Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1977"

The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.

Abstract: : The report identifies several factors--historical, institutional, and political--that have given rise to a uniquely Soviet approach to strategic thought. American doctrines of limited nuclear war and intrawar deterrence are examined in light of this Soviet doctrinal tradition. It is argued that such doctrines conflict with deeply-rooted Soviet beliefs; hence, Soviet decisionmakers may not abide by American notions of mutual restraint in the choice of targets and weapons. Three caveats are stressed, however. First, evidence on Soviet strategic doctrine is ambiguous. Two, even deeply-rooted doctrinal beliefs may change, albeit slowly, in response to technical or other environmental changes. Three, doctrinal preference is not the only important factor that might affect Soviet behavior in a nuclear crisis. Situational temptations and constraints may carry independent weight. (Author)

Deterrence, Overload, and Incapacitation: An Empirical Evaluation

Abstract: This paper explores the effect of certainty of punishment on different types of criminal behavior. It is argued that deterrence theory, which treats the potential criminal as weighing the relative rewards and costs of a criminal act, is more applicable to certain types of crimes than others. The strength of the negative relationship between certainty of punishment and crime rate will thus vary by type of crime. It is argued that deterrence, overload, and incapacitation theories each predict different patterns of these variations in strength. Thus the fit of the expected pattern to available data should allow us to choose among the theories. Using previously unpublished data for SMSAs and results obtained by other researchers, the actual patterns of strength of relationships are studied. Though the data presently available have many problems and some of the patterns are ambiguous, the deterrence predictions seem to have the best overall support. Interest in the deterrent effect of punishment has grown substantially in both sociology and economics in the past few years. Previously the work done by sociologists on deterrence focused on the death penalty, and these analyses indicated that the death penalty did not deter homicide (Savitz; Schuessler), so for a long time it was generally assumed by sociologists that punishment did not deter criminal behavior (Tullock). Recently, however, sociologists have expanded their analyses to include a broad range of offenses and a variety of dimensions of punishment, and they have used more sophisticated research methods. During the past few years, economists, who tend to see human behavior-including deviant behavior-in explicit rational and profit-maximizing terms, have also begun to address the deterrence question explicitly (e.g., Ehrlich; Sjoquist). Contrary to earlier results the bulk of the new evidence points to a deterrence effect (for *We would like to thank David Sjoquist for making some of his data available to us. The comments of Robert Crutchfield, Lisa Heinrich, Mayer Zald, and especially Michael Hughes on an earlier draft are greatly appreciated.

Deterrence in 1939

Abstract: Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the same time perceptions. Britain felt impelled to deter Germany after Prague, but could offer only a long-term deterrent. Germany's short term appeared so favorable that the long-term uncertainties posed by Britain and France failed to restrain her. The experience of 1939 also underlines the importance of political factors, particularly realignment in mutual deterrence. The Russo-German Pact tipped the balance toward war. In the contemporary setting, calculations of time perspectives between the Soviet Union and the United States are important for mutual deterrence, especially in Europe. Changes in the Sino-Soviet split hold further implications for contemporary deterrence.

A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict *

Abstract: Many professional observers have come to the conclusion that, despite denials and technical problems whose solutions are not publicly known, Israel already has nuclear weapons or has completed all but the final steps in their fabrication. It is also widely believed that one or more Arab states will come into atomic possession within a 10 to 15 year time frame. The present analysis explores the consequences of the establishment of a regional mini-balance of terror. The central hypothesis is that apocalyptic images and doomsday visions have been accepted too readily and out of proportion to the arguments that are given, and that a stable system of mutual deterrence may be viable in the Middle East and may make a positive contribution to the process of political settlement. Problems of rationality, credibility, second-strike force survivability, escalation, tactical nuclear weapons, accidents, permissive action links, terrorism, preventive war, and the disclosure of nuclear weapons possession are discussed.

