BookDOI
The control of corporate Europe
Fabrizio Barca,Marco Becht +1 more
TLDR
The separation of ownership and control in corporate Europe is discussed in this article, where strong owners, weak minorities, and social control are identified as three types of owners in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain.Abstract:
1. The Control of Corporate Europe 2. The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria 3. Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium 4. Ownership and Voting Power in France 5. Ownership and Voting Power in Germany 6. Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy 7. Ownership and Control in the Netherlands 8. Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms 9. Ownership and Control in Sweden--Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control 10. Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom 11. Beneficial Ownership in the United States THE LARGE HOLDINGS DIRECTIVE COMPARATIVE TABLESread more
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Journal ArticleDOI
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
Ruth V. Aguilera,Gregory Jackson +1 more
TL;DR: The authors developed a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations, what interests corporations serve, and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
TL;DR: The economic entrenchment of large corporations is studied in this article, where the authors posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entropy.
Journal ArticleDOI
The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis
TL;DR: In this article, the authors measure the value of corporate voting rights, specifically of the control block of votes, in a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, in 1997.
Journal ArticleDOI
Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups
Randall Morck,Bernard Yeung +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that managers act for the controlling family, but not for shareholders in general, and that such structures give rise to their own set of agency problems, such as creative self-destruction, where a family might quash innovation in one firm to protect its obsolete investment in another.
Journal ArticleDOI
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
TL;DR: A review of the existing literature on groups can be found in this paper, where the authors point out important biases in the literature including the avoidance of a serious discussion of the origins of business groups, and the unfounded assumption that rentseeking is the only feasible political economy equilibrium in an interaction between groups and the government.