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Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?
Itzhak Gilboa,David Schmeidler +1 more
TLDR
In this article, the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms is given.Abstract:
This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.read more
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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium, and that if payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutualmax and mutualmin outcomes; if payoff are large, fairness equilibrium are roughly a set of Nash equilibra.
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Can Free Choice Be Known
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a prisoner's dilemma and show that rational and identical players should cooperate in a one-shot prisoner-dilemma, regardless of how one views this type of reasoning, pointing at a possible inconsistency in standard formulations of knowledge and decision.
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The Hangman's Paradox and Newcomb's Paradox as Psychological Games
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a new interpretation of the Hangman's Paradox and Newcomb's Paradox by casting the puzzles in the language of modern game theory, instead of in the realm of epistemology, and argue that giving a player an additional attractive (even dominant) strategy may make him worse off.
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Subjective Perception Games and Privacy.
Ronen Gradwohl,Rann Smorodinsky +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown that such perception games always have equilibria, and two natural refinements are discussed, which demonstrate the applicability of the framework in a variety of contexts, with a particular emphasis on privacy-related issues.
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Intentions and Social Interactions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model intentions in a dynamic psychological game under incomplete information and find a complex social interaction in this game, where a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations.