Journal ArticleDOI
Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection
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In this article, it was shown that having an ability of the sort in question nevertheless involves possessing factual knowledge about certain phenomenal features of mental states, factual knowledge lacked by the physically omniscient but having never had them.Abstract:
Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have advanced influential arguments designed to foil any materialist attempt to account for the mental.' These socalled knowledge arguments assume that if materialism is true, someone who possesses complete physical knowledge will know every fact about mental states there is to know. Thus, because there are facts about mental states that will not be known by someone who possesses complete physical knowledge but has never enjoyed certain experiences, it follows that materialist accounts of the mental are inadequate. In response, defenders of materialism have generated counterarguments of several kinds. In my view, no materialist strategy has so far been successful, but nonetheless, further development will vindicate one of them. Early resistance to the knowledge arguments aimed to show that what distinguishes a subject who has had certain sensory experiences from someone who is physically omniscient but has never had them is not factual knowledge, but merely an ability, such as an ability to imagine, recognize, or remember,2 or an ability to apply a concept,3 and that hence, there is no fact about mental states that eludes a materialist account. The decisive issue for this first strategy is whether having an ability of the sort in question nevertheless involves possessing factual knowledge about certain phenomenal features of mental states, factual knowledge lacked by the physically omni-read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness
Murat Aydede,Güven Güzeldere +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what they call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects.
Journal ArticleDOI
A limited defense of the knowledge argument
TL;DR: In this paper, the plausibilite de la premisse principale de l'argument de la connaissance developpe par F. Jackson en faveur d'un physicalisme objectif is mesure.
Journal ArticleDOI
Experience and Evidence
TL;DR: In this paper, a unified account of perceptual evidence and its rational source in perceptual experience is provided. But the rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities that we have in virtue of being perceivers.
The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach
Murat Aydede,Donald D. Price +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the use of first-person experiential methods in the scientific study of pain is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons.