qusta ibn Luqa (Q) as a whole see immediately that the latter is a translation of a variety of the former It is absurd to argue from a single paragraphin this case I 320where Q as to the exegesis of the divine names Hera and Aidoneus agrees not with P 878A and others but with Stobaeus (S) and others, that Q translates a source other than P This chapter looks more closely at the differences between these passages in P and S dealing with EmpedoclesKeywords: doxographical traditions; Empedocles fragment; Peter Kingsley