Canadi an
Jour nal
of
Pol i t i cal
and
Soci al
Theor y/ Revue
canadi enne
de
t heor i e
pol i t i que
et
soci al e
.
Vol
.
8,
Nos,
1- 2,
( Hi ver / Pr i nt emps,
1984)
.
ANTHONY
GI DDENS' S
THEORY OF
STRUCTURATI ON
HS
Di cki e- Cl ar k
The
seven
books
wr i t t en
by
Gi ddens
i n
t he
year s
1971
t o
1979
ar e
a
r emar kabl e
appr ai sal
and
r ewor ki ng
of
t he
maj or
cur r ent s
of
exi st i ng
soci al
t heor y
.
The
cr i t i cal
par t of hi s
wor k
begi ns
wi t h
t he
f ounder s
of
soci al
sci ence
i n
t he
ni net eent h
and
ear l y
t went i et h
cent ur i es
and
goes
on
t o
what he
has
cal l ed
" t he
or t hodox
consensus"
of
t he per i od
f r om
t he
end
of
t he
Second Wor l d
War
unt i l
about
t he
l at e
1960' s
.
The
const r uct i ve
par t
of
hi s
wor k
can
be
di vi ded
i nt o
t wo
.
One
i s
hi s r econci l i at i on
or
bl endi ng
of
el ement s of
posi t i vi sm,
st r uct ur al i sm,
her meneut i cs
and Mar xi sm
i n hi s
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
and
t he
ot her
i s
t he
appl i cat i on
of
t hi s
met hodol ogy
i n hi s
t heor y
of i ndust r i al
soci et y
.
The
l at t er ,
al t hough
begun
wi t h
hi s
book
on
cl ass
st r uct ur e
( Gi ddens
1973)
and
cont i nued
i n
chapt er s
4,
5
and
6
i n
Cent r al
Pr obl ems
i n
Soci al
Theor y
( Gi ddens
1979) ,
t ook
a
l ar ge
st ep
f or war d
i n
1981
wi t h
t he
publ i cat i on
of
vol ume
one
of
A
Cont empor ar y
Cr i t i que
of
Hi st or i cal
Mat er i al i sm
.
A
second
vol ume
i s
t o
f ol l ow
and
so
Gi ddens' s
t heor y
of
i ndust r i al
soci et y
must
be r egar ded
as
i ncompl et e
.
For
t hi s
r eason
comment
on
and
cr i t i ci sm
of
i t i s
pr emat ur e and can
onl y
be
t ent at i ve
.
I n
t hi s
paper
I
have chosen
t o
deal , f or
t he
most
par t ,
wi t h
hi s
epi st emol ogi cal
under t aki ng
or
t he
" cl ar i f i cat i on
of
l ogi cal
i ssues"
( Gi ddens
1976
: 8)
;
t he
out come
of
whi ch
i s
hi s
di st i nct i ve
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
and
wi l l
dr aw
most
heavi l y
on
t he
t hr ee
books
publ i shed
i n
1976,
1977
and
1979
.
However ,
because
some
of
t he
paper s
i n
Cent r al
Pr obl ems
i n
Soci al
Theor y
as wel l
as
vol ume
one
of
A
Cont empor ar y
Cr i t i que
of
Hi st or i cal
Mat er i al i sm
ar e
avowedl y
based
on
t he t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on,
I
shal l
i ncl ude
a
shor t
t r eat ment
of
t he
l i nks
bet ween
t he
t wo
par t s
of
Gi ddens' s
wor k
at
t he
end
of
t he
sect i ons
of
t he
paper
on
t he t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
.
As
i nt r oduct i on,
i t
may
be
hel pf ul
t o
t r y
t o
pl ace
hi s
wor k
agai nst
t he
backcl ot h
of
ot her
mor e
est abl i shed
soci al
t heor i es
and
of
some
of
t he r ecent
devel opment s
i n
t hem
.
I n a
ver y
br oad
sense,
Gi ddens' s
wr i t i ngs
can be
seen
as
a
f r esh
at t empt
" t o
br i dge t he
gap"
bet ween
t he
posi t i ons
i n
t he
l ong- st andi ng
debat e over
whet her
soci al
pr act i ces
ar e
best
expl ai ned
by
some
ki nd
of
nat ur al
sci ence
of
soci et y
or
by
some
ver si on
of
t he
i nt er pr et at i ve
pr ocess
of
under st andi ng
.
