Mind and Nature

TLDR: For instance, it has been argued that knowledge of the external world is not the end of knowledge, but only a means as discussed by the authors, and that the only cognitive experiences the human mind is capable of are ideas and perceptions.

Abstract: Extensive and profound as philosophic speculation on the nature of knowledge may have been during the last twenty-five centuries, it must be conceded that it has, on the whole, failed in its undertaking. In fact, we do not seem to be much closer to the solution of the epistemological problem than were Kant and Hegel or, for that matter, Plato and Aristotle. Obviously enough, the problem should now be approached in some new way, perhaps one growing out of recent scientific findings. However, before we look around in search of such findings-that is, before we attempt to solve the basic problem of how knowledge of the external world is possible at all-it may be advisable to grant certain premises, describing the starting point of our naturalistic position, namely: (1) All knowledge, as such, is mental. Ever since Locke demonstrated that there are no innate principles of the mind, it has been acknowledged that the only cognitive experiences the human mind is capable of are ideas and perceptions. That ideas are mental will hardly be disputed. The concepts of justice and relativity, for instance, are definitely products of intellectual growth and endeavor, even when they are colored with emotion, as the case may be. Their ultimate derivation from, and application to, sensory reality makes little difference, in this connection. But when it comes to perception, the natural tendency is to regard it as of a double character, subjective as well as objective, as if it were something half-mental and half-material. The difficulty is to account for the objective reference of sensory experience, and the difficulty has proved to be serious. The resulting confusion of interpretation has given rise to countless schools of thought, including materialism, realism, pragmatism, and idealism of many varieties. One thing can hardly be denied, however, among intelligent people: that the images we see or hear are not identical with objects or events responsible for our observation, and that we can know directly only images, not objects or events themselves. The great majority of contemporary thinkers believe, to be sure, that images are not the end of knowledge, but only a means. In other words, they assume that reality, or nature in its broader sense, though unknowable directly, is somehow given in or through images of perception. The everyday assumption that, in observing an object, we know it immediately and in its true existential qualities may be somewhat naive; nevertheless, we are all forced, in practice if not in theory, to admit a cognitive connection between perceptual experience and realities underlying or causing it. But the exact nature of this connection seems to be an elusive puzzle. (2) Reality, as the object of knowledge in general, is non-mental. Though a few philosophers may be unwilling to concede this point, such seems to be the consensus of opinion among thinking people. Even Kant who attempted to explain all experience in terms of the mind's own activities and con-