Showing papers on "Inefficiency published in 1975"

Management Accounting in an Early Integrated Industrial: E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Company, 1903-1912

Abstract: The appearance of large, integrated industrial firms at the turn of the century encouraged the introduction of innovative accounting practices. Professor Johnson examines the centralized management accounting system that made it possible for one such firm, the DuPont Powder Co., to plan its long-term development and to avoid the internal inefficiency that sometimes accompanies enormous size.

Education and Allocative Efficiency in U.S. Agriculture

Abstract: Rapid technological change creates production uncertainty with a consequent decline in allocative efficiency; productivity growth appears to augment the comparative advantage of large farms, which alongside rising operator education implies scale economies in the use of information. A method is provided for measuring cost inefficiency due to changes in input mix and failure to produce optimum output which is related to growth in farm size. Statistical results provide support for the hypothesis that education enhances allocative efficiency.

On the Inefficiency of Being Efficient

Abstract: Decisionmaking in the industrialized nations of the western world increasingly can be characterized by its scale and speed of implementation. Another facet of decisionmaking is the narrowness with which problems are defined and the equally narrow range of alternatives sought for solution. This paper documents these elements of decisions and also sketches out a number of scenarios where such an approach has led to unexpected, and often undesirable, consequences.An alternative view of complex decisions, based on these scenarios, is developed. It relies heavily not on optimization as its pivotal criterion but rather upon the persistence of the decisionmaking unit, which is ultimately our society. Examples are presented which illustrate the counterproductive nature of many optimizing solutions. The argument is made that in an uncertain world, such as the one in which we live, optimizing approaches to decisions cannot succeed in the longer run because their assumptions about the constancy of our world do not h...

Tenancy Patterns, Productivity, and Rentals in Malaysia

Abstract: Tenancy in developing countries is generally condemned by economists and government officials. The main criticisms on the part of Western scholars have been the inefficiency resulting from tenancy (sharecropping in particular) and the reduced incentives that tenants have to improve their land or to maximize the discounted stream of future income. Scholars and government officials in developing countries, while acknowledging these arguments, more often focus on the "exploitation" of tenants by landlords. They cite the high levels of rentals which keep tenants in perpetual poverty, and the unfair practices such as sharecropping, short-term leases, pin money, and harsh contracts. While the types of land reforms proposed vary enormously in complexity and coverage, frequent recommendations include regulating rental levels, insuring long-term leases, preventing ejection of tenants, abolishing sharecropping, and transferring land from landlords to tenants with full or partial compensation. Such viewpoints, however, are not universal. Some economists have emphasized that rural poverty is primarily due to the abundance of unskilled labor relative to the available land and capital and that some measures of land reform which do not influence the availability of resources do not get to the root of the problem. Analysis of tenancy has frequently combined the efficiency aspects with the redistributional aspects in terms of altering the relative incomes of tenants at the expense of landlords. The subject, therefore, has often been viewed with a welfare criterion in mind, while the efficiency aspects have been a secondary consideration.1 This paper examines the tenancy situation in the paddy economy of

Peak-Load Pricing under Regulatory Constraint: A Proof of Inefficiency

Abstract: Previous studies have concluded that the rate-of-return regulation on utilities has caused distortions in the ratio of capital input to labor input. Using a single period model, these analyses have indicated that there is an incentive for utilities to use more capital than is necessary for cost minimization. An n-period model used by Elizabeth E. Baily is evaluated to determine the validity of her conclusion that peak-load pricing models do not indicate this capital over labor bias. This paper disagrees with her conclusion and emphasizes the importance of this capital bias on the pricing policies of regulated utilities. With a capital-labor ratio larger than dictated by market conditions, a regulated firm will expand output in all periods. It is concluded that both peak and off-peak users benefit from rate-of-return regulation. (BYB)

Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy: Some Australian Evidence

Abstract: DEMSETZ, in a recent issue of this Journal,' has presented an explanation of profitability and concentration which is based on the notion of competitive superiority. He argues that efficiency is associated with concentration. That is, rates of return earned by the large firms in an industry will be greater than those earned by smaller firms, not because of collusion or abuse of monopoly power by the larger firms, but because of their greater efficiency. He suggests, on the basis of his investigations, that a government following a deconcentration or anti-merger public policy may produce more inefficiency than was present in the situation which it aimed to eliminate. Such a view has important implications both for those concerned with analyzing structure, conduct and performance in Australian industries, and those involved in the implementation of antitrust action in Australia. Australian industries are noted for their comparatively high levels of concentration.2 Several reasons are put forward to explain this, including the relatively small size of the markets which they serve, the need for firms to achieve economies of scale, the wide-scale presence of overseas-owned firms and the almost total absence of any effective government antitrust policy and enforcement until the last few years. The advent to power in December 1972 of Australia's first Labor Government since the 1940's, has resulted in a series of proposals designed to discourage certain types of industry behaviour. Recently passed legislation bans per se many undesirable restrictive practices such as horizontal price agreements, market sharing and exclusive dealing. In addition, companies are prohibited from engaging in acts of merger or monopolization (this term being very broadly defined, leaving the

