Journal ArticleDOI
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control
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In this paper, it was shown that inflation is lower the higher central bank independence and that, given independence, countries that pre-announce monetary policy have even lower rates of inflation.Abstract:
ing from details, these conclusions imply that inflation is lower the higher is CBI and that, given independence, countries that pre-announce monetary policy have even lower rates of inflation. Furthermore, there is no evidence that CBI retards growth or investment. As a matter of fact, for LDCs, the evidence points in the opposite direction. Low independence is associated with lower growth and investment. Some economists feel that excessive independence may interfere with the potential stabilisatory function of monetary policy. Since fluctuations in the growth rate of the economy are found to be unrelated to CBI, this does not appear to be the case. III. COMMITMENT VIA CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE ANDread more
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Posted ContentDOI
Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence
Helge Berger,Helge Berger,Jakob de Haan,Jakob de Haan,Jakob de Haan,Sylvester Eijffinger,Sylvester Eijffinger,Sylvester Eijffinger +7 more
TL;DR: The authors reviewed recent research on central bank independence and concluded that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust, and raised various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI.
Journal ArticleDOI
Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers
Roel Beetsma,A.L. Bovenberg +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, two types of arrangements are considered for the union's common central bank (CCB): making the CCP more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the CCP, and they find that an optimally designed, conservative CCP may outperform inflation targeting.
Journal ArticleDOI
The European Internal Market Programme and Inbound Foreign Direct Investment
Posted Content
The ECB’s Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures: The Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure
TL;DR: In this article, a flow-of-funds analysis of central banks' response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis is presented, with a focus on the role of banks as lenders of last resort to the banking system.
References
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Book
Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss monetary policy with private information under perfect information and asymmetric information and changing objectives under discretion, and provide an overview of the employment and revenue motivations for monetary expansion.
Journal ArticleDOI
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed four measures of central bank independence and explored their relation with inflation outcomes, including the rate of turnover of the central bank governors, the aggregation of the legal index, and the number of changes in the chief executive of a central bank.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries
TL;DR: In this article, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini investigated the role of institutions in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers and found that there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline.
Journal ArticleDOI
Macroeconomics and Politics
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of electoral competition on macroeconomic policy and on the economic cycle are examined, and the role of different degrees of independence of the Central Bank as a determinant of monetary policy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political influence on the central bank: international evidence
Alex Cukierman,Steven B. Webb +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors measured the influence of political influence on the central bank by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government.