Showing papers on "Economic stagnation published in 1985"

Western Samoa: The Experience of Slow Growth and Resource Imbalance

Abstract: Western Samoa is a small island country in the South Pacific with a population of about 160,000 concentrated on two main islands In company with some of the other Pacific Island economies it has experienced economic stagnation and inflationary pressures emanating from external price shocks and fiscal deficits Some of the causes of slow growth are geographical: Western Samoa has a limited production base comprised of a few agricultural commodities - copra, coconut oil, cocoa and taro; a small domestic market; and large expanses of ocean separate the island economy from its major export outlets Other impediments are social in nature The purpose of this paper is to examine these constraints using anthropological perspective and to point towards their implications for future development

Mineral‐based Growth and Development‐generated Socioeconomic Problems in Botswana

Abstract: . Botswana's record of economic growth and political stability stands in sharp contrast to the economic stagnation and political turmoil endemic to Africa. Its progress was based on its fortuitous endowment of mineral wealth, and sound macroeconomic management. In effect, diamond, copper, nickel and coal mining has transformed Botswana from a least-developed, rural, agriculture-based economy into one of Africa's fastest growing, non fuel mineral exporting countries The Government has forged fiscal linkages between the companies operating in the mining sector and its public revenue collections. However, no such strong linkages have been established to the agricultural sector—particularly, to remote, rural, traditional farming areas where most of the country's people live. The growth strategy has produced underdevelopment and economic stagnation in rural agriculture, as well as increasing economic dependency on the Republic of South Africa.

Recent Small Business Reforms in Hungary: A Unique Socialist Experiment

Abstract: Hungry has since 1968 been in the vanguard of economic reform movements unfolding in the east-bloc countries. With the exception of reform measures in Yugoslavia, the measures introduced in Hungary in 1968 represent the most radical central planning system changes of any of the countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). These changes firmly establish the foundations for what can be characterized as a "socialist market economy" in Hungary. The purpose of this article is to report on a most recent and bold development in Hungarian reform: the creation, as of January 1, 1982, of radically new forms of small business organizations. The available experience with those new organizations as of early 1983 are also presented, based on descriptions by Hungarian sources. Finally, Hungarian economists' and planners' suggestions for future changes and improvements in Hungarian economic organizations are discussed and evaluated. The success or failure of the measures currently being implemented in Hungary will undoubtedly affect the direction of reforms in other east-bloc countries. It is clearly important, therefore, to assess the meaning of these reforms as well as the thinking of Hungarian reformers on future directions for change. DECENTRALIZATION MEASURES OF 1968 The principal feature of the 1968 reform measures in Hungary was decentralization of the planning mechanism, a move which significantly extended the decision-making power of enterprises to areas previously reserved for higher administrative levels, such as that of economic ministries and central planning bodies. Enterprises were thus freed of the previously obligatory plan assignments and could develop autonomous production and distribution plans. The role of economic ministries was reduced to coordination and provision of assistance and guidance for the preparation of such plans. Centralized materials allocation was abolished as well. Ministries henceforth exercised influence over enterprise management through the provision of appropriate financial incentives or disincentives, involving such "economic levers" as tax rates, interest rates, and loans. "Indicative planning" largely replaced "command planning," and the influence of market forces grew considerably. Prices, for example, were partially freed from central control and in many cases were allowed to fluctuate freely in response to demand and supply. Thus, while in 1968, 86 percent of food and consumer articles had an official price, in 1980 only 72 percent of such articles belonged to this category. Similarly, in the metal-technical sector, only 13 percent of products were freely priced in 1968, but by 1980 that percentage had increased to more than two thirds. "Market socialism" seems an apt characterization of a system that increasingly attempted to blend central guidance with local enterprise autonomy and freely functioning market forces towards the achievement of national development objectives. EMERGING PROBLEMS REQUIRING NEW MESURES The 1968 measures were generally given high marks for success, but by the late 1970s new problems had emerged that appeared to require additional regulatory steps. Severe external shocks buffeted the Hungarian economy, particularly the worsening terms of trade with both the East and the West, marketing crises in some major export markets in the West, and the halt in growth in much-needed supplies of raw materials and energy from the CMEA bloc. These negative developments provided the backdrop for additional reform measures begun in 1979-1980, which led to the 1982 small business reforms. By the late 1970s it became necessary to mobilize hitherto unused human and material resources in order to avoid economic stagnation. Hungarian planners attempted to apply to the industrial sector the principles which led to the successful experience with household plots and small-scale farming, which and resulted in high productivity gains in agriculture. …

The Dilemas of Export-Led INdustrialization: South Korea and the World Economy

Abstract: The export-led high economic growth of a handful of Third World countries has provoked the attention of researchers for the past decade. The cases of the Gang of Four in Asia (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea), and Brazil and Mexico for example, would appear to have refuted the simple dependency paradigm which asserts that external dependency leads to economic stagnation in the periphery (Rao, 1978; Luede-Neurath, 1980; Barrett and Whyte, 1982). Indeed, on the basis of rapid industrialization in these newly-industrializing countries (hereafter NICs), some researchers have argued that dependency and growth are or can be positively related (Warren, 1973, 1980; Balassa, 1981; Cardoso, 1973, Evans, 1979).1 This thesis of dependent development has accordingly been widely adopted and deployed as a useful theoretical framework for the analysis of successful capital accumulation in NICs (Gold, 1981; Lim, 1982).

South-South Economic Co-operation: Lessons from the Indian Experience

Abstract: Most discussions of the New International Economic Order in its various guises, have included statements that economic co-operation among developing countries should be promoted. This pious hope seems to be based on one or more of several assumptions: that South-South economic relations are somehow better for development, industrialisation, human capital formation, and technological progress than North-South ones;2 that South-South relations have in some form been held back by the existing structure of the international economy, so that appropriate measures to remove structural barriers would release the productive forces involved and so lead to greater economic growth; that South-South intercourse could — to some unspecified (but it is hoped a large) extent — replace North-South economic relations and so enable the South to achieve greater self-reliance or at least to strike better bargains with the North in future economic negotiations; and that the North was probably doomed to long-term economic stagnation, or in any case would place increasing restrictions on access to its markets and technologies by the South, so that the only feasible way to promote sustained growth in the South would be to rely on intra-South exchange.3