Showing papers on "Doctrine published in 1988"

The Free Economy and the Strong State

Abstract: The slow-down in the pace of accumulation has provided the opportunity for a widespread rejection of Keynesian political economy and an onslaught on the policies, values and organizations of social democracy. There has always been an element among British intellectuals which has never required much inducement to join a collective stampede to the right. We are constantly being told that 'intellectuals' are finally losing faith in socialism (this follows their previous final rejection of it in the early 1950s). They have been converted, even at this late hour, to the need to resist totalitarianism and the British Labour Party, and to reject the beliefs in collectivism and equality that were enshrined in the policies and institutions established in the 1940s. Aside from these 'men who have changed their minds', swayed by the populist clamour of the new right, there has also been in recent years a real intellectual change, a remarkable revival of liberal political economy through the elaboration of the doctrine of the social market economy, a doctrine which, under different labels, has made increasing headway within the Conservative party in the last ten years. The Conservative Government elected in 1979 had a group of ministers in the crucial economic ministries (Treasury, Industry, Trade, Energy), who were all adherents of the doctrine and prepared to govern in accordance with its prescriptions. The term social market economy originated in Germany from the neo-liberal ideas that were current there after 1945. In Britain and America similar ideas have been put forward by a number of theorists including F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, and popularized in Britain by organizations like the Institute for Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies, by lead writers in the Times and Daily Telegraph, by economic commentators such as Peter Jay, Samuel Brittan, and Patrick Hutber, and by Conservative politicians (Enoch Powell at first; more recently, Keith Joseph).

Mind-Forg'd Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the Regency

Abstract: "Mind-Forg'd Manacles" explores attitudes towards and treatments for madness in the age before the mass asylum and the emergence of the psychiatric profession. It aims to show how vernacular culture and Christian doctrine had traditionally offered explanations of insanity and how these views were displaced by the secularizing mind of the Enlightenment. It explores early social policy towards the insane and how this led to the piecemeal development of lunatic asylums. It also looks at the theoretical and practical aspects of psychiatric therapies.

Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Leavenworth Paper, Number 16)

Abstract: : The single most important origin of today's AirLand Battle doctrine was the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the writing of a wholly new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, "Operations," under the supervision of the first TRADOC commander, General William E. DePuy. Between 1973 and the manual's publication in 1976, DePuy gave the Army a mighty shove that rolled it out of its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and on the road to the 21st century. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was unlike any of its several predecessors. First, it represented a new role for military doctrine as a key integrating medium for an increasingly complex military bureaucracy. The manual attempted to present an over-arching concept of warfare that would rationalize everything the Army did, from training recruits to designing tanks, in terms of how the Army intended to fight. Central to this attempt was the hope that the manual would provide the convincing arguments the Army needed to preserve its investment in new weapons systems. Second, FM 100-5 heralded dramatic changes within the Army. Its authors intended that it play a major role in expunging the bitter Vietnam War experience; shift the Army's attention away from the problems inherent in establishing a volunteer army and onto the battlefield; address the twin issues of a renewed threat to NATO Europe and the increased lethality brought on by the spread of advanced weapons systems; and change the Army's focus from dismounted infantry operations to armored operations. Third, FM 100-5 was an attempt to demystify doctrine. It discarded the abstractions of earlier manuals in favor of specifics on "how to fight." Fourth, the manual was the personal project of General DePuy and his subordinate generals. But despite its importance and high-level authorship, FM 100-5 caused a controversy within the Army that quickly led to the manual's displacement, an event DePuy neither anticipated nor intended.

Bioethics in Thailand: The Struggle for Buddhist Solutions

Abstract: The Thai concern for bioethics has been stimulated by the departure of Thai medicine from its long tradition through the introduction of Western medical models. Bioethics is now being taught to Thai medical students emphasizing moral insights and principles found within Thai culture. These are to a large extent Buddhist themes. Veracity is always a duty for people in general and medical personnel in particular. Falsehoods and deception cannot be morally justified simply on the grounds that we think it is good for another. Buddhism also prohibits killing. The doctrine of kamma holds that joys and sorrows are the result of one's own past actions. Kamma must run its course or will be manifest in a future life. Mercy-killing also violates the Buddhist psychology. A physician who kills subconsciously transfers his aversion to suffering to the one who embodies the suffering. Buddhist justice is understood in terms of impartiality and equal treatment. Compassion goes beyond justice to self-giving and self-denial. It is central to the path to the attainment of highest human fulfillment.

Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process

Abstract: Who makes constitutional law? Is constitutional doctrine the monopoly of the courts? In accessible and persuasive prose Louis Fisher explains that constitutional law is not solely or even primarily the Supreme Court's "final word" but rather a richly political convergence of separate interpretations. With a broad range of examples, he argues that constitutional principles emerge from a dialogue among all three branches of government--executive, legislative, and judicial. Important contributions also come from the states and the general public. Fisher identifies executive and legislative initiatives in many areas of constitutional significance. Where there is litigation, the Court generally upholds these initiatives or may avoid making a constitutional decision by using "threshold devices." On those rare occasions when the Supreme Court exercises judicial review and strikes down a presidential or congressional action, it is usually only a matter of time before the proposal is revived and the dialogue begins again.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy

Abstract: "What's past is prologue" Collisions - Labour in power, 1941-49 Crosscurrents - Menzies in power, 1949-66 The Vietnam war "East of Suez" and the "Guam Doctrine" Whitlam and his fall, 1972-75 Fraser and realignments Hawke and Keating - redefinitions 1983-93 Alliance and dependency.

Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law

Abstract: The first paperback edition of a classic of American constitutional theory. The book is divided into two parts. In Part I Professor Tushnet appraises the five major competing ogrand theorieso of constitutional law and interpretation, and, argues that none of them satisfy their own requirements for coherence and judicial constraint. In Part II the author offers a descriptive sociology of constitutional doctrine and raises critical questions as to whether a grand theory is necessary, is it possible to construct a coherent, useful grand theory, and is construction of an uncontroversial grand theory possible? Professor TushnetAEs new Afterword is organized in parallel fashion to the original text. Part I offers a new survey of the contemporary terrain of constitutional interpretation. Part II provides an extended discussion of the most prominent of contemporary efforts to provide an external analysis of constitutional law, the idea of regime politics. This includes discussion of major court decisions, including Bush v. Gore and Citizens United.

The Nature of Doctrine

Abstract: Lindbeck's central thesis can be simply stated. He contends that the cultural-linguistic view of religion, long current in the social sciences, can provide theology, and especially ecumenical theology, with useful insights into the nature of doctrine. But to engage this thesis adequately, as it is unfolded in the course of the book, is not so simple. Although compact, the book ranges widely over not one but three related subjects-religion, theology, and doctrine-and it draws on a wealth of resources from outside as well as inside the domain of theol-

Ethical and Legal Aspects of Managing Corporate Cultures

Abstract: This article evaluates managers' attempts to shape their corporate cultures in relation to two aspects of fairness in employment relationships: job security and equitable treatment. Both of these aspects are becoming particularly important given the revisions to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. Statements of corporate values are increasingly being recognized as creating contractual obligations, while concepts of equitable treatment have also been expanded. An appreciation of fairness principles is becoming more important to managers since courts and juries are integrating ethical and societal values into legal judgments about employment relationships.

The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the “Dirty War” in Argentina:

Abstract: It has been taken for granted that Latin American military governments of recent decades have been under the strong influence of the National Security Doctrine. However, no systematic assessment has been made about the degree to which the doctrine directly or indirectly has shaped military perceptions. This study focuses on the Argentine military government of 1976-1981, and on its identification of threats to national security, its strategies to overcome those threats, and whether these fit within the parameters of the NSD. Through content analysis of military speeches, interviews, and private memos, it is found that members of the government perceived their adversaries in vague, operational terms; that they focused on subjective agents to the exclusion of underlying objective conditions; and that they failed to appreciate the importance of political solutions to national security problems. Together, these views find only partial support within the NSD. It is concluded that the military practiced selecti...

The Great Perfection Rdzogs Chen: A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching in Tibetan Buddhism

Abstract: The Great Perfection (rDzogs chen in Tibetan) is a philosophical and meditative teaching. Its inception is attributed to Vairocana, one of the first seven Tibetan Buddhist monks ordained at Samye in the eight century A.D. The doctrine is regarded among Buddhists as the core of the teachings adhered to by the Nyingmapa school whilst similarly it is held to be the fundamental teaching among the Bonpos, the non-Buddhist school in Tibet. After a historical introduction to Tibetan Buddhism and the Bon, the author deals with the legends of Vairocana (Part I), analysing early documents containing essential elements of the doctrine and comparing them with the Ch'an tradition. He goes on to explore in detail the development of the doctrine in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D. (Part II). The Tantric doctrines that play an important role are dealt with, as are the rDzogs chen theories in relation to the other major Buddhist doctrines. Different trends in the rDzogs chen tradition are described in Part III. The author has drawn his sources mainly from early unpublished documents which throw light on the origins and development, at the same time also using a variety of sources which enabled him to explicate the crucial position which the doctrine occupies in Tibetan religions.

