Showing papers in "Psychological Inquiry in 2004"

Target Article: "Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence".

Abstract: This article describes the concept of posttraumatic growth, its conceptual foundations, and supporting empirical evidence. Posttraumatic growth is the experience of positive change that occurs as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life crises. It is manifested in a variety of ways, including an increased appreciation for life in general, more meaningful interpersonal relationships, an increased sense of personal strength, changed priorities, and a richer existential and spiritual life. Although the term is new, the idea that great good can come from great suffering is ancient. We propose a model for understanding the process of posttraumatic growth in which individual characteristics, support and disclosure, and more centrally, significant cognitive processing involving cognitive structures threatened or nullified by the traumatic events, play an important role. It is also suggested that posttraumatic growth mutually interacts with life wisdom and the development of the life narrative, and t...

Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications

Abstract: (2004). TARGET ARTICLES: 'Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications' Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 197-215.

Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical model

Abstract: Self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame, pride) are fundamentally important to a wide range of psychological processes, yet they have received relatively little attention compared to other, more "basic" emotions (e.g., sadness, joy). This article outlines the unique features that distinguish self-conscious from basic emotions and then explains why generally accepted models of basic emotions do not adequately capture the self-conscious emotion process. The authors present a new model of self-conscious emotions, specify a set of predictions derived from the model, and apply the model to narcissistic self-esteem regulation. Finally, the authors discuss the model's broader implications for future research on self and emotion.

Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or "Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test?"

Abstract: Measures of implicit prejudice are based on associations between race-related stimuli and valenced words. Reaction time (RT) data have been characterized as showing implicit prejudice when White names or faces are associated with positive concepts and African-American names or faces with negative concepts, compared to the reverse pairings. We offer three objections to the inferential leap from the comparative RT of different associations to the attribution of implicit prejudice: (a) The data may reflect shared cultural stereotypes rather than personal animus, (b) the affective negativity attributed to participants may be due to cognitions and emotions that are not necessarily prejudiced, and (c) the patterns of judgment deemed to be indicative of prejudice pass tests deemed to be diagnostic of rational behavior.

Seven Myths About Emotional Intelligence

Abstract: Inspired by an influx of academic research, the writ ingof several best-selling trade texts, and frequent me dia exposure, emotional intelligence (El) has emerged recently as one of the most high profile of the psycholog ical constructs (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). The concept has also prospered due both to cultural trends and orientations that stress the previously ne glected role of the emotions (with some claiming it con stitutes a zeitgeist) and to increasing efforts at standard ized assessment of individual differences in El (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000a). Common claims suggest that tests for El are predictive of important educational and( occupational criteria, beyond that proportion of variance that general intellectual ability predicts. Thus, the field has increasingly important implications for so ciety, particularly in the impetus to improve emotional fuinctioning in real life. Proponents of El claim that indi v iduals can enjoy happier and more fulfilled lives if they ar-e aware of both their own emotions and those of other people and able to regulate those emotions effectively. Another reason for the widespread, often uncritical, em bracing of the El construct is the suggestion that El gives hope for a more utopian, classless society. This vision for the future stands in contrast to research suggesting a preordained "cognitive elite" (Herrnstein & Murray, 1'994) because El is within anyone's realm to learn and cultivate. Goleman's (1995) widely read book claims that raising El is a panacea for all manner of psychologi cal and social problems. Despite the seeming importance of these claims, scientific investigation of a clearly identified construct of El is sparse. Many of the current propositions pre sented in bo h the populist and specialist literature have littl empirical substance (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002). Stripped of scientific trappings, it remains plausible that El is nothing but the latest in a long line of psychological fads. On the other hand, because sys tematic scientific research is just beginning, EI could ind ed mature into a construct that is theoretically me ningful, empirically important, and practically useful. In this article, we examine seven myths about El, that is, st ong, widely believed claims that purport edly give the concept of El scientific credibility. In each case, we identify weaknesses in evidence and ar gument that challenge the value of the El construct. Today's myth could become tomorrow's accepted wisdom, or it could be conclusively falsified. For each claim, we also evaluate the likelihood that it will even tually be substantiated by research. This article focuses on what we see as the key shortcomings of current work on El and the prospects for an eventual science of El. How ver, we also acknowledge the intrinsic inter est of the subject material and the various research ef for s inspired by the concept. Our aim is not to dismiss work on El out of hand, but to examine where the first wave of research on the construct is meeting barriers to progress, and whether those barriers can be overcome.

