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Journal ArticleDOI

Functionalism, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Mind

K. V. Wilkes
- 01 Feb 1981 - 
- Vol. 12, Iss: 1, pp 147-167
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TLDR
In this paper, the scope and limits of functionalism are discussed, arguing both for the promise of its scope and the extent of its limitations, arguing that to overestimate its scope renders it vulnerable to a number of objections which cannot easily or plausibly be evaded, so that it is easy to conclude by undere stimating its power and potential in its true and proper domain.
Abstract
A great deal has been claimed for functionalism; in my view, considerably more than it can or should try to deliver. To overestimate its scope renders it vulnerable to a number of objections which cannot easily or plausibly be evaded,1 so that it is easy to conclude by undere stimating its power and potential in its true and proper domain. In this paper I sketch my own version of the scope and limits of functionalism, arguing both for the promise of its scope and the extent of its limitations. First, though, some ground-clearing: a few preliminary remarks which I hope will be recognized as obvious and trivial, (i) To describe a theory as 'functionalist' is elliptical shorthand; 'being a function' is as such an incomplete predicate. Functions are functions of things: cutting is the function of a knife, herding sheep that of a sheepdog, and seeing ( vide Aristotle) is the job of the optical apparatus. Functions are thus functions of structures, and often of complex structures at that. Further, some structures physically cannot perform certain tasks meringues can't carve joints. It often therefore proves unwise in psychology to concentrate exclusively upon the functional design of the systems examined, because the applicability of many predicates will often depend, as Gunderson puts it,2 not so much on how the robot is programmed but rather upon how the program is roboted. To keep this important, if obvious, point in mind I shall throughout the rest of the paper talk not of 'functionalism' but of 'S-F theory', where 'S-F' stands for 'structural-functional'. This point has implications to which we shall return.

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Citations
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Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation

TL;DR: This article examined people's folk-psychological concept of intentional action and found that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people's judgments as to whether or not that behavior should be considered intentional.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology

TL;DR: In this paper, the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors in folk psychology has been investigated and the aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use.
Journal ArticleDOI

What is folk psychology

TL;DR: It is argued that sorting out the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding "folk psychology" has major consequences for the eliminativism debate, if certain models of cognition turn out to be true, then on some readings of " folk psychology" the arguments for elimination collapse.
Journal ArticleDOI

Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behaviour

TL;DR: Folk psychology, however, is not the sort of framework that might be shown to be radically defective by sheerly empirical findings as mentioned in this paper, and it has nothing to fear from advances in cognitive theory or neuroscience.
Journal ArticleDOI

Why we view the brain as a computer

TL;DR: This work suggests that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical signals, and indicates why computational theories have explanatory force with respect to these regularities.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Brain Function and Blood Flow

TL;DR: Changes in the amount of blood flowing in areas of the human cerebral cortex reflect changes in the activity of those areas, as revealed by scintiscanning techniques following the injection of xenon-133.
Journal ArticleDOI

What psychological states are not

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that behaviorism and physicalism cannot be construed as theories about the conditions for type identity of psychological states, and it seems increasingly unlikely that either behaviorism or physicalism is true.