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Against mereological nihilism

Jonathan Tallant
- 01 May 2014 - 
- Vol. 191, Iss: 7, pp 1511-1527
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TLDR
It is argued that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs are arranged F-wise?
Abstract
I argue that mereological nihilism fails because it cannot answer (what I describe as) the special arrangement question: when is it true that the xs (the mereological simples) are arranged F-wise? I suggest that the answers given in the literature fail and that the obvious responses that could be made look to undermine the motivations for adopting nihilism in the first place.

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Objects and persons

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Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question

TL;DR: If nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well, and any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else.
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References
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Book

Naming and Necessity

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a connection between the mind-body problem and the so-called "identity thesis" in analytic philosophy, which has wide-ranging implications for other problems in philosophy that traditionally might be thought far-removed.
Book

A World of States of Affairs

TL;DR: This paper argued that the world is a world of states of affairs, not things, and used the phrase "state of affairs" rather than the word "fact" to mean no more than possible fact.
Book

Parts of Classes

David Lewis
TL;DR: Taking classes apart the trouble with classes a framework for set theory set theory for mereologists.
Book

Objects and persons

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an explanation of Eliminativism and its relation to Epiphenomenalism and Epistemicism, and consider the following: 1. Explaining Elimination 2. Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us? 3. Epinealism 4. Surviving Elimination 5. Mental Causation and Free Will 7.