Open AccessBook
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense Of Robust Realism
TLDR
The view, the motivation, the book, the view, and the motivation of Objectivity are discussed in this paper, along with the argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths.Abstract:
1. The View, The Motivation, The Book 2. The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof) 3. The Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths 4. And Now, Robust Metaethical Realism 5. Doing with Less 6. Metaphysics 7. Epistemology 8. Disagreement 9. Motivation 10. Tallying Plausibility Points Bibliography Indexread more
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Book ChapterDOI
Rationality’s Fixed Point
TL;DR: The Fixed Point Thesis as discussed by the authors states that any false belief about the requirements of rationality involves a mistake not only in the sense of believing something false but also in a distinctly rational sense.
Journal ArticleDOI
Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed, and that the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition.
Book
Discourse Contextualism: A Framework for Contextualist Semantics and Pragmatics
TL;DR: This article showed that the inductive premise is false given any abstract context c, and that the sharp boundaries claim is true in any context c. This result is of little comfort, however.
Posted Content
Authority and Reason-Giving
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors place discussions of authority in the context of robust reason-giving, and then, utilizing an analysis of robust reasoning that they developed in another paper, draw some lessons about authority.
Journal ArticleDOI
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors try to capture the essence of a constructivist position in the realm of practical reason and pinpoint its theoretical attractions, and give some reason to suspect that there cannot be a coherent constructivist view about practical reason as a whole, at least not if it is to be interestingly constructivist.