Book ChapterDOI
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Susan Wolf
- pp 46-62
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TLDR
The connections between philosophical and non-philosophical concerns in the area of free will and responsibility have been questioned by as discussed by the authors, who argue that the philosophical concerns grow out of the non-physics ones, that they take off where the nonphilosophy questions stop.Abstract:
Philosophers who study the problems of free will and responsibility have an easier time than most in meeting challenges about the relevance of their work to ordinary, practical concerns. Indeed, philosophers who study these problems are rarely faced with such challenges at all, since questions concerning the conditions of responsibility come up so obviously and so frequently in everyday life. Under scrutiny, however, one might question whether the connections between philosophical and nonphilosophical concerns in this area are real. In everyday contexts, when lawyers, judges, parents, and others are concerned with issues of responsibility, they know, or think they know, what in general the conditions of responsibility are. Their questions are questions of application: Does this or that particular person meet this or that particular condition? Is this person mature enough, or informed enough, or sane enough to be responsible? Was he or she acting under posthypnotic suggestion or under the influence of a mind-impairing drug? It is assumed, in these contexts, that normal, fully developed adult human beings are responsible beings. The questions have to do with whether a given individual falls within the normal range. By contrast, philosophers tend to be uncertain about the general conditions of responsibility, and they care less about dividing the responsible from the nonresponsible agents than about determining whether, and if so why, any of us are ever responsible for anything at all. In the classroom, we might argue that the philosophical concerns grow out of the nonphilosophical ones, that they take off where the nonphilosophical questions stop.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
A Person-Centered Approach to Moral Judgment:
TL;DR: This work offers a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts, and can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.
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Bringing character back: How the motivation to evaluate character influences judgments of moral blame.
Journal ArticleDOI
Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy
TL;DR: The concept of self-critical and self-mastering capacities of a person are used to form the desires which motivate free action as mentioned in this paper, which is a theory of individual autonomy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Praise, Blame and the Whole Self
Nomy Arpaly,Timothy Schroeder +1 more
TL;DR: A. Frankfurt as mentioned in this paper adopts a la suite de H. Frankfurt une approche interdisciplinaire de la question de la responsabilite de l'agent moral qui ouvre le debat sur la volonte libre au domaine de la theorie de la personne, de la rationnelle et du choix moral, and montre que le phenomene psychologique de lakrasia inverse, illustre par les exemples de Huckleberry Finn, Neoptoleme et Schindler, contribue
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The Moral Psychology Handbook
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