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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

Rafael La Porta, +2 more
- 01 Apr 1999 - 
- Vol. 54, Iss: 2, pp 471-517
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
Abstract
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.

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Journal ArticleDOI

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems, and discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.
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Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

TL;DR: The authors investigated the relation between founding-family ownership and firm performance and found that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity.
Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TL;DR: The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries and propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders.
Journal ArticleDOI

How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?

TL;DR: In this article, the authors used proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms during 1994-2000 and found that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman with a hired CEO.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Book

The theory of the growth of the firm

Edith Penrose
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the role of large and small firms in a growing economy and found that large firms are more likely to acquire and merge smaller firms in order to increase their size.
Journal ArticleDOI

Law and Finance

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Survey of Corporate Governance

TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
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Do controlling shareholder firms engage in strategic decision-making?

Controlling shareholder firms engage in strategic decision-making, often exceeding their cash flow rights through pyramids and management involvement, especially in economies with weak shareholder protection.