Al l
ser i ous
soci al
t heor y
has
been
concer ned
wi t h
t hi s
br i dgi ng
oper at i on,
but
t wo
ci r cumst ances
gi ve
speci al
si gni f i cance
t o
Gi ddens' s
at t empt
t o
do
so
.
One
i s
t hat
i t i s
t aki ng
pl ace
at
a
t i me
when
nat ur al i st i c
soci al
t heor y
has
been
consi der abl y
under mi ned,
not
onl y by
t he
f ai l ur e
t o del i ver
adequat e
expl anat i ons,
but
al so
by
t he
at t ack
on
i t s
under l yi ng
epi st emol ogy
whi ch
has
been
mount ed
by
cont empor ar y
phi l osophy
of
sci ence
and
l anguage
.
So
Gi ddens
has
been
abl e
t o
use
new
means
f or
t he
ol d
t ask
.
The
ot her
ci r cumst ance
whi ch
makes
hi s
wor k
unusual l y
si gni f i cant
i s i t s
r el at i onshi p
t o
r ecent
soci al
t heor y
i n
bot h
i t s
" academi c"
and
Mar xi st
f or ms
.
I n
9
2
ANTHONY
GI DDENS
r espect
of
t he
f or mer ,
Gi ddens' s
wr i t i ngs
r epr esent
a
deci ded
br eak
f r om
t he
pr edomi nant l y
nat ur al i st i c
t r adi t i on
of
Engl i sh
soci ol ogy
.
The
cr i t i ci sms
of
hi s
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
whi ch
have
come
f r om
t hi s
quar t er ,
f or
exampl e,
t hat
of
M
. S
.
Ar cher
( 1982) ,
woul d
seem
t o
bear
t hi s
out
.
As
woul d
t he
uneasi ness
among
some
of
hi s
ot her
cr i t i cs
i n t he
f ace
of
Gi ddens' s r eadi ness
t o
accept
a
l ar ge
measur e
of
doubt
and
cont i ngency
i n
t he
mat t er s
of ei t her
phi l osophi cal
or
soci ol ogi cal
cer t ai nt y
( J
.
Bl ei cher
and
M
.
Feat her st one,
1982
: 72)
.
Gi ddens' s
r el at i onshi p
t o
Mar xi sm
i s,
of
cour se,
an
i mpor t ant
i ssue
i n
bot h
hi s
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
and
hi s
t heor y
of
i ndust r i al
soci et y
and
wi l l
be
deal t
wi t h
at
t he
appr opr i at e
poi nt s
i n
t he
body
of
t he
paper
.
Her e,
i t
shoul d be
poi nt ed
out
t hat
Gi ddens,
whi l e
bui l di ng
on
some
el ement s
i n
Mar x' s
t hought
i s
not
a
" Neo-
Mar xi st "
of
any
ki nd
and
" i n
di ver gi ng
f r om
Mar x,
want s
t o
pr opose
t he
el ement s
of an
al t er nat i ve
i nt er pr et at i on of
hi st or y"
( Gi ddens
1981
: 3)
.
Such
a
t hor ough-
goi ng
" deconst r uct i on"
r at her
t han
a
" r econst r uct i on"
( Bl ei cher
and
Feat her st one
1982
: 63)
i s
bound
t o
be
r ej ect ed
by
al l
t hose
who
wi sh
t o r et ai n
t hose
el ement s
of
Mar xi sm whi ch
Gi ddens
r ej ect s
.
Mor e
speci f i cal l y,
t he
wor k
of
Gi ddens
can
be
seen
as
f ol l owi ng
up
sever al
st r ands
i n
exi st i ng
expl anat or y
and
i nt er pr et at i ve
soci al
t heor y
.
He
dr aws
subst ant i al l y
f r om
phenomenol ogy
( i ncl udi ng
et hnomet hodol ogy) ,
her meneu
t i cs,
st r uct ur al i sm,
syst ems
t heor y
and
cer t ai n
aspect s
of
Mar xi sm
.
