Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 1988"

Freedom and Belief.

Abstract: Introduction PART I: METAPHYSICS AND COMMITMENT: Libertarianism, action, and self-determination Kant and commitment Commitment, illusion, and truth Non-rational commitment: a view of freedom Phenomenology, commitment, and what might happen PART II: THE OBJECTIVIST BASIS: Objectivism: preliminaries Choice Self-consciousness PART III: THE SUBJECTIVIST CHALLENGE: Evidence and independence Contravention and convention The spectator subject and integration The natural epictetans The experience of ability to choose Subjectivism and the experience of freedom Anitomy and truth Appendices.

Knowability and Constructivism

Abstract: If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic.1 One might try to sever this link between anti-realism and revisionism in logic by giving either a modified version of anti-realism not vulnerable to Fitch's argument within classical logic or a modified version of Fitch's argument to which anti-realism is vulnerable within constructivist logic. A recent article by Dorothy Edgington in effect takes the first path; I have objected elsewhere.2 In this paper I discuss an ingenious attempt by Crispin Wright to take the second path.3 The anti-realist principle can be formalized as:

On the Consistency of Jeffreys's Simplicity Postulate, and its Role in Bayesian Inference

Abstract: This paper is about the Bayesian theory of inductive inference, and in particular about the status of a condition, called by him the Simplicity Postulate, imposed by Jeffreys [1948] and [1961] on the so-called prior probability distributions. I shall explain what the Simplicity Postulate says presently: first, some background. The context of the discussion will be a set of possible laws hi, ostensibly governing some given domain of phenomena, and a test designed to discriminate between them. The prior probabilities of the hi are here simply their pre-test probabilities; the posterior, or post-test, probability distribution is obtained by combining likelihoods with prior probabilities according to Bayes's Theorem. Posterior probability oc prior probability x likelihood, where the coefficient of proportionality is the prior probability of the test outcome e. The likelihood of hi given e is equal to the probability of e, conditional on hi, and in those cases where hi describes a well-defined statistical model which determines a probability distribution over a set of data-points of which e is one, the likelihood of hi on e, is just the probability assigned e by hi. The prior, and hence also the posterior probabilities, are understood to be relativised to a stock of well-confirmed background theories about the structure of the test, presumed to be neutral between the hi. These probabilities are interpreted by Jeffreys as reasonable degrees of belief. In such circumstances it might seem natural to make the prior probabilities of the hi equal. For reasons which will become apparent shortly, Jeffreys instead stipulates that they should be a decreasing function of the complexity of the hi, where the complexity of a hypothesis is measured by its number of independent adjustable parameters, i.e., the

Agency and the Essence of Actions

Abstract: After a long period of both neglect and derision the question of essences has, over the last two decades, re-emerged as an important and bona fide issue for philosophers. An important spur to, and tool for, this renewed activity has been Saul Kripke's work on rigid designation and identity. In this paper I put one of Kripke's doctrines to work in order to uncover the essence of actions. This doctrine is that of the necessity of identity, which I shall here assume without further comment. It is sometimes said that our intuitions about the identity conditions for persistent individuals are firmer and more extensive than those concerning events (of which I take actions to be a subclass); and with this I cannot but agree. Nevertheless, I feel that we do possess a sufficient reflective grasp of our thought about events to allow some progress in this area. This paper may be seen as an attempt to substantiate this claim. Questions of essence are inseparably bound up with questions of individuation; and there are two broad views available on the individuation of actions. To take a classic example: suppose I move my finger in a certain way, thereby flipping a switch, thereby turning on a light ... According to one influential view, first propounded by G.E.M. Anscombe but now perhaps principally associated with Donald Davidson, I here perform a single action, which the expressions 'I moved my finger', 'I turned on the light' and so forth equally designate. Here, it is claimed, the so-called 'accordion effect' is in operation, whereby an action may be redescribed in the light of its causal consequences. Let us call this the Identity View. A different school of thought holds that in the above episode I performed several distinct (or at least non-identical) actions:' my moving my finger

Realism, Meaning and Truth

Abstract: Michael Dummett's famous paper on 'Truth', published by the Aristotelian Society in 1959, alerted philosophers to a line of inquiry which appeared both classical and new. It combined some of this century's most distinctive philosophical ideas Frege's analysis of sense, the reflections on meaning as use in the later work of Wittgenstein, intuitionism in the philosophy of mathematics. At the same time it promised to put philosophy back into intelligible contact with its own great tradition: for the position which Dummet labelled 'anti-realism' offered a novel perspective on terrain which since Kant, perhaps incipiently since Berkeley and the attack on abstract ideas, had emerged as philosophy's heartland. Dummett's suggestion, at the end of the paper, was that by substituting

Can Non-Pure Perception be Direct?

Abstract: Sur la question de l'influence des caracteristiques personnelles sur le contenu de perception

What Justifies Restoration

Abstract: As restorer the way in which I decide what to do with damaged works of art such as sculptures and paintings should be guided by what I believe constitutes their identity, or so I shall argue. That is to say, I must ask myself: 'What determines the identity of this statue or painting which I intend to restore?'. At least implicitly, it is only in reference to the answer I would give to this question that I could justify what I go on to do. It is therefore important to establish for such works of art a correct account of their identity, and for me, as restorer, to use it as my basis in any such justification. A correct account of the identity of works of art is also central to their appreciation, whether by the restorer or the viewer. It is needed by any of us who wish to be said to "appreciate" these works of art. For must we not, like the restorer, have the ability to discern what is or is not "authentically" of the work? That is, we talk of someone "appreciating" such works of art artistically partly in virtue of his behaviour towards them in manifesting a sensitivity in his choices and in his discourse to what makes them those individuals; i.e., what it is about them that both individuates and identifies them. If so, then we too are going to require some view of what counts towards that "authenticity" in the work's identity, even if only implicitly. I shall have something to say about such "authenticity" later in this paper. These are good reasons then for my project: to outline a theory of identity that will account for the restoration practices we feel are sometimes justified by their maintenance of our artistic heritage. Made explicit, it may then be used to help justify such practices while providing a basis for our criticism of restoration practices of which we disapprove. Like Rawls' methodology for determining correct principles of political justice1, I too shall look for a reflective equilibrium between practice and principle, appealing to both, and our intuitions about them, in my search for correct principles of restoration.