Showing papers on "Exemplification published in 1971"

Exemplification of Ruin Probabilities

Abstract: The following numerical values of ruin probabilities, F(M, T) for finite times T, have been calculated by the method proposed in \"Analytical steps towards a numerical calculation of the ruin probability for a finite period when the risk process is of the Poisson type or of the more general type studied by Sparre Andersen\", presented to this colloquium by Olof Thorin. The notations used in the sequel follow those of Thorin.

The dialectics of metaphor

Abstract: Two points of contact are explored between contemporary philosophy of science and Dialectical Materialism. The first point deals with the interaction view of metaphor as an exemplification of the law of the unity of opposites. The contradiction is then noted between the strategy and tactics of much analytical philosophy and the lesson to be learnt from this account of metaphor. The concern to change category habits into category disciplines rules out the process of conceptual change of the interaction view. G. A. Paul's dismissal of Lenin's theory of reflection is then criticized in the light of the interaction view.

Taste and Judgment in the Arts.

Abstract: Since Kant's Critique of Judgment philosophical aesthetics has been beset, and continues to be beset, by a dilemma resulting from the apparent antinomy between the purported objectivity of aesthetic judgment and the ultimacy of personal taste. Abandonment of either of these principles has seemed to be fraught with consequences which in their full rigor few have been prepared to regard as other than disastrous. And because of this a large part of the philosophizing done in aesthetics has been animated consciously or unconsciously by a hope to smooth over, circumvent, or obscure this conflict. First I will be a little more explicit about the reasons for the inveteracy of the two principles. The purporting objectivity of aesthetic judgments was asserted by Kant on phenomenological grounds which have been accepted by most subsequent philosophers. He contrasted aesthetic judgments with statements about gratification (the pleasantness of sensations) and judgments about the suitability of a thing for any function or its exemplification of a conceptual type. In this sense aesthetic judgments are not merely reports on the observed presence of "aesthetic" properties but carry an implicit affirmation of value which purports to be right or wrong. In the field of practice a tacit assumption that aesthetic judgments are objectively right or wrong underlies and bolsters all the social apparatus of art education, amelioration of public taste, selection of objects for public purchase and display in museums and galleries, and is the justification for criticism as it is practiced. For what is recognized in any