A dynamic school choice model

TLDR: It is proved that a solution always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley, and that the mechanism is dynamically strategy-proof and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.

About: This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior.The article was published on 2013-07-01 and is currently open access. It has received 48 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Solution concept & Assignment problem.

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions in "Division of the humanities and social sciences" ?

This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, the authors introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. The authors also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure. 

Q2. What is the author’s theory of dynamic strategy-proofness?

The author also studies two dynamic mechanisms: a spot mechanism (with or without property right transfers) and a future mechanism. 

Q3. What is the definition of dynamic strategy-proofness?

The authors prove that if each school’s priority ranking is lexicographic by tenure, that is, if teachers who were present in the previous period have priority over new teachers, then the proposed mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof. 

Q4. What is the overlapping teacher placement problem?

In an overlapping teacher placement problem 〈 S, {qs}s , The authort, µt−1, , >t 〉 in which the set of orders >t= {>ts}s∈S is lexicographic by tenure, each order in the related market consists of three groups of teachers. 

Q5. What is the problem of finding an acceptable matching in their original framework?

the problem of finding an acceptable matching in their original framework is equivalent to finding a matching that adapts to Ot and is non-wasteful in the related market. 

Q6. What is the purpose of this paper?

In this paper, the authors have developed a new framework to model a dynamic school choice problem with overlapping generations of agents. 

Q7. What is the result of the teacher proposing deferred acceptance mechanism?

Then the matching generated in each period is:µ′t = i j k s1 s3 s2 µ′t+1 = i j l s2 s3 s1 Since µ′t+1(i) = s2 i µt+1(i) = s1, teacher i can benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting her preferences. 

Q8. What is the author’s idea of dynamic strategy-proofness?

The author introduces a model of house allocation with overlapping agents and analyzes the impact of orderings on Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness. 

Q9. how many teachers are there in the related market?

In their problem, under the assumption that in each period there are at least three teachers, each of whom was assigned to a different school in the previous period, the priority structure of the related market