Showing papers on "Abductive reasoning published in 1986"

A logic of deliberation

Abstract: Deliberation typically involves the formation of a plan or intention from a set of values and beliefs. I suggest that deliberation, or "practical reasoning," is a form of normative reasoning and that the understanding and construction of reasoning systems that can deliberate and act intentionally presupposes a theory of normative reasoning. The language and semantics of a deontic logic is used to develop a theory of defeasible reasoning in normative systems and belief systems. This theory may be applied in action theory and to artificial intelligence by identifying expressions of values, beliefs, and intentions with various types of modal sentences from the language.

Reasoning by Analogy as a Partial Identity Between Models

Abstract: We present in this paper a formal theory of analogical reasoning. We are mainly concerned with three subjects: a formal definition of analogy, a formalization of the reasoning in terms of deduction, and a method for realizing the reasoning in a logic programming system. First we assume that each domain for the reasoning is the least model for logic program. Then we consider an analogy as a partial identity between the models. Secondly we introduce a notion of rule transformation which transforms rules in one domain into those in the other. Then we can formalize the reasoning as a system with three inference rules: instantiation of rules, modus ponens, and the rule transformation. Finally, based on the formalization, we present an extended pure-Prolog interpreter which performs the detection of analogy and the reasoning by the partial identity at the same time.

Abduction by Classification and Assembly

Abstract: Red-2 is a computer program for red-cell antibody identification, a piece of "normal science". Abstracting from Red-2, a general problem solving mechanism is described that is especially suited for performing a form of abductive inference or best explanation finding. A problem solver embodying this mechanism synthesizes composite hypotheses by combining hypothesis parts. This is a common task of intelligence, and a component of scientific reasoning. The work addresses the question, 'How is science possible?' by showing how a simple but powerful form of hypothesis synthesis is computationally feasible.

Formal logic and practical reasoning

Abstract: In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic (the deductive logic) of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is probably the simplest, for it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard “assertoric” principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical inference. I am not daunted by these objections. My aim here is to offer some observations that, I hope, will make the merits of my account a bit easier to appreciate.