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Book ChapterDOI

Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory to Managerial Incentivation

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TLDR
In this article, the authors provide an overview over the current findings in game theory regarding such incentive mechanisms and critically evaluate the practical applicability of these findings to the design of incentive systems in the area of management accounting.
Abstract
On the one hand, game theory has proven to effectively address a wide range of economic problems. In general, it analyses the impact of incentives of different kinds on human decision making and behaviour. Thereby, it has found mechanisms to effectively induce specific behaviour, like the Groves mechanism. On the other hand, in management accounting the design of effective incentive systems plays a major role. The aim of these incentives is to induce decision makers to act in the interest of their firms. Consequently, the question rises whether and how game theory can inform the design of these incentive systems. The present paper provides an overview over the current findings in game theory regarding such incentive mechanisms and critically evaluates the practical applicability of these findings to the design of incentive systems in the area of management accounting. The paper concludes with an overview of aspects that should be addressed in future research.

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Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion

TL;DR: The authors modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
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Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives?

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the relationship between reward and motivation, drawing on the psychological, behavioural economics and decision-making literatures, concluding that the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are generally not efficient and are often not effective in meeting their objectives.
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Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay [Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay]

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 US CEOs and show that the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility.
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Should executive stock options be abandoned

TL;DR: In this article, the pros and cons of executive stock options are compared using a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard, showing that option-based contracts are weakly dominant in a general environment without restrictions on preferences or technologies.
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Risk aversion and the efficiency wage contract

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the relations between the terms of the efficiency wage contract offered by a firm and the responses of a worker, under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the firm and worker.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review

TL;DR: In this article, the authors review agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develop testable propositions and conclude that agency theory offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk.
Journal ArticleDOI

Moral Hazard and Observability

TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Journal ArticleDOI

Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives

TL;DR: For example, the authors estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.
Book

Performance pay and top-management incentives

TL;DR: For example, the authors estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.
Book ChapterDOI

An analysis of the principal-agent problem

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the optimal way of implementing an action by an agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem, and they use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem.
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