Index numbers and the computation of factor productivity1

Abstract: For purposes of analyzing the nature and meaning of index number formulas to be used in the calculation of factor productivity, a distinction is made between interetemporal comparison of factor productivity for a single country and contemporaneous comparison of factor productivity in two different countries. In the former case, the country in question is supposed ideally to be realizing fully its production possibilities, and the concern is seen as appraisal of shifts in such possibilities over time due to the advance of technological knowledge. Following Moorsteen such an advance is taken to be represented by the change in capacity to produce a standard mix of outputs per unit of a standard mix of inputs. Any mix might be standard, but those actually realized at the times in question are of particular interest. The index number formulas to be applied then depend on the assumed shape of the functions representing production possibilities. The conventional practice of aggregating output arithmetically and inputs geometrically, for example, is in order where production possibilities are given by an elaborated Cobb-Douglas function, but achieves only more or less approximate results otherwise. The analysis necessarily bears also on the prices at which inputs and outputs are to be valued. For the case of contemporaneous comparison of different countries, technological knowledge is taken ideally to be the same in the countries considered. Hence the concern is to gauge differences in production efficiency, i.e., realization of production possibilities. With production capacity understood to reflect any shortfall from possibilities, and hence production inefficiency in that sense, the analysis proceeds much as before, but given the fact of inefficiency determination of suitable prices for valuation of inputs and outputs becomes relatively difficult. Alternative expedients, none entirely satisfactory, are explored.

Congestion and Over-exploitation of Free Access Resources

Abstract: Free-access or common-property resources are important in accounting for many environmental problems like pollution, congestion and the over-exploitation of natural resources, but we still lack a completely satisfactory framework within which to analyse them. Typically, a freeaccess resource is one whose physical characteristics make it impossible or costly to divide it among competing users in a way that gives each producer complete control over the allocation of his portion of the resource. As such, a free-access resource obviously differs from a pure private good, but it also differs from a pure public good in that an increased use of the resource by one agent will have a direct effect on other users. If access to the resource is unrestricted a large number of agents may be affected, while the characteristics that make exclusion costly will almost certainly rule out the possibility of internalizing the externality by pairwise bargaining. It is therefore probable that free market competition will lead to an inefficient use of the resource. Free-access resources may be polluted, congested or over-exploited, which suggests that there may be important distinctions between different kinds of inefficiency. Can these distinctions be made precise within a unified analysis of free-access resources? Two writers, Haveman (1973) and Gould (1972), have recently attempted to draw distinctions between various kinds of inefficiency and to examine the nature of the differing resource misallocations. Haveman contrasts pollution, congestion and what he calls the common-property case, which he illustrates with a depletable natural resource. Pollution differs from the other two in that the costs of the reduced quality of the free-access resource are typically borne by a different set of agents than those who cause the pollution. The externality is unidirectional, and not, therefore, selflimiting. This distinction and its consequences are clear-cut, interesting and need detain us no further. Haveman further argues that the basic source of the misallocation in the congestion case is quite different from that of the common-property case. "In the congestion case, overuse is encouraged because real crowding costs imposed by users on each other are not reflected in marginal use decisions. In the common property resource case, excessive output is stimulated by the negative user cost

Property Rights and the Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism: Comment

Abstract: In a recent article in this Journal, Lancaster (1973) presented "a new paradigm for capitalism" which provides a new way of looking at the welfare losses involved in "intergroup rivalry" and leads to "a clearly defined dynamic welfare loss." Incredibly, the inefficiency of Lancaster's model results from the absence of private property rights in the means of production. Thus the model lacks what seems to be the defining characteristic of capitalism: private ownership of the means of production.

Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency in Government Management

Abstract: “In recent years the public has been reluctant to accept tax increases, the principle means of supporting government services. one reason is the public's belief that government is ineffective and i...

Reducing the effect of charge-transfer inefficiency in a c.c.d. video integrator

Abstract: The usefulness of c.c.d.s as video integrators is limited by the charge-transfer inefficiency of the device. A method of coding the signal before passage through the c.c.d. is described which greatly reduces the effect of this inefficiency.

Operation of three-phase charge-coupled devices with two-level clocking waveforms

Abstract: Both theoretical and experimental investigations of three-phase CC D's have been carried out The results of these investigations show that when these devices are driven by two-level clock pulses with linear edges backwards flow loss is an important loss mechanism The exact value of the transfer inefficiency is strongly influenced by the clock voltage turn-off time with longer turn-off times giving, in general, lower inefficiencies It has also been shown that the transfer inefficiency is a function of the charge-packet size and that for a given turn-off time the transfer inefficiency is independent of frequency over a wide range of clock frequencies