AUTHORS' RESPONSE: "The Foundations of Posttraumatic Growth: New Considerations"

Abstract: In response to comments on our model of posttraumatic growth, we consider the validity of reports of posttraumatic growth, appropriate methodology to use to assess posttraumatic growth, and its relation with other variables that appear to bear a resemblance to posttraumatic growth (e.g., well-being and psychological adjustment). The potentially important role of proximate and distal cultural factors is also addressed. Clinicians are encouraged to use interventions that facilitate posttraumatic growth with care, so as not to create expectations for posttraumatic growth in all trauma survivors, and to instead promote a respect for the difficulty of trauma recovery while allowing for the exploration of possibilities for various kinds of growth even in those who have suffered greatly.

The transformed self: A narrative understanding of posttraumatic growth

Abstract: The preceding quote is taken from a middle-aged woman's narrative account of her most traumatic ex perience in adulthood. It clearly and vividly demon strates the close connection between the life narrative and posttraumatic growth, a connection that Tedeschi and Calhoun (this issue) include in their model but do not fully develop. However, they end their stimulating target article by challenging others to pursue this con nection: "The overall picture of posttraumatic growth has been sketched. Describing the details of cognitive processing and narrative development will be much more difficult." Picking up where Tedeschi and Calhoun leave off, we respond to their closing chal lenge by presenting a more developed and comprehen sive analysis of the role of narrative within posttraumatic growth. As the basis for a sense of iden tity in adulthood (McAdams, 1996), the life story should not be viewed as just one piece of the complex puzzle of posttraumatic growth, as Tedeschi and Calhoun's process model suggests, but rather as the fundamental frame that holds the entire puzzle to gether. Specifically, we assert that posttraumatic growth may be best understood as a process of con structing a narrative understanding of how the self has been positively transformed by the traumatic event and then integrating this transformed sense of self into the identity-defining life story. This narrative perspective on posttraumatic growth has important implications for how growth outcomes are assessed in the aftermath of traumatic events, our understanding of the processes that may enhance or limit the possibility for posttraumatic growth over time, and, more broadly, the role of culture in posttraumatic growth.

No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock

Abstract: 1. Prejudice and other attitudes were assumed to operate largely in conscious (explicit, deliberate, con trollable, intentional) mode. Now they are generally viewed as also operating in a less conscious (implicit, spontaneous, uncontrollable, unintentional) mode (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). From this conceptual shift other changes have followed:

AUTHORS' RESPONSES: "A Further Consideration of the Issues of Emotional Intelligence"

Abstract: (2004). AUTHORS' RESPONSES: 'A Further Consideration of the Issues of Emotional Intelligence' Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 249-255.

The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon: Too Fast To Live, Too Young To Die?

Abstract: (2004). AUTHORS' RESPONSES: 'The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon: Too Fast To Live, Too Young To Die?' Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 239-248.

What is unique about self-conscious emotions?

Abstract: In their target article, Tracy and Robins (this issue) offer a far-reaching and generative theory of self-con scious emotion. The central assertion is that the self-conscious emotions differ from other well-studied emotions, such as fear or anger, and their understand ing requires concepts from the self literature. The focus of this commentary is to sharpen the discussion regard ing the unique facets of the self-conscious emotions, in terms of how they differ from other emotions and from one another. The commentary concludes by positing self-regulatory function as the most unique character istic of self-conscious emotion.

Keeping the self in self-conscious emotions: Further arguments for a theoretical model

Abstract: As researchers who study topics at the interface between self and emotion, we are often frustrated by the lack of integration and interconnection between the two areas. Prevailing views on emotion frequently neglect important self-evaluative processes or fail to do justice to the complexity of these processes; and research and theory on the self is dominated by a simple dichotomy between positive and negative affect, when emotions such as pride and shame seem so central to many important self-processes. These dual frustrations motivated us to develop the theoretical model presented in our target article, which represents our attempt to “put the self into self-conscious emotions.” Our goal was to summarize what the field knows about self-conscious emotions and related self-processes, and organize this research into a coherent, explanatory framework. In this response, we (a) explain why we believe a process model of self-conscious emotions is essential for the field to progress, (b) address some of the concerns raised by the commentators about the role of the self in the emotion-elicitation process, and (c) suggest topics for future research inspired by the commentaries and our model.

