Journal ArticleDOI
Joint-liability with endogenously asymmetric group loan contracts☆
Francesco Carli,Burak Uras +1 more
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors developed a multi-agent principal-agent model with costly peer monitoring and solved for the optimal group loan contract, which exhibits (i) a joint-liability scheme; and (ii) asymmetric loan terms which can be interpreted as appointing a group leader, who has strong incentives to monitor her peer.About:
This article is published in Journal of Development Economics.The article was published on 2017-07-01. It has received 3 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Non-performing loan & Collateral.read more
Citations
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Trust-Building Mechanisms in Group-Based Microfinance: A Cameroonian Perspective
Nathanael Ojong,Amon Simba +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the practices of trust in micro-lending groups and examine the vital factors and mechanisms that foster its emergence in microlending communities, while trust is critical to micro-loans.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Effectiveness Improvement of Financial Poverty Alleviation in Zhanjiang
Zhe Chen,Hanyuan Liang +1 more
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Joint Resposibility System As The Key Success Of Women's Cooperative Setia Bhakti Indonesian East Java Woman
TL;DR: In this article , the authors describe the key success of women's cooperative Setia Bhakti Wanita (SBW) Jawa Timur which used a joint responsibility system to manage the cooperative's business so becomes a big cooperative in East Java Indonesia.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Bengt Holmstrom,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained is studied, and how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring.
Journal ArticleDOI
The microfinance promise
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group-lending contracts, the measurement of financial sustainability, the estimation of economic and social impacts, the costs and benefits of subsidization, and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit.
Journal ArticleDOI
Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market is presented, where the transfer of risk from the bank to the cosigner leads to an improvement in borrowers' welfare.
Journal ArticleDOI
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
Timothy Besley,Stephen Coate +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment, and show that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile.
Journal ArticleDOI
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a stronger definition of self-enforceability, and label the class of efficient self-ensforcing agreements "coalition-proof" for non-cooperative games.