Arms Control: The Retreat From Disarmament The Record to Date and the Search for Alternatives

Abstract: The main thesis in this paper is that arms control as implemented in recent years and reflected in a number of multilateral and bilateral US-Soviet accords has not halted the arms race, but rather impelled its course. An effort must be made to change direction and initiate the process of real disarmament.Arms control has meant a retreat from disarmament. It has come to symbolize a practice of building security not on less but on more arms. Deterrence has become the main theme of arms control, and has meant the establishment of a threat system which requires a constant augmentation of armaments, so as to enhance the retaliatory power of the adversary.The paper analyses the flaws and drawbacks of arms control and reviews the achieve ments and failures of the arms control agreements. It then discusses the armaments dyna mics and prospects of disarmament. Two basic mainstays of armaments dynamics today lie in the domain of politics and technology. To undercut armaments dynamics the modus operandi in these two...

The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

Abstract: Five aspects of the relationship of strategic and theater nuclear forces are addressed in this essay, as well as some of the early policy discussions that surrounded the development of these forces. The first aspect concerns the notion that, in this relationship, the balance at each significant level of potential violence-or of deterrence-affects and is affected by the balance at higher and lower levels. Implicit in that notion is the idea of a hierarchy of potential levels of violence. I suggest that at least ten and perhaps eleven levels can usefully be distinguished and that the relationship between strategic and theater nuclear capabilities involves the interaction among at least five of these levels. Second, at each interface between levels, at least four questions arise: 1) What would be the probable military outcome of combat at that level? 2) What would be the degree of collateral destruction implicit in combat at that level, including the social and political destruction to each side? 3) What is the likelihood that either side would initiate or be deterred from initiating combat at this or higher or lower levels of combat? 4) What is the degree of clarity or ambiguity of the cut-off line between one level and the next? A third aspect of the relationship requires the recollection of some of the turning points in American thought about the interface between strategic and theater nuclear conflict. Fourth is a discussion of strategic rivalry and the potential use of nuclear force, at the relative force levels of deterrence, as I believe the situation is likely to evolve during the next few years. Finally, there is comment on how we might approach the problem and what we should do about it.

What Happens If ...? Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons

Abstract: This paper explores what may happen if ter rorists or revolutionaries are able to develop nuclear explo sives or the ability to dispense radioactive materials. Contin ued proliferation of so-called peaceful nuclear technology will increase the likelihood of this happening. The consequences are substantial, since nuclear technology would provide terrorists or revolutionaries with a lever for threatening or carrying out acts of mass destruction against a society. Deterrence would be ineffective against terrorists who are unidentified and/or unlocatable, or at least believe themselves to be so. Complications would arise, which could potentially trigger an international war, if nuclear-armed terrorists or revolutionaries deliberately misidentify themselves. The solution to the problem would require perfect safeguarding of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials on a global scale. The record in the United States, a technologically advanced nation with an established nuclear program, sug gests that perfec...

Threats to détente: intuitive hopes and counterintuitive realities

Abstract: The theoretical perspective behind detente is elaborated. While avoidance of war is the major goal, cooperation, tension-reduction and improvement of domestic societies are the major means. Cooperation includes trade, legal commitments, functional cooperation within IGOs and routine diplomacy. Tension reduction includes less verbal conflict, less defense expenditures, a slower arms race and possibly multipolarization. Improvement of domestic socieities refers to stability, egalitarianism and democracy within nations. All those detente-related propositions about means-ends-relationships are scrutinized from a quantitative international politics perspective. In general, propositions receive little or no support. A tentative explanation why is suggested by reference to an alternative theoretical framework. It is argued that detente neither affects the security dilemma nor territorial problems nor ideological dissens enough to overcome still irreconcilable conflicts of interest. As long as there are such conflicts of interest, meaningful victory has to be ruled out by deterrence in order to avoid war. While deterrence may help us to survive in the short run, it guarantees doom in the long run. So, there is some true insight behind the drive for detente. Nevertheless detente may prove counterproductive, because it might promote multipolarization and finally nuclear proliferation. While we badly need something better and safer than deterrence, detente doesn't seem to be the solution to our problems of survival.

