Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries

TLDR: In this article, the authors used Probit and Tobit estimators to examine the compliance behavior of 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishermen who face a regulation banning them from fishing in a zone along the coast.

Abstract: This study adds to the limited body of empirical evidence on the effect that legitimacy and deterrence have on compliance behavior. The theoretical models of compliance behavior tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for legitimacy, deterrence, and other motivations expected to influence indiv duals' decisions whether to comply. Probit and Tobit econometric estimators are used to examine the compliance behavior of 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishermen who face a regulation banning them from fishing in a zone along the coast. The results of the empirical analysis provide additional evidence on the relationship of deterrence and legitimacy to compliance. The findings are also used to draw implications for compliance policy for regulated fisheries. According to normative compliance theory, people tend to obey laws made and implemented by authorities perceived to be legitimate. A key determinant of perceived legitimacy, according to the procedural justice literature, is the fairness built into the procedures used to develop and implement laws and regulations.l Paternoster et al. (1997) note that while there are numerous theoretical perspectives suggesting that legitimacy is an important determinant of compliance, the empirical evidence making that connection is meager.2 Our study adds to this limited body of empirical evidence. The subjects of our study are fishermen. Fishermen are excellent subjects for the study of compliance. They are subject to numerous regulations that constrain their opportunities to earn income, and temptations and opportunities for offending repeatedly occur.3 Passion, inadvertence, and accident rarely cause a fishery violation; most are the result of deliberate choice. The behavior of fishermen offers good evidence on which to test the role deterrence, legitimacy, and other factors play in explaining compliance. Studying the compliance behavior of such regulated economic agents as fishermen is important for other reasons. Achieving compliance in regulated industries is both costly and difficult. Expenditures on enforcement commonly constitute the largest cost element in governmental regulatory programs. The viability of environmental protection and resource management programs is often threatened by low rates of compliance and high enforcement costs. This raises questions whether there are ways to improve the cost effectiveness of traditional enforcement and whether there are ways to secure compliance without heavy reliance on costly enforcement. Central to improving the cost effectiveness of enforcement and compliance programs is understanding the compliance behavior of the economic agents subject to regulations. To this end, we present tests of alternative models of compliance behavior. The models tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations influencing individuals' decisions whether to comply.4 The tests are conducted on data from interviews with fishermen in Peninsular Malaysia (selfreports of violations). Becker (1968) was the first to develop a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity. Following Smith (1966 [1759], 1985 [1776]) and Bentham (1967 [1789]), Becker assumes that criminals behave basically like other individuals in that they attempt to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In Becker's model, an individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity.5 The basic deterrence framework used in these studies assumes that the threat of sanctions is the only policy mechanism available to improve compliance with regulations. …