Desert-sensitive egalitarianism

TLDR: In this article, the authors present a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice, which combines the two forms of egalitarianism in such a way that telic egalitarianism is a baseline position but allows deviations from it for reasons that deontal egalitarianism specifies.

Abstract: The main purpose of my thesis is to present a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice. In this thesis, egalitarianism comes in two principal forms: teleological (telic) egalitarianism and deontological (deontic) egalitarianism. Telic egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality, because it makes the outcome better. Deontic egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality not because it makes the outcome better, but for some other morally relevant reason. While the two forms of egalitarianism are often regarded as incompatible positions in egalitarian justice, this thesis combines the two in such a way that telic egalitarianism is a baseline position but which allows deviations from it for reasons that deontic egalitarianism specifies. In taking this approach, I show three things. The first is that telic egalitarianism as a base point can be fleshed out as the Principle of Baseline Equality. This principle holds that all people should be equally well off as a point of departure. This would very likely obtain in conditions of moderate scarcity (which is often called ‘the circumstances of justice’). The second is that deontic egalitarianism is better interpreted in the responsibility-sensitive form: substantive inequalities are morally permissible only if they precisely reflect people’s exercise of responsibility. This is what I formulate as the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. This principle can apply in both negative—an agent’s responsibility for being worse off—and positive—an agent’s responsibility for being better