scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1986"







16 May 1986
TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the process by which the operational level commander percieves the mission and the current situation, makes major decisions, and supervises the execution of his orders.
Abstract: : The monograph characterizes the process by which the operational level commander percieves the mission and the current situation, makes major decisions, and supervises the execution of his orders. It distinguishes those responsibilities which the commander, as the operational artist, should accomplish himself, from those responsibilities which the commander can properly delegate to his staff. The monograph then contrasts the current military decision-making process, as promulgated in FM 101-5, with an alternative system which emphasizes the role of the commander as the operation artist. Although this monograph is conceptual, rather than historical in focus, it draws heavily on the writings of World War II operational level commanders for its analysis, and upon a post-war decision-making model as the basis of its alternative approach to the process.

4 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A decade later a few European breech-loading rifles began to appear, and by 1907 the military intelligence department estimated that over a quarter of those tribesmen had acquired a modern weapon.
Abstract: When Kipling published that aptly-named poem ‘Arithmetic on the Frontier’ in 1886 his use of the term ‘jezail’ was no more literary device, for the tribesmen of the north-western borderlands were then armed with locally made, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore muskets. A decade later a few European breech-loading rifles began to appear, and by 1907 the military intelligence department estimated that over a quarter of those tribesmen had acquired a modern weapon. It was the Government of India's wish to halt that flow of arms which led to a British naval blockade of the south-eastern coast of Persia from 1909, and the landing of troops in Makrāan during 1910 and 1911.

3 citations


Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Dec 1986
TL;DR: Current efforts to utilize artificial intelligence in the military are examined, difficulties which need to be resolved before intelligent systems can become fully operational are discussed, and potential applications of artificial intelligence for the Military Airlift Command of the U. S. Air Force are identified.
Abstract: Artificial intelligence methodologies are being applied to support decision making at all levels of military operations. Applications being studied include assessing force readiness, reliability and capability; planning complex missions; and integrating data from multiple sources. Unclassified research is addressing the considerable challenges presented by supporting such decision making in time-sensitive environments. We examine current efforts to utilize artificial intelligence in the military, discuss difficulties which need to be resolved before intelligent systems can become fully operational, and identify potential applications of artificial intelligence for the Military Airlift Command of the U. S. Air Force.

2 citations



Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: The findings suggest that a combination of object-oriented simulation and logic programming appears to provide an effective framework for exploring and implementing distributed problem-solving systems, and choice of task negotiation procedure, message passing protocol, planning algorithm, and uncertainty representation technique depends strongly on situational conditions.
Abstract: : Cooperative behavior, by either humans or machines, is necessary for solving problems that, because of time or other physical constraints, cannot be solved by one agent acting alone. Complex, spatially distributed military systems, such as tactical air operations, Naval task force control, and command and control networks frequently rely on cooperative problem solving. This report develops aspects of coordinating groups RPV's in a surveillance mission. The findings suggest that (1) a combination of object-oriented simulation and logic programming appears to provide an effective framework for exploring and implementing distributed problem solving systems, and (2) choice of task negotiation procedure, message passing protocol, planning algorithm, and uncertainty representation technique depends strongly on situational conditions such as time stress, communication costs, and number of planning options.

1 citations


15 May 1986
TL;DR: In this paper, the role and number of operational level commanders in a theater of operation are discussed and it is shown that the side possessing the greater number of operationally thinking commanders stands the better chance to emerge as the victor.
Abstract: : Emerging doctrine on the operational art level of war leaves many unanswered questions. One issue concerns the role and number of operational level commanders in a theater of operation. The thesis of this essay is that in order to win on today's battlefield in which U.S. Army forces will undoubtedly be outnumbered, there must be several commanders at echelon's from brigade to field army empowered to act with the freedom and authority of an operational level commander. A second critical insight in the paper is that the side possessing the greater number of operationally thinking commanders stands the better chance to emerge as the victor. In order to assess the merit of the thesis, the author first broadens the definition of operational art and then examines the senior operational commander for the Union Army in the campaign at Chancellorsville. General Joe Hooker did not conform his operational objective to the strategic objective. More importantly he did not involve his subordinate commanders in the planning of the campaign or envision them with overall pattern of his operation. As a result his commanders did not seize opportunities on the battlefield that could have meant the difference between success and failure. Hooker's real lesson for the modern operational commander is that all operations cannot be under his personal supervision and that waging war on the map requires envisioning troops he cannot see.

ReportDOI
01 Nov 1986
TL;DR: The Dynamic Intelligence Assessment Aid (DINAA) is designed to assist military intelligence analysts in revising judgments on an enemy's most likely avenue of approach as new information arrives.
Abstract: : The Dynamic Intelligence Assessment Aid (DINAA) is designed to assist military intelligence analysts in revising judgments on an enemy's most likely avenue of approach as new information arrives. When a message is received, the analyst assesses, for each avenue of approach. The likelihood that the reported event would occur if the enemy were actually using that avenue of approach. DINAA then applies Bayes' Theorem to the user's assessments and generates a set of probabilities. Keywords: Decision aids; Bayesian aid.

Proceedings ArticleDOI
18 Jun 1986
TL;DR: The Tactical Intelligence Processing System is an experiment in utilizing expert systems technology to automate the handling and evaluation of intelligence reports and utilizes the Knowledge Engineering Environment for encoding the knowledge base and inference rules.
Abstract: Naval commanders must have a current and accurate summary of the tactical situation. They typically obtain it by sifting through volumes of intelligence. The Tactical Intelligence Processing System (TIPS) is an experiment in utilizing expert systems technology to automate the handling and evaluation of intelligence reports. It utilizes the Knowledge Engineering Environment (KEE) for encoding the knowledge base and inference rules. An object oriented representation is used for geographic data to allow rule based reasoning about contacts in the context of the local geographic and cultural features. A domain specific operator interface is included to allow evaluation of the concept.

ReportDOI
01 Jun 1986
TL;DR: It is proposed that decision support systems for military commanders should be taught by means of the system language appropriate to the destined user, and the idea of formal systems languages which vary as one moves through any hierarchy is introduced.
Abstract: : This document discusses the similarities and differences between the conceptual requirements of decision support in civilian and military situations, and introduces the idea of formal systems languages which vary as one moves through any hierarchy. The approach of soft system methodology is extended by the addition of the concept of mutually malevolent (mumal) systems. It is proposed that decision support systems for military commanders should be taught by means of the system language appropriate to the destined user. Keywords: Systems Theory; Command and Control; and Management Science.