He
t akes
l i t t l e, i f
anyt hi ng,
f r om
f unct i onal i sm
as
i t
devel oped
i n
Amer i can
soci ol ogy
and
Br i t i sh
ant hr opol ogy
and,
whi l e
r ecogni zi ng
t he
af f i ni t y
of hi s
i deas
t o
symbol i c
i nt er act i oni sm,
he
i s
hi ghl y
cr i t i cal
of
t hat
di vi si on
of
subj ect - mat t er
as
i s
suggest ed
by
t he
t er ms,
" mi cr o"
and
" macr o"
l evel s
of
anal ysi s
.
At
t he
same
t i me,
he
i s
det er mi ned
not
t o
abandon
t he
pur sui t
of
t hat
i nt er subj ect i ve
causal
anal ysi s
whi ch
i s
necessar y
f or
any
cr i t i cal
st ance
i n
soci al
t heor y
.
Obvi ousl y,
nei t her
t he
si mpl e
j uxt aposi t i on
of
her meneut i cs
and
nat ur al i st i c
causat i on,
nor t he
easy
choi ce
of
one
or
t he
ot her ,
wi l l
do
.
Onl y
a
sat i sf act or y
i nt egr at i on
of
bot h
wi l l
suf f i ce
and
i t
i s
no
l ess
t han
such
a
t hor oughgoi ng
i nt egr at i on
whi ch
Gi ddens
pr esent s
i n hi s
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
.
Pr el i mi nar y
Over vi ew
By
r eason
of
i t s
i nt egr at i ve
t ask,
Gi ddens' s t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
i s
an
exceedi ngl y
cl ose- kni t
one
whi ch
does
not
al l ow
i t sel f
t o
be
br oken
down
i nt o
par t s
whi ch
ar e r eadi l y
compr ehensi bl e
i n
i sol at i on
.
Thi s
i s
especi al l y
so
when
one
t r i es
t o
pr esent
an
abr i dged
account
of
what
one
t akes
t o
be
t he
essent i al s of
t he
t heor y
and
i t s
i mpl i cat i ons
.
So
i t
may
be
advi sabl e
t o
begi n
wi t h
a
br i ef
and
dogmat i cal l y
expr essed
over vi ew
of
what
Gi ddens
f i nds
wr ong
wi t h " t he
or t hodox
consensus"
and
how
he
pr oposes
t o set
i t
r i ght
.
Ther eaf t er
I
shal l
at t empt
a
mor e
det ai l ed
st at ement
of
hi s
vi ews
of
soci al
act i on,
of
st r uct ur e
and
of
how
he
makes
t hem
i nt o
a
whol e
.
That
done,
I
shal l
t ur n
t o
t he
l i nks
bet ween
t he
t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
and
t he
t heor y
of i ndust r i al
soci et y
.
Fi nal l y,
I
shal l
el abor at e
some
of
t he
i mpl i cat i ons
of
t he
t heor y
al ong
wi t h
some
possi bl e
cr i t i ci sms
.
H
.
E
.
DI CKI E- CLARK
I n
t he
f i nal
chapt er
of
Cent r al
Pr obl ems
i n
Soci al
Theor y,
Gi ddens
l i st s
f i ve
shor t comi ngs
of
mai nst r eam
soci ol ogy
whi ch
I
shal l
r epeat
and
t hen
t r y
t o
r educe
even
f ur t her
.
The
f i r st
weakness
of
most ,
i f
not
al l
of
i t ,
i s
i t s
" mi st aken
sel f - i nt er pr et at i on
of
i t s
or i gi ns
vi s- i d- vi s
t he nat ur al
sci ences"
( 1979
: 240)
.
Seei ng
i t sel f
as a
newcomer
and
cl ai mi ng
i t s
yout hf ul ness as
t he
r eason
f or
i t s
di f f i cul t i es,
soci ol ogy,
i n
t he
r at her
l ess
t han
i nnocent sense
r ef er r ed
t o
by
Gi ddens
( 1979
: 8) ,
doggedl y
st r ove
af t er
gener al l aws
of
t he
same
l ogi cal
f or m
and
pr edi ct i ve
power
t hat
t he
nat ur al
sci ences
wer e
consi der ed
t o
possess
.
I t
t hus
r emai ned
bl i nd
t o
t he
di f f er ences
bet ween
nat ur e
and
soci et y
.
