University of Southern Denmark
NGOs, Trust, and the Accountability Agenda
Keating, Vincent Charles; Thrandardottir, Erla
Published in:
British Journal of Politics and International Relations
DOI:
10.1177/1369148116682655
Publication date:
2017
Document version:
Submitted manuscript
Document license:
CC BY-NC-SA
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Keating, V. C., & Thrandardottir, E. (2017). NGOs, Trust, and the Accountability Agenda.
British Journal of
Politics and International Relations
,
19
(1), 134-151. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148116682655
Go to publication entry in University of Southern Denmark's Research Portal
Terms of use
This work is brought to you by the University of Southern Denmark.
Unless otherwise specified it has been shared according to the terms for self-archiving.
If no other license is stated, these terms apply:
• You may download this work for personal use only.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying this open access version
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Please direct all enquiries to puresupport@bib.sdu.dk
Download date: 30. May. 2022
1
NGOs, Trust, and the Accountability Agenda
Dr. Vincent Charles Keating
Assistant Professor in International Relations
Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark
Dr. Erla Thrandardottir
Visiting Research Fellow
Department of International Politics, City University London
This is the pre-print version of the article: Vincent Charles Keating and Erla Thrandardottir (2016),
‘NGOs, Trust, and the Accountability Agenda', British Journal of Politics and International Relations,
1-18, which is published at https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148116682655.
Abstract
NGOs are undergoing an alleged crisis of trustworthiness. The past decades have seen an increase in
both academic and practitioner skepticism, particularly given the transformations many NGOs have
undergone in size, professionalism, and political importance. The accountability agenda, which
stresses transparency and external oversight, has gained a significant amount of traction as a means
to solve this crisis. But the causal link between the implementation of these recommendations and
increased trustworthiness among donors has never been considered. This paper bridges this gap by
drawing on theoretical innovations in trust research to put forward three arguments. First, the
proponents of the accountability agenda are implicitly working with a rational model of trust.
Second, this model does not reflect important social characteristics of trust between donors and
NGOs. Third, this mismatch means that the accountability agenda might do more to harm trust in
NGOs than to help it.
Introduction
In 2015, the tragic suicide of a British pensioner who was allegedly overwhelmed with cold calls and
requests from charities led to a public outcry in the United Kingdom over NGO fundraising practices
(BBC News 2015). Though this tragedy could have generated any number of responses from the
public in their expression of disappointment or outrage, the discussions and debate that followed
were largely framed in terms of trust and trustworthiness. UK broadsheets argued variously that
“there is a great deal to do to win back the trust of the public after this summer of scandals,”
(Slawson 2015) that “Charities must themselves shoulder the burden of maintaining public trust,”
(2015) or pointed out that “the readiness of the public to believe that charities are behaving badly
reflects a serious decline in trust.” (Baggini 2015) In exploring the relationship between NGOs,
donors, and the public more widely, trust was front and central.
This focus on a problem of trust was echoed in the UK government, which set up a review team to
look into the sector’s fundraising practices. The results were published in a report entitled
Regulating Fundraising for the Future: Trust in Charities, Confidence in Fundraising Regulations
which, as the title suggests, framed the tragedy as a problem of NGO trustworthiness. The report’s
concluded that the regulatory shortcomings of the sector needed to be dealt with ‘swiftly and
effectively to restore public trust’ (Sir Stuart Etherington et al. 2015, 4). Under pressure from the
2
Etherington review, and in the wake of exposed malpractices in the sector, many NGO bodies
responded by announcing steps to tighten-up guidance rules “to retain public trust in the sector.”
(Meade 2015)
The framing of Mrs. Cooke’s death as a crisis in NGO trustworthiness must be understood within
broader trends in government, civil society, and academia. Issues of NGO trustworthiness came into
renewed focus in the 1990s with several publications that questioned whether NGOs were the
saviors they claimed to be (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Gibelman and
Gelman 2001; Smillie 1997; Sogge 1996). This work started an academic debate about the place of
NGOs in the wider political system, scrutinizing several dimensions of their organization such as their
legitimacy, accountability, representativeness, and trustworthiness (Feldman 2003; Holmén and
Jirström 2009; Hudson 2002; Montanaro 2012).
