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Journal ArticleDOI

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes

Cukierman, Alex Webb, Steven B. Neyapti, Bilin
- 30 Sep 1992 - 
- Vol. 6, Iss: 3, pp 353-398
TLDR
In this paper, the authors developed four measures of central bank independence and explored their relation with inflation outcomes, including the rate of turnover of the central bank governors, the aggregation of the legal index, and the number of changes in the chief executive of a central bank.
Abstract
Making the central bank an agency with the mandate and reputation for maintaining price stability is a means by which a government can choose the strength of its commitment to price stability. This article develops four measures of central bank independence and explores their relation with inflation outcomes. An aggregate legal index is developed for four decades in 72 countries. Three indicators of actual independence are developed: the rate of turnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaire answered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregation of the legal index and the rate of turnover. Legal independence is inversely related to inflation in industrial, but not in developing, countries. In developing countries the actual frequency of change of the chief executive officer of the bank is a better proxy for central bank independence. An inflation-based index of overall central bank independence contributes significantly to explaining cross-country variations in the rate of inflation.

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Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI

The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target

TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the ideal central bank should place a large, but finite, weight on inflation, and a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets is proposed.
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Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss monetary policy with private information under perfect information and asymmetric information and changing objectives under discretion, and provide an overview of the employment and revenue motivations for monetary expansion.
Journal ArticleDOI

Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries

TL;DR: In this article, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini investigated the role of institutions in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers and found that there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline.
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The evolution of central banks

TL;DR: Goodhart as mentioned in this paper surveys the case for free banking, examines the key role of the clearing house in the evolution of the central bank, and investigates bank expansion and fluctuation in the context of a clearing house mechanism.
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