Freedom, Contingency, and Things Possible in Themselves

Abstract: It is well known that a number of very plausible arguments against freedom can be constructed using what appear to be Leibnizian premises. Leibniz was aware of most of these arguments and developed a rich variety of responses to them, including his so-called theory of things possible in themselves. There is no doubt of the importance of this theory: Leibniz repeatedly asserted it from the I 670s until the end of his career. One of his best contemporary commentators has even described it as Leibniz's "principal (and most confident) solution to the problem of contingency."' Yet despite its prominence in his writings, the doctrine has

A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogācārin@@@Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor@@@A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin

Abstract: The author shows that Yogacara metaphysics is basically the same as that of the early Buddhism. The texts included herein are: (i) Madhyanta Vibhaga Karika bhasya, (ii)Trisvabhavanirdesa, (iii) Trimsatika, and (iv) Vimsatika

The doctrine of creation and modern science

Abstract: . In contrast to Christian theology that has ignored science, this essay suggests that a credible doctrine of God as creator must take into account scientific understandings of the world. The introduction of the principle of inertia into seventeenth-century science and philosophy helped change the traditional idea of God as creator (which included divine conservation and governance) into a deist concept of God. To recapture the idea that God continually creates, it is important to affirm the contingency of the world as a whole and of all events in the world. Reflecting on the interrelationship of contingency and natural law provides a framework for relating scientific theories of a universal field, the concept of emergent evolution, and the theological concept of eternal divine spirit active in all creation.

Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman

Abstract: Frank Michelman believes that the Supreme Court is "moving noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine."' He criticizes this development, believing that the Court should instead engage in balancing. To him "balancing-or, better, the judicial practice of situated judgment or practical reason-is not law's antithesis but a part of law's essence."2 I argue in this Article that Michelman is wrong on both counts. Part I demonstrates that the Court does not appear to be articulating consistent formal principles in the takings area. Part II argues that it should try to do just that. Whatever the merits of ad hoc balancing in other areas of law, it has special difficulties in the takings area because of the important role of investment-backed expectations. Nonetheless, Michelman is correct in saying that the formal pattern he discerns is an undesirable one.3 Thus, Part III suggests a way to think about the takings question that unifies physical and regulatory takings and provides a way to distinguish between government actions that require compensation and those that do not. Nevertheless, even a very imperfect, but clearly articulated, formal takings doctrine is likely to be superior to open-ended balancing.

The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existentialism

Abstract: It is possible that a philosopher could be guilty of a compromise with political authority in an apparently inconsequential manner; he himself might be aware of this. But what he could not be aware of is the possibility that this apparent compromise with authority finds its basis in the most profound deficiency . . of his own doctrine. If therefore a philosopher should "conform" (by making concessions to authority), his disciples will have to explain what he himself was aware of in a merely external way, in an internal and essential fashion.

The Structure of Standing

Abstract: The structure of standing law in the federal courts has long been criticized as incoherent. It has been described as \"permeated with sophistry,\"' as \"a word game played by secret rules,\"2 and more recently as a largely meaningless \"litany\" recited before \"the Court . . . chooses up sides and decides the case.\"' This unhappy state of affairs does not result from the unimportance of standing doctrine.4 If anything, the contrary is true. The root of the problem is, rather, that the intellectual structure of standing law is ill-matched to the task it is asked to perform. In this article I propose a new structure, one that can serve as a paradigm not only in the scientific sense of explaining observed phenomena, 5 but also in the sense

The English Sabbath: A Study of Doctrine and Discipline from the Reformation to the Civil War

Abstract: Acknowledgements Abbreviations 1. The case for a reappraisal 2. Medieval sabbatarianism and Reformation reaction 3. Early Elizabethan sabbatarianism: 1558-82 4. Late Elizabethan and Jacobean sabbatarianism: 1583-1617 5. The Book of Sports controversy: 1617-18 6. The 1620s: continued consensus 7. The sabbatarian controversy Epilogue Appendix Bibliography Index.