I t s
second
weakness
was
i t s
" r el i ance
upon
a
now
out moded
and
def ect i ve
phi l osophy
of
l anguage"
( 1979
: 245)
.
That
i s
t o say t hat
l anguage
was
seen si mpl y
as a
means
of
descr i pt i on
and communi cat i on
wi t hout
adequat e
r ecogni t i on
of
how
i t
pl ayed
a cr uci al
par t
i n
const i t ut i ng
and
per pet uat i ng
soci al
l i f e
.
Thi r d,
" or t hodox
soci ol ogy
r el i ed
upon
an
over si mpl e
r evel at or y
model
of soci al
sci ence,
based
on
nat ur al i st i c
pr esumpt i ons"
( 1979
: 248)
.
So
i t
di smi ssed
t he
l ay cr i t i ci smt hat
i t
was
t el l i ng
peopl e
t hi ngs
t hey
al r eady
knew
and
mi sr ead
t he
r ol e of l ay
knowl edge
i n
pr oduci ng
soci al
pr act i ces,
whi ch
l ay
behi nd
t he
cr i t i ci sm
.
I n
t hi s
way,
soci ol ogy
l ar gel y
f ai l ed
t o
deal
wi t h
a
vi t al
par t
of
soci al
r eal i t y
:
i t s
const r uct i on
by
act or s
;
and
t her eby,
l ost
a good
deal
of
i t s
subj ect - mat t er
.
Wi t hout
t hi s
cr uci al
el ement ,
i t
was
possi bl e
f or
or t hodox
soci ol ogy
t o get
by,
al most
wi t hout
not i ci ng, t hat
i t
had
a
f our t h
shor t comi ng,
vi z
. ,
t hat
i t
" l acked
a
t heor y
of
act i on"
( 1979
: 253)
.
By
t hi s
Gi ddens
means
t hat
i t
l acked
" a
concept i on
of
conduct
as
r ef l exi vel y
moni t or ed
by
soci al
agent s
who
ar e
par t i al l y
awar e
of
t he
condi t i ons
of
t hei r
act i on"
( 1979
: 253)
.
As
a
consequence
var i ous
mor e
or
l ess
det er mi ni st i c
expl anat i ons
wer e
of f er ed
.
These
usual l y
t ook
t he
f or m
of
" st r uct ur al "
f act or s
whi ch
i n
t he
shor t
or
l ong
r un
wer e
consi der ed
t o
det er mi ne
peopl e' s
conduct
.
The
f i f t h
and
l ast
shor t comi ng
l i st ed
by
Gi ddens
i s,
i n a
sense
an
ext ensi on
of t he
f i r st
one
i n t hat
he
seems
t o
f eel
t hat
not
onl y
t he
f ol l ower s
of
t he
l ogi cal
posi t i vi sm
of
Hempel
and
Nagel ,
but
al so
even
some
i nt er pr et at i ve
t heor i st s,
e
. g
. ,
Wi nch
and
Haber mas, have
not
ent i r el y
f r eed
t hemsel ves
f r om
" t he
posi t i vi st i c
model
of
nat ur al
sci ence
. "
For
our
pr esent ,
i nt r oduct or y
pur pose,
I
wi sh
t o
t r y
t o
r educe
( wi t hout
di st or t i ng
what
I
r et ai n)
t he
number
of
shor t comi ngs
t o
t hr ee
.
Fi r st ,
t he
" nat ur al
sci ence"
sel f - under st andi ng
i s
t oo
det er mi ni st i c
and
so
l eaves
out t he
measur e
of
aut onomy
possessed
by
soci al
act or s
.
Second,
and
as a
r esul t ,
t he
vi t al
par t
pl ayed by
l anguage,
consci ousness
and
t he
consequent
l ay
knowl edge
i n
t he
pr oduct i on
of soci al
r eal i t y
i s
negl ect ed
.
Thi r d
and
f or
t he
same
r eason,
t he
or t hodox
consensus
has
been
unabl e
t o i nt egr at e
adequat el y
a
t heor y
of f ace-
t o- f ace
i nt er act i on
wi t h
one
of
i nst i t ut i onal
anal ysi s
.
What
t hen does
Gi ddens
pr opose
t o
do
t o
r emedy
t hese
shor t comi ngs?
