According to official religious policies in China, the activities surrounding popular religious temples such as temple festivals are considered superstitions to be eradicated However, during the reform period in the past thirty years, local temple leaders in many rural areas have been engaging in the politics of legitimation to protect and expand their communities’ temples and related activities At the same time, the de-centralisation of political power in China has resulted in wide-spread rent-seeking practices among local state agencies The convergence of these two interests, from the rural communities on the one hand and from the local state agencies on the other, has produced a “channeling zone” of benefits flowing in opposite directions and that cover a wide range of sectors (eg heritage protection, commerce, education, forestry, tourism, etc), resulting in the consolidation of legitimacy for popular religious activities This article presents the case study of a rural temple, the Black Dragon King Temple, in Shaanbei (northern Shaanxi Province), which exemplifies the intricate processes and mechanisms of such a politics of legitimation The ethnographic highlight is a “plaque-hanging ceremony” that took place during the annual temple festival that marked the transition in status of the temple from superstition to officially-recognised religion

/pdf/la-channeling-zone-religion-populaire-etat-local-et-rites-de-4spz60hy1w.pdf

Religion in Chinese Society

La channeling zone : religion populaire, État local et rites de légitimation en Chine rurale à l'ère de la réforme

Emergence and consolidation of Protestantism in the Holy Roman Empire to 1600

/pdf/becoming-a-military-frontline-4vf8hij3jy.pdf

Becoming a Military Frontline

ABSTRACT The study attempts to delineate the degree of system rigidity of three major dialect groups, namely, the Cantonese, the Hakkas and the Hokkiens. The principal source of data is derived from inscriptions collected by Chen and Tan (1972). The findings reveal that at the individual level the system boundary of the Hokkiens was more rigid than that of the Cantonese and the Hakkas. This confirms earlier observations made at the organizational level. Earlier observations dictate that after 1854 the Cantonese and the Hakkas were, at the organizational level, not on good terms. This was, however, not the case at the individual level. We also found that the system boundary of religious organizations, i.e., temples and burial ground bodies, was least rigid.

/pdf/rigidity-of-system-boundary-among-major-chinese-dialect-2xpwwcofa9.pdf

Religion in Chinese Society

Citations

La channeling zone : religion populaire, État local et rites de légitimation en Chine rurale à l'ère de la réforme

Emergence and consolidation of Protestantism in the Holy Roman Empire to 1600

Becoming a Military Frontline

Rigidity of System Boundary among Major Chinese Dialect Groups in Nineteenth-Century Singapore: A Study of Inscription Data

Religion and the Early Modern State: The Disenchantment of Space: Salle Church and the Reformation

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