The US–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance had significantly developed asset specificities and common social identities attached to it during the cold war period. If institutional features and ideational factors originating from the cold war threat can account for alliance resilience in the post-cold war period, the US–ROK alliance should be a ‘most likely case’ to support those causal links. This article shows that such is not the case. This article, instead, argues that the US–ROK alliance went beyond being an instrument of threat response to becoming a more complicated mechanism for serving ‘general interests’ in relation to North-East Asian regional order maintenance and order-building, which drove the US–ROK alliance between 1998 and 2008.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

‘General interests’ as a rationale for the US–Republic of Korea alliance between 1998 and 2008

: In 1915, the Allies attempted to force open the Dardanelles Straits in the face of an integrated Turkish and German defense (sea mines plus covering fire), using first their navy and then their army, with disastrous results. An analysis of the navy portion of this campaign identified a number of lessons at the strategic and operational levels pertaining specifically to risk assessments, strategic communications, proper strategic and operational planning, operational leadership, and operational art. These lessons were juxtaposed with a modern attempt by a belligerent such as Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, yielding a number of points to consider when thinking through the implications of a Strait of Hormuz closure as well as corresponding recommendations for U.S. policymakers, strategists, and planners.

/pdf/a-strait-comparison-lessons-learned-from-the-1915-3dkmsji9ta.pdf

A Strait Comparison: Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz Closure Event

The President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is a 1998 United States governmental initiative to prevent the spread of AIDS, primarily in Africa. The PEPFAR program has provided antiretroviral treatment to over 11 million HIV-infected people in Africa and it has been called the largest health initiative ever initiated by one country to address a disease, with a budget exceeding $70 billion since its creation. While
PEPFAR has been praised for having saved millions of lives, diminishing media attention to AIDS as well as potential policy changes are likely to negatively impact the progress of the organization in the future. Thus a number of questions arise: How has PEPFAR’s policy been driven and assessed so far? What are the key factors which have led to PEPFAR’s success? How does it measure its own efficiency? How does PEPFAR
compare to other international organizations? What are its links with local organizations? How does it relate to its partners? The aim of this paper is to consider these important questions and to map out the shifting balance of HIV prevention in the next decade. This study is based on the institutional documentation, press articles as well as on a series of interviews conducted with local members of HIV/AIDS Disease
Control and Prevention programmes in Africa

/pdf/how-is-the-united-states-s-international-hiv-prevention-3gkbf45409.pdf

How is the United States’s international HIV prevention programme evolving?

background

/pdf/on-the-dangers-of-ignoring-apocalyptic-icebergs-y1k-and-y2k-2scdy4wuuh.pdf

On the Dangers of Ignoring Apocalyptic Icebergs, Y1K and Y2k

: China has described the South China Sea as its sovereign territory, where it has the right to intervene economically and militarily. The United States has described the South China Sea as a global commons, where freedom of navigation and the rule of law are in its national interests. These two worldviews currently coexist in an unstable peace in which each side claims its own version of international law should apply, and occasionally, goes to arms to defend it. All of the claimants to the South China Sea are willing to use force if necessary to implement their policies, yet no nation knows how far the other is willing to go. The result is a chess match of gunboat diplomacy: the maritime show of force that aims to influence the policy makers in the targeted nation. This thesis will analyze the conflict over the South China Sea on the legal, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The purpose of the thesis is to examine Chinese and U.S. policy in the South China Sea and determine if and where conflict could arise, and how it could be avoided. Chapter One is a short introduction to the South China Sea's geography, economic profile, strategic importance, and other characteristics. Chapter Two examines the dispute at the legal level concerning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the political rhetoric about its implementation. Chapter Three examines China's military forces, their strategic doctrine, and how that strategy manifests itself in the South China Sea. Chapter Four details the same, but concerning Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chapter Five examines U.S. policy in the South China Sea, current force structure in the Western Pacific, strategy, and a look into the future of possible conflict scenarios.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA578075.pdf

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Citations

‘General interests’ as a rationale for the US–Republic of Korea alliance between 1998 and 2008

A Strait Comparison: Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz Closure Event

How is the United States’s international HIV prevention programme evolving?

On the Dangers of Ignoring Apocalyptic Icebergs, Y1K and Y2k

Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea

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