The Role of Population Defense in Mutual Deterrence

Abstract: Simple mathematical models can help reveal complexities easily overlooked in verbal reasoning, but the results of such modeling must be explicated verbally to be credible to policy-makers. The commonplace notion that population defense is antithetical to stability in a mutual deterrence situation is studied using a simple model which reveals much more complex phenomena than are usually considered in verbal arguments. The results motivate a more careful verbal consideration of the problem, leading to the conclusion that some forms of population defense may, in some circumstances, act as a stabilizing influence rather than causing escalation of offensive strategic armaments. It is suggested that a stability-promoting defense might even be designed specifically to take advantage of this phenomenon—a paradoxical conclusion from the traditional point of view.

The Political Impact of U.S. Military Force in the Middle East

Abstract: : This study used a rigorous content analysis/events data system to evaluate the impact of events relating to broadly defined U.S. force. Arab media seem to see the United States and the Soviet Union in a situation of mutual deterrence. The press is relatively inattentive to strategic weapons development and arms control, but follow technology and weapons development relevant to the Middle East. All the newspapers surveyed depended heavily on Western sources-- particularly AP, UPI, AFP, and Reuters--for their news. Even on issues such as the global balance, Western news is the dominant source. The primary subject of the newspapers is military assistance and arms transfers in and to the Middle East. This area accounts for over one third of the total coverage of force events. American and Soviet weapons are both highly regarded. Soviet weapons are viewed more favorably than overall Soviet technology. In general, U.S. high technology is greatly respected, as is advanced American military technology. Soviet air defense and ATGMs received particularly favorable treatment. American 'commitment' to Israel is seen to be in terms of Israel's existence only, not support of any particular Israeli policy.

Deterrence Failures and Deterrence Strategies

Abstract: : The alternative perspective developed in this essay contends that a nation's long-term political, economic, and social prospects dominate narrow military considerations in a decision on whether or not to go to war. If long-term prospects seem bright to a nation's NCA(National Command Authority), it will find the current state of affairs on the whole acceptable. In this case a nation might not go to war even when presented with certain military success. On the other hand, if long-term prospects seem dim to a nation's NCA, it will find the current state of affairs intolerable, in that existing trends define those long-term developments. In this case a nation might go to war in the face of likely military defeat.

Nuclear strategy and national security: points of view. [17 papers]

Abstract: Nuclear strategy and national security are discussed in 17 papers, 9 official documents and statements, and a Senate debate report on the neutron warhead. In the post-Vietnam debate over the future role of the United States in world affairs, new political and military strategies have been formulated to deal with new realities. That debate continues today, and its implications are as uncertain as the changing realities it seeks to comprehend. While there is virtually no disagreement that deterrence should be the primary purpose of nuclear arsenals, controversy continues to surround questions regarding their composition and use should deterrence fail. Increasingly, deterrence has been associated with a capability to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield or in limited strategic exchanges; the traditional dichotomy between deterrence and war-fighting has today become ambiguous for many people. Yet, others would argue that by blurring the distinction between prevention and initiation of nuclear war there is at least some chance that such a war would become more ''thinkable'' than in the past. Contemporary debate on American nuclear strategy and national security policy is taking place between these two schools of thought. This volume is designed to present the major arguments in the debate and issuesmore » related to it.« less

The Neutron Weapon and NATO Strategy.

Abstract: : The Neutron or enhanced radiation weapon can be seen as an improvement to NATO capabilities to carry out its strategy or a technological premise for changing that strategy. Proponents of change have ignored the connectedness of all elements of theater nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence, and intra-war deterrence defense. The neutron weapon can be valuable for improving some components of strategy but cannot solve all of NATO's strategic problems. (Author)

Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Theater Nuclear Forces

Abstract: : This paper is one part in a series of six papers on planning U.S. general purpose forces. While it does not directly address issues of major budgetary significance, it is nevertheless a necessary part of the series. Its primary purpose is to show the relationship between theater nuclear forces and conventional force planning. One possible response to the rising costs of conventional forces is to place more reliance on theater nuclear forces to deter the outbreak of war. This paper explores the reasonableness of that response, and attempts to answer the question: Are theater nuclear weapons a useful substitute for conventional force capability, or a hedge against failure of conventional forces?

Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy

Abstract: Certain 'arms controllers' defend SLBMs as 'ideally suited' to deterrence. But superpower nuclear strategy has nothing to do with deterrence. It concerns warfighting through counter force attacks on military targets. Soviet strategy especially emphasises the 'first strike', yet arms controllers have minimized Soviet capabilities and advocated appeasement. Examination of technical weapons systems characteristics and their impact on nuclear war fighting tactics shows that accurate SLBMs are especially useful to whoever strikes first and of little use to whoever is struck first. Their short range, speed, accuracy, flexibility and con cealment are ideally suited to surprise attack. In a first strike, they uniquely complement bombers, ICBMs and reconnaissance systems to advantage the attacker, where otherwise ad vantage might lie with the defence. SLBMs are officially 'quick reaction' and 'priority strike' forces for tactical and theatre targets, and will probably be the first 'strategic' forces used. But SLBM efficiency against hardened targets depends on completely vulnerable pre cision navigation systems like Omega, Loran C and satellites. Future developments like ma neuverable warheads will make accurate SLBMs even more useful in striking first, without diminishing their extreme vulnerability when struck first. Even as 'reserve deterrents', inac curate SLBMs are unlikely to survive longer than certain other forces. Thus arms controllers have defended a classical 'destabilizing' weapons system -- the principal first strike forces on each side. The arms race is a 'rational' outcome of superpower contention for world domination and preparations for world war. Opposition cannot centre on international arms control agree ments, but must mobilize people against the superpowers, and especially against the super power that talks peace while preparing for war. Ultimately man, not weapons, is decisive. Western Europeans should get prepared to defend themselves.

Détente and deterrance: from kissinger to carter

Abstract: : The interrelationships between detente and deterrence are often confusing and misinterpreted. For one group of Americans, detente is a no-win policy. The US has acquiesced at every encounter but gained nothing in return from the USSR. As Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey once chastised Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, "I do suggest for the most part the gains that have been made in detente have accrued largely to the Russian side, that is, on specific issues." Others take an even harsher view and argue that the USSR has no genuine interest in detente. Detente is only a guise to weaken American resolve to resist Soviet pressures while the USSR passes the US militarily. The latter point very well could be a Soviet objective, but the more important issue is that the USSR cannot obtain it unless the US concedes and allows such an action to occur. There does not seem to be any evidence in either American declarations or actions to support the idea that during either the Kissinger years or the current administration the US was or is willing to negotiate or abdicate American strategic nuclear deterrent powers. Kissinger referred to the need to retain American power as "essential equivalence" while the Carter Administration has chosen to use the term "rough equivalence." Whatever the terminology, the concept remains the same. Even in an era of improved bilateral relations--detente--the US must retain the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviets in case the detente impulse should fade at some time in the future. This interrelationship and its continuity between Republican and Democratic administrations is the thesis of this paper.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

Abstract: : This paper is devoted exclusively to the question of how strategic nuclear forces in particular contribute to U.S. deterrence against the Soviet Union.

An Assessment of European Attitudes on Tactical Nuclear Force Modernization. Volume II. Main Study.

Abstract: : This report analyzes existing views in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, toward tactical nuclear weapons; assesses possible reactions in Europe toward the modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear force, especially through the introduction of high-accuracy, tailored-effects weapons with the potential for increasing military effectiveness while substantially reducing collateral damage in the event of war; and discusses ways in which European opinion might be made more receptive to tactical nuclear force modernization. (Author)

Peace and Security by Means of Arms Limitations — Six Imperatives of the German Grundgesetz to Orient Defense Policy towards its Consequences

Abstract: One of the imperatives binding the state's defense measures is the quest for peace in the Grundgesetz, especially as it is expressed in Articles 24-26, directed against any form of abstract endangerment of peace. The logic of these imperatives, intending to avoid all mea sures which might infringe upon peace, implies that the FRG is obliged to renounce every armament measure, insofar as defensive character of an arms system is not beyond doubt. Moreover, we must keep in mind that it is not the German citizen, but man and his rights in general, who forms the focus of the Grundgesetz, insofar as there is a concept of peace, in positive terms, unequivocally underlying the Grundgesetz. Consequently, mea sures of defense against an external attack may never have the effect of retaliation. The parti cipation of the FRG in the system of deterrence is thus inhibited by the extent that she would have to threaten to retaliate upon potential external enemies to maintain her 'credibility'.