Fi r st ,
he
pl aces
peopl e
at
t he
ver y
cent r e
of
t hi ngs
by
maki ng t hem
t he
act i ve,
ski l l ed
agent s
who
act ual l y
pr oduce,
sust ai n
and
t r ansf or m
soci al
l i f e
.
Second,
by
usi ng
a
not i on of
st r uct ur e
r at her
di f f er ent
f r om
t hose
used
i n
or t hodox
soci ol ogy
and one whi ch was
compat i bl e
wi t h
t he
r ol e
he
gi ves t o
act or s,
he
consi der abl y
r educes
i t s
det er mi ni ng
ef f ect ,
and
gi ves
equal
i mpor t ance
t o
9
4
ANTHONY
GI DDENS
st r uct ur e
as
means
or
r esour ces
.
Thi r d,
he
achi eves
t he
deci si ve
i nt egr at i on
of
" act i on"
and
" st r uct ur e"
t hr ough
t hei r
i nt er dependence
whi ch
i s
br ought
about
i n
t he
pr oduct i on
of st r uct ur e
( i n
Gi ddens' s
sense)
by
act or s
usi ng
i t
as a
r esour ce
and
at
t he
same
t i me
r epeat edl y
r epr oduci ng
i t
as a
const r ai ni ng
out come
of
t hei r
i nt er act i on
.
I n
t hi s
way
t he
" dual i t y"
of
st r uct ur e,
whi ch
i s
si mul t aneousl y bot h
t he
means
and
t he
out come
of
act i on,
l i nks
act i on
and
st r uct ur e
as
i nt egr al
par t s
of
each
ot her
and
r epl aces
t he
separ at i ng
" dual i sm"
of
f ace- t o- f ace
i nt er act i on
and
t he
const r ai ni ng
pr oper t i es of
t he
r esul t ant
syst ems
of r epeat ed
soci al
pr act i ces
and
r el at i onshi ps
.
Wi t h
t hi s
cr ude
i ndi cat i on
of
what
i s
t o
come,
we can
now
t ur n
t o
a
mor e
det ai l ed
account
of f or ci bl y
separ at ed
el ement s
of
t he t heor y
of
st r uct ur at i on
.
The
Theor y
of
Soci al
Act i on
A
f undament al
cr i t i ci sm t hat
Gi ddens
makes
of
al most
al l
exi st i ng soci al
t heor i es
i s
t hat
t hey
do
not
have
an
adequat e
t heor y
of
soci al
act i on, or
agency
( 1976
: 93- 98,
126
;
1977
: 167
;
1979
: 49- 53,
253- 257)
.
Ei t her
t hey
r et ai n
t oo
much
det er mi ni sm
( i ncl udi ng
even
Par sons' s
woul d- be
" vol unt ar i st i c" t heor y)
and
r educe
t he act or s
t o
mer e
puppet s
who
r espond
mor e
or
l ess
mechani cal l y
t o
t he
f act or s,
f or ces
and
st r uct ur es
whi ch
ar e
hel d
t o
det er mi ne
i n
var i ous
ways
t hei r
act i ons
.
Or t hey
make
t he
opposi t e
er r or
and
act or s
ar e
endowed
wi t h
near l y
compl et e
aut onomy
and
f ul l
knowl edge
of
t hemsel ves
and
t hei r
act i ons
.
I n
cont r ast ,
Gi ddens
wi shes
t o
" pr omot e
a
r ecover y
of
t hesubj ect
wi t hout
l apsi ng
i nt o
subj ect i vi sm" ( 1979
: 44)
and
whi l e
r ecogni zi ng
t he
l i mi t s
of
our
sel f - knowl edge
.
I n
seeki ng
t o
achi eve
t hi s
ai m,
Gi ddens
t ur ns
i ni t i al l y
t o
t heor i es
of
mai nl y
i deal i st
or i gi n,
but
t hen
goes
on
t o
make
cer t ai n
addi t i ons
of hi s
own
.