The issue of trust is exceptionally important for NGOs. This is particularly the case in the relationship
between NGOs and their donors,
a
since most NGOs are highly dependent on them for labor and
financial help. An increase in the public’s perception of NGO untrustworthiness can lead donors to
take their resources elsewhere, with potentially devastating consequences. Most of the solutions to
this problem have involved the introduction of, or renewed emphasis on, accountability measures –
such as those put forward by the Etherington Report. However, the popularity of this accountability
agenda among NGOs and government regulators has not been met with a sustained consideration of
whether the accountability agenda is likely to increase trustworthiness. At most, the current
scholarship implicitly accepts or merely asserts that trustworthiness is a positive outcome of the
accountability agenda. This lack of critical engagement is notable given that there is a large
multidisciplinary literature on trust that NGO scholars could draw on to consider this issue. Given the
importance of maintaining the trusting relationship between NGOs and their donors, and in light of
significant implementation costs that come with the accountability agenda, it is important to assess
whether accountability is an appropriate strategy for NGOs to maintain public trust.
This paper argues that by examining the accountability agenda through the lens of trust theory,
serious questions arise. The accountability agenda makes implicit rationalist assumptions about the
nature of trust that, at best, tell only part of the story and, at worst, may be totally out-of-sync with
how some donors trust NGOs. Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that the
implementation of the accountability agenda might produce the exact opposite effect than intended
– to increase individual donor distrust in NGOs by eroding the social base of trust that NGOs
currently benefit from. This could paradoxically create the conditions that make the accountability
agenda impossible to eliminate, leaving NGOs with permanent fixed costs that were previously
unnecessary. In making this argument, we hope to open up a new strand of theoretically-informed
empirical research on NGO trustworthiness that will inform academics and practitioners alike of the
complexity of generating and sustaining trusting relationships across multiple donors types; one that
we believe has been lacking in the NGO literature to date.
The paper makes this argument in five steps. First, it explains why the accountability agenda exists in
the first place to highlight its purpose and goals. Second, it demonstrates how supporters of the
accountability agenda operate through an underlying rationalist understanding of trust that stresses
transparency to maximize information and the provision of external oversight that can levy penalties
for non-compliance. Third, it argues that this rationalist understanding ignores how trust between
3
donors and NGOs is likely to have a strong social component that requires a consideration of social
trust theory. Fourth, using social trust theory and the results of experimental social psychology, it
argues that the accountability agenda is likely not as effective as its proponents suggest at sustaining
or increasing trust and, at worst, may have the exact opposite effect. Lastly, it considers these
results in light of the different types of NGO donors and suggests that although corporate and
government donors might be institutionally predisposed to rational models of trust, this less likely
with individual donors. Though certain elements of the accountability agenda might be unavoidable
in relationships with corporate and government donors, NGOs should not conflate the demands
from specific donors with the needs of all donors – particularly given the potentially negative
consequences of the accountability agenda that we identify.
The Accountability Agenda and its Critics
The loss of perceived trustworthiness with donors can be a major problem for NGOs.
Trustworthiness, despite some contestation over its exact definition, revolves around whether one
party has positive expectations that another party will fulfil agreements where there is the
possibility of a loss to the first party if the second party defects (Coleman 1990; Hoffman 2002, 20;
Kydd 2005, 3; Larson 1997, 12). In the case of trustworthy NGOs, donors have positive expectations
that their time and money will be used wisely in the service of the NGO’s cause. Donors’
perceptions of trustworthiness will cut across several distinct domains, based on their expectations
about efficiency, commitment to norms, and time and resource management. Perceptions of high
NGO trustworthiness will attract donors since they will want to dedicate resources to NGOs that are
likely to fulfil these expectations, while perceptions of low trustworthiness will lead donors to take
their resources elsewhere. In a competitive environment where donors have multiple options,
maintaining positive perceptions of trustworthiness can prove decisive for NGOs, not only for the
existence of any individual NGO but also for the sector as a whole.
