Book ChapterDOI
Charging Network for Electric Vehicles
Tiago Pinheiro,Mário Serafim Nunes,Martijn Kuipers +2 more
- pp 405-415
TLDR
This paper proposes a full EV charging network architecture, based on the current test-pilot of a national energy provider, that follows a modular approach, allowing multi-communication technologies, such as, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Wi-Fi and Ethernet.Abstract:
This paper proposes a full EV charging network architecture, based on the current test-pilot of a national energy provider. The Electric Vehicle Charging Station (EVCS) follows a modular approach, allowing multi-communication technologies, such as, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Wi-Fi and Ethernet. The EVCS was verified both in the functional, as well as in the electrical domain. The prototype implementation of the EVCS is already fully operational and integrated in an energy operator EVCS network.read more
References
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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
TL;DR: This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which provides communications security over the Internet by allowing client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.
Proceedings Article
Reverse-engineering a cryptographic RFID tag
TL;DR: This paper reconstructs the cipher from the widely used Mifare Classic RFID tag by using a combination of image analysis of circuits and protocol analysis, and reveals that the security of the tag is even below the level that its 48-bit key length suggests due to a number of design flaws.
Book ChapterDOI
Dismantling MIFARE Classic
Flavio D. Garcia,Gerhard de Koning Gans,Ruben Muijrers,Peter van Rossum,Roel Verdult,Ronny Wichers Schreur,Bart Jacobs +6 more
TL;DR: This work reverse engineered the security mechanisms of the mifare Classic chip: the authentication protocol, the symmetric cipher, and the initialization mechanism and describes several security vulnerabilities in these mechanisms, which enable an attacker to clone a card or to restore a real card to a previous state.
Book ChapterDOI
A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic
TL;DR: Due to a weakness in the pseudo-random generator, it is able to recover the keystream generated by the CRYPTO1 stream cipher and exploit the malleability of the stream cipher to read all memory blocks of the first sector of the card.
Related Papers (5)
Attacks and Security Measures of the Exchanged Information in the Charging Infrastructure for Electromobiles
Ivan Nedyalkov,Dimitar Arnaudov +1 more