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Showing papers on "Coalition government published in 1989"



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors survey the economic legislation and policies of the new Blue-Red coalition government in Finland in six separate fields - competition policies, industrial relations, income policies, the financial system, taxation and the public sector -and ask whether the different measures can be seen as parts of an overall strategy to change the Finnish mode of regulation.
Abstract: Surveying the economic legislation and policies of the new Blue - Red coalition government in Finland in six separate fields - competition policies, industrial relations, income policies, the financial system, taxation and the public sector - the question is asked whether the different measures can be seen as parts of an overall strategy to change the Finnish mode of regulation. Is it possible that we are witnessing the development of a two-tiered form of corporatism, combining a more traditional social corporatism on the macro-level and a new liberal corporatism on an intermediate level of production and innovation?

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Namaliu immediately became prime minister under provisions of the constitution that enable governments to change without recourse to general elections as discussed by the authors, and immediately faced an immense array of problems including coalition tensions, sluggish economic growth, bureaucratic inertia, resurgent separatism, soaring crime rates, industrial strife, militant landowner action at mine sites and apprehensive foreign investors.
Abstract: The established pattern of Papua New Guinea's parliamentary politics-frequent floor-crossing, shifting factional alignments, and unstable coalitions-was demonstrated again in 1988. On July 4 the coalition government of Paias Wingti was toppled from power by a noconfidence motion in Parliament. The opposition parties led by Pangu's Rabbie Namaliu, together with defectors from the government, defeated Wingti by a vote of 58 to 50. Namaliu immediately became prime minister under provisions of the constitution that enable governments to change without recourse to general elections.1 In a clear reference to the taint of corruption and air of instability that had surrounded the outgoing government, the new prime minister promised to "stop the moral rot," revive national unity, and restore public confidence in the country's leadership. At year's end Namaliu's majority remained intact, but there were doubts whether he could deliver on his promises. Like Wingti before him, Namaliu faced an immense array of problems including coalition tensions, sluggish economic growth, bureaucratic inertia, resurgent separatism, soaring crime rates, industrial strife, militant landowner action at mine sites, and apprehensive foreign investors. Clearly all was not well at the "grass-roots" or in the polity at large. Indeed, a qualitative change in the character of political and social dissent had occurred. The political game was now decidedly "hard ball," and the first phase of independence politics-the postcolonial twilight-was obviously over. As in 1987 following the turbulent election, questions were raised about the overall stability of Papua New Guinea's political system and its democratic institutions. The

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the objectives, implementation, and effects of U.S. policy towards Kampuchea and its close link to U. Sihanouk's leadership are discussed.
Abstract: This article examines America's Jow-keyed roJe in the Kampuchean conflict against the backdrop of its bitter Vietnam War experience and its declining economic strength. The paper discusses the objectives, implementation, and effects of U.S. policy towards Kampuchea and its close link to U.S. policy towards Vietnam. The views of the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush Administrations and their critics are included. Through the United Nations and ASEAN, America at first offered mainly humanitarian aid to Kam puchea. Later, it also extended overt and covert military assistance to the non-communist forces in the Coalition Government of Demo cratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Support for ASEAN's proposals to resolve the conflict has insulated America from the onus of deeper involvement and responsibility. Yet problems abound regarding the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk's leadership, and U.S. economic concerns versus security interests.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The only Danish chlorine plant, situated in Copenhagen, has been under study since 1937 as discussed by the authors, and the Environmental Appeal Board (EAB) dealt with the case and found that the standard of the plant was second to none.
Abstract: The only Danish chlorine plant, situated in Copenhagen, has been under study since 1937. In 1987 the Environmental Appeal Board (EAB) dealt with the case. It found that the standard of the plant was second to none. It demonstrated that the societal risk of railway tanker transport of chlorine through Copenhagen was of a similar size as the risk to society of the chlorine stored at the plant. It recommended a general survey of dangerous installations. Finally, it confirmed the decision of the Agency of Environemental Protection (AEP) that the production and storage could continue. An opposition majority in Parliament, however, carried a resolution that a law closing the plant should be proposed. The law was duly proposed, but since then an extraordinary parliamentary election has modified the basis of the coalition Government. The new Minister of Environment will not repropose the law, preferring first to make a general survey of the risks in connection with the chemical industry in Denmark.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The impact of EC membership on the foreign policy of the coalition government led by Garret FitzGerald between 1982 and 1987 is examined in this article, where it is argued that while the EC presented a number of major challenges to the government, notably on the milk super levy and some aspects of the Single European Act, it generally remained true to its communautaire self-image, reassuring its fellow members of the Community and minimising the scale of the problems at home.
Abstract: In this paper the impact of EC membership on the foreign policy of the coalition government led by Garret FitzGerald between 1982 and 1987 is examined. It is argued that while the EC presented a number of major challenges to the government, notably on the milk super levy and some aspects of the Single European Act, it generally remained true to its communautaire self‐image, reassuring its fellow members of the Community and minimising the scale of the problems at home. Nevertheless, the government was unable to resolve a number of foreign policy problems or mobilise public opinion decisively behind its approach to them before it fell from power. Indeed, its approach to foreign policy questions may have contributed to its eventual political defeat.


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1989
TL;DR: The coalition government of Lloyd George and Bonar Law as discussed by the authors had a unique opportunity to strengthen Britain's position in the world and to formulate an effective strategic policy, but it failed to do so because of overconfidence and adverse circumstances.
Abstract: By December 1918 Britain had emerged a victor from the great war as had the coalition government from the coupon election. This government had a unique opportunity to strengthen Britain’s position in the world and to formulate an effective strategic policy. It failed to do so because of overconfidence and adverse circumstances. Lloyd George dominated the Cabinet, supported by Bonar Law, the Conservative Party leader and Lord Privy Seal, while the Finance Committee composed the inner Cabinet. By 1920 its members were Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and the ministers for the departments involved in strategic policy: Curzon, Long, Churchill, Austen Chamberlain, Montagu, the India Secretary and Milner, the Colonial Secretary. This government had great ambitions: to establish British hegemony over the Middle East, a stable balance of power in Europe and the Pacific, and close ties with several victor powers. On the assumption that Britain would be secure during the forseeable future, while the world would become stable, it intended to use the August 1919 principles to govern service policies.