Showing papers in "Southern Journal of Philosophy in 2004"
20 citations
TL;DR: The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze as discussed by the authors is based on a revised version of material derived from Kerslake's PhD dissertation (Middlesex, 2001).
Abstract: This article presents a revised version of material derived from Kerslake's PhD dissertation (Middlesex, 2001), The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze
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TL;DR: The subjective eudaimonistic theory of value as mentioned in this paper is based on three claims: (1) all happiness is intrinsically valuable, (2) all suffering is intrinsically disvaluable (i.e., possesses negative value), and (3) nothing else is either intrinsically valuable or intrinsically valuable.
Abstract: The theory I will refer to as the eudaimonistic theory of value consists of three claims: (1) that all happiness is intrinsically valuable, (2) that all suffering is intrinsically disvaluable (i.e., possesses negative value), and (3) that nothing else is either intrinsically valuable or intrinsically disvaluable. By ‘happiness’ and ‘suffering’ I mean to refer to certain kinds of subjective states. (Some people, by contrast, mean by ‘happiness’ something like overall human flourishing.) Thus, the theory could be called the subjective eudaimonistic theory of value. However, I will leave the qualifier ‘subjective’ implicit in what follows. Combined with a n agent-neutral consequentialist ethical framework, the eudaimonistic theory of value results in what I will term eudaimonistic utilitarianism: the theory that moral agents ought always to do whatever they can to maximize the amount of happiness in the world and minimize the amount of suffering. Robert Nozick‘s famous thought experiment, the Experience Machine, poses a problem for the eudaimonistic theory of value and, thus, for eudaimonistic utilitarianism. The Experience Machine simulates the sorts of experiences tha t are had by people who are living actual lives. The simulations are imagined
13 citations
TL;DR: The idea that there are conceptual schemes, relative to which we conceptualize experience, and empirical content, the non-conceptual (and so purely causal) "raw" data of experience that get conceptualized through our conceptual schemes into beliefs or sentences, is not new.
Abstract: The idea that there are conceptual schemes, relative to which we conceptualize experience, and empirical content, the nonconceptual (and so purely causal) "raw" data of experience that get conceptualized through our conceptual schemes into beliefs or sentences, is not new. The scheme-content dualist par excellance was Kant, and in the twentieth century the logical positivists formulated the dualism in terms of linguistic frameworks (or "languages") and sense-data. Quine himself, though rejecting the positivists' characterization of linguistic frameworks as sets of analytic sentences, nonetheless continued to distinguish what he calls 'language', embodying our set of concepts, from 'extralinguistic facts', the raw data of experience. On this view a conceptual scheme would be the total system of concepts and, so, the epistemic agent's total contribution to the truth of beliefs and sentences; understood linguistically, a conceptual scheme would be the total linguistic contribution to doxastic and sentential truth. Empirical content would then be the total nonconceptual content given by the world itself and, so, the world's total contribution to doxastic and sentential truth—the total ej:^ralinguistic contribution to such truth. Nonetheless Quine argued that, though "[i]t is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact" (1951, 36), this "double dependence ... is not significantly traceable into the statements ... taken one by one" (42, my emphasis throughout).^ Instead, according to Quine, "language" or "scheme" is dispersed holistically throughout all the sentences of a theory.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an attempt is made to get clearer on what exactly the generality problem for reliabilism is all about, and it is concluded that although much speaks in favor of the latter position, the dispute cannot be resolved by philosophical debating alone.
Abstract: In this paper, an attempt is made to get clearer on what, exactly, the notorious generality problem for reliabilism is all about. On a charitable reconstruction, one major issue is empirical, concerning as it does the frequency with which people converge in their assessments of reliability. Conee and Feldman’s pessimistic view on this matter is contrasted with a more optimistic outlook that is taken to be supported by influential work in cognitive psychology. It is concluded that although much speaks in favor of the latter position, the dispute cannot be resolved by philosophical debating alone. Additional experimental work is also needed.
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TL;DR: The degree to which an entity possesses moral status is proportional to the degree t o which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant property possession is reached, whereupon the degree to whether E possesses moral relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree of status remains the same as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Pr inc ip le of Full Mora l S ta tus : The degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree t o which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses moral status remains the same.