Overruling and the instability of law
Nicola Gennaioli,Andrei Shleifer +1 more
TLDR
In this article, the authors investigate the evolution of common law under overruling, a system of precedent change in which appellate courts replace existing legal rules with new ones, and they find that overruling leads to unstable legal rules that rarely converge to efficiency.About:
This article is published in Journal of Comparative Economics.The article was published on 2007-02-21 and is currently open access. It has received 52 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Precedent & Common law.read more
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The evolution of common law
Nicola Gennaioli,Andrei Shleifer +1 more
TL;DR: The Cardozo theorem as discussed by the authors states that even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise.
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Legal Realism for Economists
TL;DR: The authors introduce the American Legal Realism, a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law professors that flourished in the early 20th century, and develop a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of American legal realism.
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Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth
Guido Cozzi,Silvia Galli +1 more
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with endogenous skill acquisition, and shows that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short and possibly medium run.
Posted Content
Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System
Carsten Hefeker,Michael Neugart +1 more
TL;DR: The authors show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts, and this finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.
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Judicial Fact Discretion
Nicola Gennaioli,Andrei Shleifer +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising fact discretion in finding facts in a trial are modeled and two motivations for the exercise of such discretion are judicial policy preferences and judges' aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled.
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Book
The Path of the Law
TL;DR: A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can as mentioned in this paper.
Book
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
TL;DR: In this article, two leading scholars of the US Supreme Court and its policy making, systematically present and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making.
Book
The Economic Structure of Tort Law
TL;DR: The first full-length economic study of tort law is as discussed by the authors, which provides a comprehensive description of the major tort law and a series of formal economic models used to explore the economic properties of these doctrines.
Posted Content
Judicial Checks and Balances
TL;DR: In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom as discussed by the authors, and Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks: judicial independence and constitutional review.
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Why Is the Common Law Efficient
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the rationality of the common law rests on irrational behavior of litigants, and that the decision to use the courts to settle a dispute is more likely in cases where the legal rules relevant to the dispute are inefficient, and less likely where the rules are efficient.