Journal ArticleDOI
Is There a Self-Enforcing Monetary Constitution?
TLDR
In this article, a self-enforcing monetary constitution has rules that agents acting within the system will uphold even in the presence of deviations from ideal knowledge and complete benevolence and thus does not require external enforcement.Abstract:
A self-enforcing monetary constitution has rules that agents acting within the system will uphold even in the presence of deviations from ideal knowledge and complete benevolence and it thus does not require external enforcement. What would such a constitution look like? Such a constitution, I show that two regimes — a version of NGDP targeting that relies on market implementation of monetary policy, and free banking — meet these requirements for self-enforcing monetary constitutions. The analysis draws insights from political economy, and from constitutional political economy in particular.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Monetary Policy and the Quest for Robust Political Economy
Peter J. Boettke,Daniel J. Smith +1 more
TL;DR: The authors make a case for applying the concepts of robust political economy to the Fed and incorporate their intellectual experiences to make a claim for applying robust economic models to the US Federal Reserve, arguing that robust political economies call for relaxing idealized assumptions in order to seek out institutional regimes that can overcome both the epistemic and motivational hurdles that characterize contemporary democratic settings.
Journal ArticleDOI
Friedman Versus Hayek on Private Outside Monies: New Evidence for the Debate
TL;DR: Friedrich Hayek is often credited with the resurgence of interest in alternative monetary systems as mentioned in this paper, however, his own proposal, however, received sharp criticism from Friedman, Stanley Fischer, and others at the outset and never gained much support among academic economists or the wider population.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that discretionary policy does not result in the social objective function being maximized, and that there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.
Journal ArticleDOI
Econometric policy evaluation: A critique
Journal ArticleDOI
Expectations and the neutrality of money
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a simple example of an economy in which equilibrium prices and quantities exhibit what may be the central feature of the modern business cycle: a systematic relation between the rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output.
Book
A Monetary History of the United States
Milton Friedman,Anna J. Schwartz +1 more
TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.