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Journal ArticleDOI

Chevron Without Chevron

TLDR
Chevron v NRDC may well be the most important case in all of administrative law, and it establishes a general principle that agencies may interpret ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as their interpretations are reasonable as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract
Chevron v NRDC may well be the most important case in all of administrative law. It establishes a general principle, which is that agencies may interpret ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as their interpretations are reasonable. That principle is now under serious pressure. If the Court abandoned it, how would Chevron itself be decided? There are five possible approaches: (1) textualism; (2) purposivism; (3) resort to canons of construction; (4) use of Skidmore deference; and (5) validation of the agency’s decision, on the ground that no statutory provision prohibited it. In the context of Chevron, (1) and (2) run into serious problems, but (3), (4), and (5) are promising. The discussion suggests some general lessons for statutory interpretation and administrative law, and offers some cautionary notes for those who want to abandon the Chevron framework. Abandoning that framework would introduce high levels of confusion in the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself, and in all probability, the framework that would ultimately replace it would turn out to look a fair bit like that in Chevron itself.

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Separation of Powers in Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection for the Rule of Law?

TL;DR: The notion of separation of powers was introduced by John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu as a prescription for government organization capable of offering protection against tyrannical rule and for human rights, and some assurance of an open, accountable and responsive government.
Journal ArticleDOI

Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Statutes from a Comparative Perspective

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine, from a comparative perspective, how judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes takes place and whether it is constitutionally admissible, and propose a nuanced approach along all or part of the following lines may be appropriate: when (i) in light of the applicable methods and canons of construction, a statute allows a margin of interpretation, (ii) the administrative interpretation remains within this margin, and (iii) the applicable international, constitutional, statutory or other constraints permit or, at least, do not exclude judicial defererence either generally or in the