The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: a Critique

Abstract: This book is a study of the ethics of homicide in medical practice almost wholly devoted to showing the inadequacy, because of its inconsistency, of a sanctity of life approach to that ethics. According to the first chapter, the sanctity of life approach is based on the notion that the direct taking of innocent life in medical practice, as elsewhere, is absolutely forbidden. But other important ideas are seen to be associated with the sanctity of life principle as discussion proceeds: for example that there is something inherently valuable in human life independent ofthe quality of life it occasions, that all human life is of equal value, that there is something inherently wrong in the taking of human life as such. To the sanctity of life approach with these implications the author opposes an account of the ethics of homicide based on a quality of life approach. This uses the notion that life is valuable only in so far as it is a precondition of other things (for example pleasure or the exercise of autonomy). Homicide is only an evil if it forecloses a life which is associated with these other goods. Three lengthy chapters in the middle of the book, amounting to some threequarters ofits material, treat ofthe ways in which defenders of the sanctity of life principle try to reconcile their views with the fact that many apparently licit clinical decisions have among their foreseen consequences that a life should not be prolonged as long as is medically possible or that a patient's death should be hastened. Acts and omissions, the principle of double effect, and extraordinary and ordinary means are treated here. The critique of these devices is thorough and penetrating but its general outline is familiar from other treatments of homicide and medical ethics provided by quality of life theorists (including the author's own work with Singer on life/death decisions in paediatrics). The general conclusion reached is that these devices are used with notable inconsistency by their proponents and do not offer any good grounds for supposing that if the hastening of death (or the failure to prolong life) are foreseen consequences of voluntary actions., these acts should not be considered homicidal in their intent and thrust. Sanctity of life theorists, in other words, are using a much broader notion of justified homicide than they suppose and are in effect endorsing the belief that quality of life considerations can justify an act homicidal in its thrust. The principle of double effect is the most important of the devices used in the ethics the author opposes. Her treatment of it is polemical in character. A more independent discussion is perhaps needed to settle finally the question of whether the fact that a homicidal consequence is no part of the reason for an act being performed does at all imply that this consequence is (as Thomists argue) no part ofthe act itself, but a mere circumstance which bears less centrally on its moral character. Overall, however, it must be said that the author succeeds in showing that we need a broader notion of justified homicide than that suggested by traditional talk of the sanctity of life. What does not follow from the force of the central critical chapters of this book is the truth of the quality of life ethics of homicide expounded in the final chapter. For the quality of life and sanctity of life accounts of the ethics of homicide are not exhaustive alternatives, and as a study of the applied ethics of homicide this book is seriously deficient in implying that they are. It is possible to hold that human life is intrinsically a good (and homicide therefore intrinsically an evil) while recognising that in some cases the consequences of continued living (for example in great pain in a terminal state) justify or mitigate the taking of life. The intrinsic wrong or evil of homicide is not an absolute wrong or evil, though homicide is always a drastic act which unless justified or mitigated is wrong without qualification. To say that homicidal acts are intrinsically wrong, and forbidden unless justified, is to endorse the idea that there is something about being human which makes a life importantly valuable. In her last chapter the author seeks to overthrow this impediment to her quality of life view by appealing to the manifest injustices of speciesism. Like others before her she is unable to distinguish between saying that being a human life is necessary for having a peculiar value and saying that it is sufficient. Let us hope that the latter view is defensible, for then we shall avoid the miserable conclusion endorsed in this work to the effect that there are no direct reasons why it is wrong to kill human infants.

The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and A Primitivist View of the Law of Nations

Abstract: International law is the most rarefied of social sciences. Even so, it has scarcely any sense of its intellectual history. International law is finely articulated, oblique in its analysis, and respectful of its position as an arbiter of national competition and conflict. But aside from the casual citation to an ancient arbitration or the consultation of a famous publicist for an essential principle, little credence has been given to its historical development as either a collection of doctrines or a learned study. This article offers both an intellectual history of an international law doctrine and a tour d'horizon of the nature of discourse in our discipline. These two exercises are intimately connected. It makes little sense to discuss international law theory without reference to a particular set of doctrines, rules that arguably govern the behavior of states. Likewise, international law doctrines are empty unless informed by some conception of how they evolved, what they mean and the ideas of those scholars that have thought about them before us. The methodology used in this article is therefore unabashedly historical. That is why the concept "law of nations" pervades these pages. We need to recognize that international law is inherently a modern invention. The very term was the creation of that most Enlightened of men, Jeremy Bentham,I and did not really gain currency until this century. In the course of its development, international law has managed to lay its own intellectual snares, dig formidable doctrinal pitfalls and rig theoretical trapdoors. It is wonderfully complex. It seems, by comparison, that the law of nations is easily reducible to a multivolume treatise, now gathering dust in our law libraries. As used in this article, the term "primitivist" captures one response to this antihistorical attitude toward international law. Primitivists are our discipline's metaphysicians. They view international law's first principle, sovereignty, through a doctrinal prism that combines rules of state behavior

