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Freedom Without Idealization : Non-Ideal Approaches to
Freedom of Communication
Karppinen, Kari Eerik
2019-02
Karppinen , K E 2019 , ' Freedom Without Idealization : Non-Ideal Approaches to Freedom
of Communication ' , Communication Theory , vol. 29 , no. 1 , pp. 66-85 . https://doi.org/10.1093/ct/qty013
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/307199
https://doi.org/10.1093/ct/qty013
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Kari Karppinen
University of Helsinki
Freedom Without Idealization: Non-Ideal Approaches to Freedom of Communication
Abstract
This article discusses the normative perspectives that guide debates on freedom of
communication and media from the perspective of the distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory. In political theory, ideal theories are often criticized as being detached from
actually existing social conditions and real-world problems. Similarly, it can be argued that
abstract and idealized models of freedom of communication and media do not provide the
most useful theoretical resources for analyzing the factors that enable or constrain free
expression in contemporary societies. The article discusses the implication of three different
non-ideal approaches to freedom: Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction, the capabilities
approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and the notion of agonistic
freedom associated with radical-democratic theory.
Keywords: Freedom of communication, ideal theory, non-ideal theory, normative
reconstruction, capabilities approach, agonistic freedom
Freedom Without Idealization: Non-Ideal Approaches to Freedom of Communication
In the debate on the roles of ideal and non-ideal theory in contemporary political
theory, it has been suggested that abstract ideals of societal perfection may not always
provide the most useful conceptual basis for normative theory and critical research (e.g.,
Mills, 2005; Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). Ideal theories about notions, such as freedom,
justice, or democracy, in particular have been widely criticized for being too abstract and
detached from actually existing empirical conditions to guide normative analyses or political
action in real-world circumstances. Instead, these critics have argued that there is a need for
non-ideal normative theories that can better address actual problems and guide political
choices.
The same kind of criticism can be directed at current academic and political debates
on freedom as a central normative concept in the context of communication and media. There
is no shortage of discussion and disagreement on the different meanings of freedom of
expression, communication, and media, or the institutional implications of these ideals.
However, the normative conceptions of freedom that underpin these debates are often highly
abstract and idealized, to the extent of being vacuous, in the sense that they provide little
guidance for actually analyzing and evaluating media systems, performance, or concrete
media policy choices.
Instead, it can be argued that ideal-theoretical frameworks of free expression and
media freedom often serve the function of normative reassurance: justifying their status as
universal abstract principles or defending pre-determined policy positions, rather than
actually providing resources for analyzing how these principles have emerged and evolved,
or how actually existing structures and practices enable or constrain their realization.
What I mean by “idealized” conceptions of freedom thus refers both to the way of
thinking about freedom of communication as an absolute or authentic ideal, detached from
empirical conditions, and to the uses of such absolute ideals in public and policy debates as
“fetishized principles” to gather support for a variety of agendas (see Freedman, 2015, p.
104).
Especially in political debates on the media, but also in research, the status of freedom
as a foundational ideal is often simply taken for granted, which leaves questions of normative
assumptions unexamined. At other times, when different normative frameworks of freedom
are explicitly invoked, they typically presuppose a classic ideal theory developed in a context
very different from the current conditions. Despite the recognition of the decidedly non-ideal
circumstances surrounding the contemporary media landscape, the debates tend to be
couched in ideal frameworks of the free marketplace of ideas, the public sphere, or some
other established model or metaphor of what communicative freedom would mean under
idealized, hypothetical conditions.
According to Edge (2013, p. 379), a normative theory of freedom should enable us to
evaluate “the way the (alterable) shapes and structures of our societies affect the shape of our
freedom, and how our areas, or degrees, of individual liberty are distributed and, indeed, what
kind of obstacles might be standing in the way of our actual and potential choices.” The
debates on freedom of communication and media freedom in contemporary societies clearly
touch upon concrete real-world problems that involve complex, evolving obstacles and power
structures. In terms of understanding and critically evaluating these constraints or making
comparisons between different non-ideal cases, relating these conditions to abstract and
timeless idealizations of pure and perfect freedom is arguably not the most useful approach.
The idealized way of thinking about freedom as a state of perfection also offers little practical
policy guidance: Invoking free speech as an absolute principle may well help compel political
support for the actors and causes that deploy them, but for the purposes of critically
evaluating obstacles to communication, different policy options and their consequences, it
may sometimes be counter-productive. As many critical scholars have noted, such ritualistic
uses risk reducing terms such as free speech, press freedom, or internet freedom to mere
fetishized principles or “tired, incoherent mantras” (Freedman, 2015; Tambini, 2012). With
enduring and emerging constraints ranging from government control and market censorship
to new forms of platform dominance and algorithmic censorship, normative and media policy
choices related to freedom of communication arguably need better theoretical and normative
grounding.
The aim of this article is to examine and compare three distinct normative
perspectives, which approach freedom of communication and media in non-ideal and non-
foundational terms. These approaches recognize freedom as a contested, imperfect, and
socially constructed ideal, not a state that can be attained in any absolute sense. However, the
idea is not to replace ideal theories with relativism or descriptivism, or to argue for accepting
the status quo as a given. The non-idealizing perspectives discussed here retain freedom of
communication as a central normative principle, but without binding it to any transcendental,
universal ideal theory with definite conditions of realization. While they are not without
problems, I argue that the three approaches discussed below can, in different ways, provide
useful theoretical perspectives for rethinking freedom of communication as a normative
concept and for evaluating the structures and practices that enable or constrain it today.
The article begins with a brief introduction to the philosophical distinction between
ideal and non-ideal theory. The implications of the distinction in the context of current
debates on freedom of communication and media are then discussed. After that, the article
present three different theoretical perspectives on freedom that have arguably been, if not
neglected, at least underdeveloped in normative debates in communication studies: Axel