Given these problems, many scholars and practitioners have argued that the accountability agenda
can provide the necessary checks and balances to prevent potential abuse of power or other
malfeasance, whether intended or unintended. Many of these frameworks are market driven, based
on principal-agent models, and are favored because they are seen as contract based and apolitical
(Thrandardottir 2015, 109). Accountability measures under the principal-agent market model focus
heavily on measuring how NGOs (the agent) are achieving the goals set out in their contract with the
donor (the principal). This often involves managing NGOs’ agendas and detecting possible conflicts
of interest or misinformation. The accountability criteria used for monitoring and evaluation involve
benchmarking and auditing performance, often to respond to issues of supply and demand in
relation to service delivery (Frumkin 2002). Although the accountability agenda also relies on other
models that are normative or representative in nature to test the legitimacy of NGOs, the market
model is by far most common because it facilitates a contractual relationship between donors and
NGOs with safeguards to ensure trust.
The recent proposals within the Etherington Report reflect a steady increase in institutionalized
versions of the accountability agenda across the English-speaking world, including GuideStar (1994),
the Sphere framework (1997), the Charity Navigator (2001), Statements of Recommended Practice
(2005), and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2003) and its successor the Core
4
Humanitarian Standard (2014). There is also an international version of the accountability agenda
found in the INGO Accountability Charter (2008). Although these frameworks may differ in their
functions and mission – some are focused on helping donors to benchmark charities, some on
accountancy practices, or auditing, and others on internal codes of voluntary commitments – most
of these schemes present themselves as ways to maintain or increase perceptions of trustworthiness
in NGOs.
This emphasis on trust can be seen in the selling of workshops to the sector as “valuable in helping
to build trust with your donors,” (The Sphere Project 2015) or, in a sales pitch to donors, arguing that
“charities that are accountable and transparent are more likely to act with integrity and learn from
their mistakes because they want donors to know that they're trustworthy.” (Charity Navigator
2016) Such references to trust are also visible in policy documents from the International NGO
Training and Research Centre, which argues that adopting accountability codes of conduct is a way
to gain ‘greater public trust’ (Heap 1997). Similarly, when explaining why organizations should join
the INGO Accountability Charter, they argue that joining “improves trust in the organization”
because “CSOs demanding high standards of accountability from governments and the corporate
sector are only credible if they can evidence compliance with the same standards.” (INGO
Accountability Charter 2016) The extent of this assumption, that accountability will help with NGO
trustworthiness, is such that in 2009 INTRAC worried that any “coverage of non-compliance [with
accountability measures] could serve to undermine public confidence in the NGO sector,” (Harris-
Curtis 2009) implying that non-complying organizations would likely be seen as de facto
untrustworthy by donors. “a proactive means of ensuring … trust.” (Lloyd 2005, 6)
This assumption that accountability leads to perceptions of trustworthiness is also found in
practitioner and academic commentary on the issue (Lee 2004, 7; Marschall, 1566; Sloan 2009, 220).
For instance, Hugo Slim argues that NGOs need to act positively on potential trust problems through
accountability (Slim 2002), an argument echoed by Robert Lloyd who argued that implementing
accountability measures are “a proactive means of ensuring … trust.” (Lloyd 2005, 6) Goddard
supports the accountability agenda by arguing that, “governance structures such as regulatory
regimes for NGOs work well and are perceived to be legitimate because they are important in
sustaining trust among stakeholders. A weak and outdated regulatory regime for NGOs eroded this
dimension of trust.” (Goddard and Assad 2005, 393-394) Finally, state regulatory institutions, such
as the Charity Commission of England and Wales or the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits
Commission, are tasked with inspiring “public trust and confidence in charities”, “[enhancing] the
accountability of charities to donors, beneficiaries and the general public” (Frumkin 2002; The
Charity Commission 2013, 1), with the ability to use “a number of enforcement tools” (Nehme 2014,
25) should expectations not be met. As a result of this consistent message coming from scholars,
practitioners, and organizations, empirical studies suggest that leaders of transnational NGOs have
by and large been socialized into the necessity of financial accountability to donors through these
measures (Schmitz et al. 2012, 1177).
Though growing in influence, the accountability agenda has not been universally accepted. On the
contrary, it has been criticized from a number of different angles. Lisa Jordan argued that with
respect to accountability measures that, “ ... in [some] circumstances they are inadequate, they do
not address the needs of the NGOs, they are divorced from missions, they do not address moral