Maintaining a focus on the social goals underlying self-conscious emotions

Abstract: Tracy and Robins (this issue) provide a target article that represents an ambitious effort to integrate previous analyses of the self-conscious emotions with observa tions and theory from the self-esteem, attribution, and self-awareness literatures. In their model, they situate self-conscious emotions in the broader framework of basic emotions while tackling issues ranging from facial expressions and developmental processes to global ver sus stable and internal versus external attributions. The broad nature of this piece tempts us to generate a similarly wide-ranging commentary; perhaps a top10 list of the aspects we found most and least com pelling. Instead we focus our commentary on one ma jor idea, which on reading the article we perceived to be one of its most important strengths until the train (or, perhaps, the train's engine) somehow left the tracks. This idea is that self-conscious emotions can be fully understood only by carefully attending to the so cial goals that drive them. An examination of goals is necessarily central to any appraisal model, in which emotional responses are theorized to arise from the perception of harms or ben efits with respect to important motives. In the view of Lazarus (1991), "Emotions are social phenomena. This is especially the case with guilt and shame" (p. 241 ). We agree wholeheartedly with this statement and were pleased to read Tracy and Robins's (this issue) analysis of the motivational underpinnings of specific emotions. In their appraisal-theory formulation, they link basic emotions to survival goals and then clearly tie self-conscious emotions directly to social goals and dynamics. Although they do not explore the nature of the underlying social goals in depth, they summarize them as including "getting along and getting ahead," the familiar motives for social acceptance or connec tion and dominance or status in social hierarchies. The function of self-conscious emotions is hypothesized to be the maintenance of positive social relationships, by motivating us to act in ways that promote social accep tance. They argued that social behavior is evaluated explicitly and implicitly through a comparison with in ternalized standards and ideals. Behaviors that are evaluated as falling short of these standards are linked with the social outcomes of rejection and "losing face." Indeed, we might add that attachment researchers (see, e.g., Magai, 1999) have documented this link between evaluations, social outcomes, and emotion by examin ing the shaming behavior of parents in which deroga tory and belittling comments are delivered to a child in a contemptuous, disgusted tone of voice. Tracy and Robins cite theory and data (of their own and many others) about the interpersonal action tendencies linked to self-conscious emotions. For example, a per son feeling shame might engage in gaze aversion or other forms of hiding to avoid disapproval or rejection and might express shame as an appeasement or sub mission maneuver to produce sympathy rather than at tack from scornful onlookers. A person feeling guilt might attempt reparative action to mend the communal relationship their hurtful behavior had damaged and avoid anticipated social punishments of rejection and contempt. This analysis of self-evaluation fits well with current and classical thinking in self-theory that portrays iden tity dynamics as embedded in the individual's social life, where the sense of self is developed and then contin uously negotiated and maintained in the context of inter nalized and contemporary interpersonal relations. Be cause the self is social, self-conscious emotions are social as well. Early on, for example, Cooley character ized the process of self-evaluation as involving

AUTHORS' RESPONSE: "Keeping the Self in Self-Conscious Emotions: Further Arguments for a Theoretical Model"

Abstract: (2004). AUTHORS' RESPONSE: 'Keeping the Self in Self-Conscious Emotions: Further Arguments for a Theoretical Model' Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 171-177.

AUTHORS' RESPONSE: The Implicit Prejudice Exchange: Islands of Consensus in a Sea of Controversy

Abstract: Some commentators dismiss Arkes and Tetlock (this issue) on two grounds that we regard as specious, namely that we are either (a) political apologists for covert bigotry-the soft-on-racism charge raised by Sears (this issue) or (b) psychological na�fs who cling to obsolete definitions of attitudes and prejudice-the scientific incompetence charge raised by both Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald (this issue) and Wittenbrink (this issue). To move the debate beyond such caricatures, the scholarly community must eventually confront the specific empirical objections that Arkes and Tetlock raised about how construct-validational work is done (whether researchers are giving fair weight to ideologically dissonant alternative explanations) and the specific logical objections that Arkes and Tetlock raise about the blurring of fact-value distinctions (whether psychological theory is advanced by researchers' opining on the political defensibility of their research participants' opinions).

Implicit prejudice: Pentimento or inquisition?

Abstract: Roth, B M (1994) Prescription for failure: Race relations in the age of social science New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Sears, D O (1994) Ideological bias in political psychology: The view from scientific hell Political Psychology, 15, 547-556 Sears, D O (1997) Review of B M Roth (1997) Prescription for failure: Race relations in the age of social science Political Psychology, 18, 209-215 Sidanius, J, & Pratto, F (1993) The inevitability of oppression and the dynamics of social dominance In P Sniderman & P E Tetlock (Eds), Prejudice, politics, and the American dilemma (pp 173-211) Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press Tetlock, P E ( 1994) Political psychology or politicized psychology: Is the road to scientific hell paved with good intentions? Politi cal Psychology, 15, 509-529