Al t hough
Gi ddens' s t heor y
of
act i on
owes much,
as
we
shal l
see
pr esent l y,
t o
phenomenol ogy,
t he
phi l osophy
of
l anguage
and
her meneut i cs,
he
al so
not es
i t s
cl oseness
t o
Mar xi an
Pr axi s
and
t o
Mar x' s
cont ent i on,
i n t he
i nt r oduct or y
par agr aphs
of
' The
Ei ght eent h
Br umai r e
of
Loui s
Bonapar t e, "
t hat
" Men make
t hei r
own
hi st or y,
but
t hey
do
not
make
i t
j ust
as
t hey
pl ease
. "
Whi l e
Gi ddens
i s
cr i t i cal
of
t he
posi t i vi st
and
f unct i onal i st
aspect s
of
Mar x' s
wr i t i ngs,
el ement s of
hi s
phi l osophy
of hi st or y ar e
deci si vel y
used
by
Gi ddens
.
However ,
Mar x
hi msel f
di d
not
syst emat i cal l y
devel op
t hi s
t heme
of
t he
par t i al
aut onomy
of
human
agent s
and
i t
i s
t o
t he
l at er
phi l osopher s
of
l anguage
and
her meneut i cs
t hat
Gi ddens
must
go
f or a
mor e
adequat e
account
of
how
i t
i s
possi bl e
f or act or s
t o
" make
t hei r
own
hi st or y"
even
i f
wi t hi n
cer t ai n
l i mi t s
.
Wher e
does
t he
par t i al
f r eedom
f r om
const r ai nt ,
or
vol unt ar i sm
of soci al
act or s
come
f r om?
Thi s
quest i on,
of
cour se,
t akes
us
al l
t he
way
back
t o
t he
r oot s
of
t he
gap
bet ween
expl anat i on
and
under st andi ng
whi ch
Gi ddens
i s
t r yi ng
t o
br i dge
.
Ver y
br oadl y
speaki ng,
al l
i nt er pr et at i ve
soci al
t heor y
makes
t he
assumpt i on
t hat
we do
not
have
t he
mor e
or
l ess
di r ect
access
t o
t he
obj ect s
and
event s
of
our
exper i ence
whi ch
nat ur al i st i c
expl anat i ons
pr esume
;
r at her ,
what
i s
accept ed
as
" knowl edge"
ar e t he
i nt er pr et at i ons
we
pl ace
upon
obj ect s
and
event s
t hr ough
t he
exer ci se
of
consci ousness
.
Hence
what
we
cr eat e i n
t he
f i r st
pl ace
we
may,
H
.
F
.
DI CKI E- CLARK
al t hough
wi t h
di f f i cul t y,
r ecr eat e
and
t r ansf or m
.
Thi s
i s
what
gi ves
us
a
measur e
of
f r eedom
i n
maki ng and
r emaki ng
t he
soci al
wor l d
wi t hi n t he
const r ai nt s
i mposed
by
i ncompl et e
knowl edge,
nat ur e
and
t he
soci al
ar r angement s,
bot h
past
and
pr esent ,
made
t o
sat i sf y
needs
.
Her e,
t oo,
l i es
t he
essent i al
di f f er ence
bet ween
nat ur e
and
soci et y
as
seen
by
phenomenol ogy
and her meneut i cs
and
whi ch
Gi ddens
al so
accept s ( 1976
: 15- 16,
160)
.
However
cl ose
and
i mpor t ant
t he
t i es
bet ween
t he
t wo
may
be
i n
some
r espect s,
or i n
some
ul t i mat e
sense,
nat ur e
i s
not
a
human
pr oduct
wher eas
soci et y
i s
.
The
endl essl y
r epeat ed
soci al
pr act i ces
whi ch
compr i se
soci al
l i f e
ar e
not
" gi ven"
as
nat ur e
i s,
but
br ought
about
by
act or s
endowed
wi t h
consci ousness,
l anguage
and
a
body
of
col l ect i ve
l ay
" knowl edge
. "
These
t hr ee
el ement s
i n
i nt er pr et at i ve
t heor y
ar e
cl osel y
al l i ed
and
t he
unr avel l i ng
of
t hei r
meani ngs
and
compl ex
i nt er r el at i onshi ps
woul d
be
an
i mmense
t ask
.
Ther e
i s
consi der abl e
over l appi ng
i n
t he
usages
of
t he
t er ms
but
t hey
can
be
l oosel y
hel d
t oget her , as
i t
wer e,
by
t he
i ncl usi ve
concept
of
Ver st ehen,
or
under st andi ng
.
