In my previous work, I clarified two characteristics of pure knowing (liang zhi): (1) pure knowing as the capacity of making moral judgments, and (2) pure knowing as moral standards and moral knowledge. In this paper, I clarify another two aspects of pure knowing: (3) pure knowing as moral motivation, and (4) pure knowing as practical ability (enriched by practice). Moral emotion unifies all these characteristics of pure knowing. Regarding the interpretation of the unity of pure knowing and action in Wang’s thought, this paper maintains that the interaction of pure knowing and action should be seen as a dynamic pattern, in which the two mutually promote each other. This paper disagrees with the following viewpoints: (1) Pure knowing does not exist or function without action. (2) Pure knowing only can be recognized, examined and confirmed, but cannot be developed. These views risk dividing apart the continuity of lived experience. This paper argues that there is a difference of degree in clarity of consciousness, motivating power, and promotion of experiential knowledge between pure knowing without action, and various levels of pure knowing refined through action.

Introduction to Logic.

Wang Yangming's Theory of the Unity of Knowledge and Action Revisited: An Investigation from the Perspective of Moral Emotion

So-called quantificational accounts explicate logical consequence or validity as truth-preservation in all cases, cases being construed as admissible substitutional variants or as admissible interpretations with respect to non-logical terms. In the present study, which is the first from three successive studies devoted to quantification accounts, I focus on the beginning of systematic theorizing of consequence in Aristotle‘s work, which contains the rudiments of both modal and formal accounts of consequence. I argue, inter alia, that there is no evidence for the claim that Aristotle propounded a quantificational account, and that for a full-fledged quantificational approach in a modern style we need to turn to Bolzano’s substitutional approach, whose motivation, structure and problems are explained in the second part of this study.

Quantificational accounts of logical consequence 1: from aristotle to bolzano

ABSTRACT:The author explains how Rand was absolutely correct in saying that Aristotle \"stated the formula\" of the Law of Identity. He corrects long-standing faulty Thomist criticisms on this issue and gives due credit to thinkers such as Antonius Andreas, Leibniz, and William Hamilton. The author further contends that the gradual shift in Objectivist usage of the Law of Identity (from \"a thing is itself\" to \"a thing is what it is\") tacitly ratifies these erroneous criticisms and has actually contributed to the failure of Objectivist thinkers to develop Rand's concept theory into a valid model of propositions and syllogisms.

Ayn Rand and the Lost Axiom of Aristotle: A Philosophical Mystery—Solved?

Is reasoning a uniquely human ability? This article reviews experiments on reasoning in chimpanzees. In the first series of experiments, a 16 year old female chimpanzee, Sarah, demonstrated the ability to reason analogically in a variety of analogy problems. She chose the correct stimulus B’ to complete an analogy A is to A′ same as B is to B1 and chose the correct predicates to complete analogies A is to A′ same as B is to B′ and A is to A′ different from B is to C. The second series of experiments investigated transitive inference. A 6 year old female chimpanzee, Sadie, was trained on adjacent pairs from a linear series, F r E, E r D, D r C, C r B, and B r A, where the relation r was “more food than.” Sadie then was given the novel nonadjacent pairs, EB, EC, and DB; she chose E and D indicating the ability to make transitive inferences. The third series of experiments placed four chimpanzees in a reasoning task similar to a problem likely to confront chimpanzees in their natural environment. A subject had to choose between two limited food sources. Just prior to making the choice, the chimpanzee received negative information from which it could infer that food was no longer in one of the locations. The chimpanzees demonstrated their inferential abilities by consistently going to the other location.

Ascent of Apes

The concept of the vanishing mediator is basically a theory concentrating on a mediation that ceases when its task is complete. However fundamental its function is, it still has nuances that are, when juxtaposed altogether, quite differing. What I intend to do in this paper is to develop the concept to be utilized as a theoretical framework for further researches. To do that, I will: 1) succinctly clarify theory both in its essence and its being a concept through symbolic logic; 2) review related literature and tabulate the recently cited related works on the vanishing mediator; 3) frame a structure or methodology and discuss its nuances based on the common references strategically extracted; 4) attempt to develop a refined version of it and its process through synthesis; and later, 5) present areas or topics in some selected disciplines where the concept can be applied as conclusion.

http://www.sosyalarastirmalar.com/cilt12/sayi64_pdf/4sosyoloji_psikoloji_felsefe/kahambing_jangresil.pdf

Introduction to Logic.

Citations

Wang Yangming's Theory of the Unity of Knowledge and Action Revisited: An Investigation from the Perspective of Moral Emotion

Quantificational accounts of logical consequence 1: from aristotle to bolzano

Ayn Rand and the Lost Axiom of Aristotle: A Philosophical Mystery—Solved?

Ascent of Apes

Developing the vanishing mediator as theoretical framework: synthesis and application