MEND: A Nurturing Voice in The Nuclear Arms Debate

Abstract: While the argument about the meaning of nuclear weapons has been fluid and dynamic for the past forty years, it is fair to say that, at the present time, the prevailing definition of the nuclear situation is “deterrence policy.” Some of the fundamental premises of this doctrine are (1) that the Soviets are an unambiguous and non-negotiable threat to U.S. interests, (2) that Soviet expansionism must be contained, and (3) that nuclear weapons are designed to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack on the United States or its allies. While the deterrence doctrine has obtained a dominant position, it is not the only voice in the nuclear conversation. In this paper, we report on the efforts of “Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament” (MEND), an anti-nuclear group that is attempting to redefine the nuclear situation and reset the parameters of the conversation. MEND is challenging the techno-strategic assumptions of the deterrence doctrine by employing a nurturing discourse that insists mothers share a universal biological and spiritual bond that cuts across political boundaries. We report on the discourse strategies that MEND employs to gain ownership of the nuclear situation, the responses MEND has engendered from competing voices, and the contradictions that are emerging in the group's discourse. In the process, we counter the passive view of language that has predominated in the study of international relations with an essentially constitutive view of the role language plays in political action.

Kant's Theory of Property

Abstract: that, while the present work would be concerned only with the supreme principle of morality, he intended some day to write a "metaphysics of morals" in which he would set forth the whole system of man's duties derived from this principle (Ak 4, 391-92).1 Twelve years later, in 1797, he published The Metaphysics of Morals in two parts: Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right2 and Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue. As the Groundwork made clear, the concept of duty contains that of con straint upon an agent who, because of impulses belonging to his sensible nature, does not necessarily do whatever is objectively

Accommodation, Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory

Abstract: This paper examines the famous doctrine that independent prediction garners more support than accommodation. The standard arguments for the doctrine are found to be invalid, and a more realistic position is put forward, that whether evidence supports or not a hypothesis depends on the prior probability of the hypothesis, and is independent of whether it was proposed before or after the evidence. This position is implicit in the subjective Bayesian theory of confirmation, and the paper ends with a brief account of this theory, and answer to the principal objections to it.

Law, Deconstruction, and the Resistance to Theory

Abstract: ideal. And this in turn gives rise to the history of variant legal creeds and philosophies, the debate between conservatives, liberals, and radicals all of whom adopt some particular view of how the balance can best be struck. What de Man suggests is that the rhetoric of law more specifically, the tensions that develop in its language between "constative" and "performative" modes may be at the root of these differences and affect them in ways not fully understood by exponents of this or that principled viewpoint. Now there might, on the face of it, seem little to choose between de Man's deconstructionist reading of the Social Contract and the arguments put forward by members of the critical legal studies movement. They also make a practice of exposing contradictions and antinomies, pointing to areas where law is indeterminate, and claiming that judgments are arrived at not on the basis of impartial reasoning, or in pursuit of justice and truth, but always under pressure of competing political interests. Furthermore, they would appear to follow his example by treating legal discourse in rhetorical terms, as a language that works to persuade, win over, or (most often) simply to coerce subjects into accepting the current institutional status quo. Any attempt to derive a code of practice from first principles, rules, or natural justice is regarded by these "delegitimising" critics as a ruse in the service of authority and power. Their main target is the doctrine of legal "formalism", classically defined (in the words of Roberto Unger) as "belief in the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive method capable of giving determinate solutions to particular problems of legal choice".39 This belief found its most articulate expression in the work of Hans Kelsen, the neo-Kantian theorist who sought to ground jurisprudence in a self-sufficient system of a priori concepts, ground rules, and regulative terms, and hence to save it from the looming threat of cultural and ethical relativism.40 This strong version of the formalist case has since been subjected to widespread criticism and nowadays has few adherents. But the doctrine survives, according to Unger, in current attempts to distinguish between questions that belong strictly within the province of legal debate, and issues that open into wider contexts of socio-political argument. Formalism in this sense can be defined more generally as "a commitment to, and a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that contrasts with open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary".41 It is the aim of the critical legal studies movement to demolish the grounds of any such distinction, to show that legal reasoning is always bound up with particular interests, values, priorities, or visions of the social good. And this can best be