Hence
i t i s
necessar y
and
mor e
usef ul
her e
t o
di st i ngui sh
t he
ear l i er
usage
of
t hi s
t er m
f r om
t hat
whi ch
i s
t aken
over by
Gi ddens
.
Peopl e
have
pr obabl y al ways
known
about
t hei r
awar eness
of
t hemsel ves,
t hei r
abi l i t y
t o
r ef l ect
on
t hei r
conduct
and
of
t he
possi bi l i t y
of
" sel f - f ul f i l l i ng
pr opheci es" ,
and
t he
at t empt
t o
t ake
t hem
i nt o
account
when
expl ai ni ng
soci al
l i f e
i s
a
l ong- st andi ng
one
.
Thus
i n t he
ear l i er
not i on
of
Ver st ehen,
as
gener al l y
under st ood
i n
Nor t h
Amer i ca
and
usual l y
at t r i but ed
t o
Max
Weber ,
" under st andi ng"
was
t he
i nsi ght
at t ai ned
by
put t i ng
onesel f
i n
anot her ' s
pl ace
or r el i vi ng
anot her ' s
exper i ence
i n
some
way
.
I t
was
seen
as a
usef ul
sour ce
of
hypot heses
whi ch
coul d
t hen
be
put
t o
t he
t est
of
i nt er subj ect i ve
causal
anal ysi s
i n
one f or m
or
ot her
.
I n
t hi s
way
t he
cl ai ms
of
i nt er pr et at i ve
t heor y
wer e
par t i al l y
r ecogni zed
but
al so
r el egat ed
t o a
mi nor ,
pr el i mi nar y
r ol e
.
Si mi l ar l y,
t he
abi l i t y
of
act or s
t o
moni t or
and
modi f y
t hei r
conduct
i n
t he
l i ght
of
t hei r
own,
or
ot her s' ,
expect at i ons
was
di smi ssed
as
of
mi nor
i mpor t ance
.
I n
st r ong
cont r ast ,
t he
mor e
r ecent
vi ew
of
Ver st ehen,
whi ch
Gi ddens
appl i es,
r ai ses
r ef l exi ve
consci ousness,
l anguage
and
col l ect i ve l ay
knowl edge
t o
t he
ut most
i mpor t ance
.
For
t hey
become
t he
ver y
pr econdi t i ons
and
means
of
any
ki nd
of
soci al
i nt er act i on
what soever
.
" Under st andi ng"
i s
t her ef or e
t he
knowi ng,
or
havi ng
a
compet ent
gr asp, of
t he
col l ect i ve
l ay
knowl edge,
expr essed
i n
l anguage,
whi ch
i s
a
pr econdi t i on
of
our
bei ng
abl e
t o
i nt er act
wi t h
ot her s
.
I t
i s
upon
t hi s
st ock
of shar ed
knowl edge
t hat
act or s
dr aw
i n
or der
t o
pr oduce
t he
soci al
pr act i ces
t hr ough
whi ch
t hey
pur sue
t hei r
i nt er est s
.
Gi ddens
cal l s
i t
" mut ual
knowl edge"
or
" common- sense
under st andi ngs
possessed
by
act or s
wi t hi n
shar ed
cul t ur al
mi l i eux"
( 1976
: 88- 89)
and
r ef er s
t o
i t
as
" t aken- f or -
gr ant ed"
knowl edge
;
or
what
any
compet ent
act or
coul d
be
expect ed
t o
know
.
Gadamer ,
a
l eadi ng
exponent
of
t he phi l osophi cal
her meneut i cs
on
whi ch
Gi ddens
dr aws,
uses
t he
t er m,
" t r adi t i on"
( 1960) ,
whi l e Wi t t genst ei n
and
hi s
f ol l ower s
t al k
of " f or ms of
l i f e"
.
But
what ever
name
i t
bear s, a
compet ent ,
i f
not
a
whol l y
compl et e
or
even
consci ous,
under st andi ng
of
i t
i s,
i n
Gi ddens' s
wor ds,
" t he
ont ol ogi cal
condi t i on
of
human
soci et y
as
i t
i s
pr oduced
and
r epr oduced
by
i t s
member s"
( 1976
: 151)
.
9
6