Journal ArticleDOI
On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables.
TLDR
A distinction is made between two subclasses of intervening variables, or the authors prefer to say, between ‘intervening variables’ and ‘hypothetical constructs’ which they feel is fundamental but is currently being neglected.Abstract:
As the thinking of behavior theorists has become more sophisticated and selfconscious, there has been considerable discussion of the value and logical status of so-called ‘intervening variables.’ Hull speaks of “symbolic constructs, intervening variables, or hypothetical entities” (5, p. 22) and deals with them in his theoretical discussion as being roughly equivalent notions. At least, his exposition does not distinguish among them explicitly. In his presidential address on behavior at a choice point, Tolman inserts one of Hull’s serial conditioning diagrams (11, p. 13) between the independent variables (maintenance schedule, goal object, etc.) and the dependent variable (‘behavior ratio’) to illustrate his concept of the intervening variable. This would seem to imply that Tolman views his ‘intervening variables’ as of the same character as Hull’s. In view of this, it is somewhat surprising to discover that Skinner apparently feels that his formulations have a close affinity to those of Tolman, but are basically dissimilar to those of Hull (10, p. 436, 437). In advocating a theoretical structure which is ‘descriptive’ and ‘positivistic,’ he suggests that the model chosen by Hull (Newtonian mechanics) is not the most suitable model for purposes of behavior theory; and in general is critical of the whole postulate-deductive approach. Simultaneously with these trends, one can still observe among ‘tough-minded’ psychologists the use of words such as ‘unobservable’ and ‘hypothetical’ in an essentially derogatory manner, and an almost compulsive fear of passing beyond the direct colligation of observable data. ‘Fictions’ and ‘hypothetical entities’ are sometimes introduced into a discussion of theory with a degree of trepidation and apology quite unlike the freedom with which physicists talk about atoms, mesons, fields, and the like. There also seems to be a tendency to treat all hypothetical constructs as on the same footing merely because they are hypothetical; so that we find people arguing that if neutrons are admissible in physics, it must be admissible for us to talk about, e.g., the damming up of libido and its reversion to earlier channels. The view which theoretical psychologists take toward intervening variables and hypothetical constructs will of course profoundly influence the direction of theoretical thought. Furthermore, what kinds of hypothetical constructs we become accustomed to thinking about will have a considerable impact upon theory creation. The present paper aims to present what seems to us a major problem in the conceptualization of intervening variables, without claiming to offer a wholly satisfactory solution. Chiefly, it is our aim here to make a distinction between two subclasses of intervening variables, or we prefer to say, between ‘intervening variables’ and ‘hypothetical constructs’ which we feel is fundamental but is currently being neglected. We shall begin with a common-sense distinction, and proceed later to formulations of this distinction which we hope will be more rigorous. Naively, it would seem that there is a difference in logical status between constructs which involve the hypothesization of an entity, proc-read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Psychology and epistemology: The place versus response controversy
TL;DR: The notion of “epistemological parity” is introduced as a mechanism by which a psychologist's substantive theory and epistemological views are adjusted one to another in a historical case study of the “place versus response” controversy.
On the role of theory in behavior analysis 1
TL;DR: This paper argued that the rejection of hypothetical constructs is one of the defining features of radical behaviorism and that the constructs employed by radical behaviorists are not qualitatively different from those often employed by cognitivists (e.g. "reinforcement") and that much of the basis for recent criticisms of cognitive psychology by behaviorists disappears.
Journal ArticleDOI
Behavior analysis and ecological psychology: past, present, and future. a review of harry heft's ecological psychology in context
TL;DR: The alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science are considered, albeit more for the future than at present.
Journal ArticleDOI
Assessing clinically relevant perceptual organization with multidimensional scaling techniques.
Teresa A. Treat,Richard M. McFall,Richard J. Viken,Robert M. Nosofsky,David B. MacKay,John K. Kruschke +5 more
TL;DR: The authors describe the use of deterministic and probabilistic MDS techniques for investigating numerous aspects of perceptual organization, such as dimensional attention, perceptual correlation, within-attribute organization, and perceptual variability.
Journal ArticleDOI
The hegemonic ambiguity of big concepts in organisation studies
Mats Alvesson,Martin Blom +1 more
TL;DR: The use of concepts is a vital part of the research process as mentioned in this paper and many researchers overexploit popular concepts by adding more and more vague and poorly defined meanings to them, thereby making their bo...
References
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Book
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
TL;DR: Bertrand Russell is concerned in this book with the foundations of knowledge as mentioned in this paper, and he approaches his subject through a discussion of language, the relationships of truth to experience and an investigation into how knowledge of the structure of language helps our understanding of the world.