Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1989"

Vietnam at War : The History, 1946-1975

Abstract: This is a definitive and comprehensive account of the three Vietnam wars starting with the French, through Dien Bien Phu to the American involvement. The author was, for part of the Vietnam war, Chief of US Military Intelligence. Here he presents an account of the fighting from a multi-conceptual level that of direction, planning and implementation. Throughout, Giap is the central figure and the points of view of North and South Vietnam are clearly identified.

Soviet military intelligence in war

Abstract: This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

Operational Level Intelligence: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Abstract: : This paper responds to a request from the United States Army Intelligence Center and School to develop an analytical framework for intelligence preparation of the battlefield for the operational level of war. And specifically, to suggest modifications to existing tactical level intelligence preparation of the battlefield processes so the processes can be applied to operational level intelligence estimates focusing on terrain, weather, and enemy forces. The renewed attention to warfare at the operational level has revived interest in many combat support functions at the operational level. Operational level intelligence analysis and operational level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) are such areas. While much published doctrine and actual IPB exist for tactical level warfare, less is available for operational level use. This paper proposes an analytical framework for conducting operational level IPB and suggests modifications to existing tactical level IPB practices in areas of terrain, weather and the enemy forces so these areas of analysis may be applied to operational level IPB. Keywords: Tactical information.

The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada

Abstract: The historical evolution of a military intelligence system in Canada, like that of other Western powers, developed largely under the stimuli of the two world wars. Yet within this evolutionary framework, unique national characteristics emerged. One was the underlying Canadian concern with intelligence on a variety of threatened frontiers, especially after 1945 with the remote northern flank. Another unique feature of Canadian history was the response to the lessons of the Second World War. Rather than consolidating the wartime intelligence community to serve postwar needs, Canada restricted itself to subordinate partnership in an intelligence alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom, forfeited a strategic intelligence capability, and concentrated on domestic security problems. This article attempts to analyze these developments as a preliminary step toward the still unwritten history of the intelligence function in Canada.

The Origins of Operational Intelligence

Abstract: THE ORIGINS OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE by Major Victor M. Rosello, Jr. USA, 48 pages. Fhis monograph examines tea tcpic of operational intelligence from the standpoint o its historical development in support of operational level commanders. It focuses on two periods of military history and attempts to answer the question: what elements of operational intelligence developed during the Napoleonic wars and the American Civil War? This paper has chosen these two specific historical eras to form the framework for discussion because they represent periods in which both revolutionary and evolutionary forms of warfare developed. Though this study does not attempt to settle the controversy over the origins of the operational level of war and its art form, it does identify those elements of intelligence that were created to support commanders during the respective wars. The discussion also benefits from the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz to turther dejine the theoretical mindset of the period. This study concludes that elemcats of operational intelligence were present in varying degrees during both periods of war. More importantly, the difiiculties experienced during these periods by those called upon to develop intelligence services capable of supporting commanders at the operational level of war, serves as ,i reminder that the advent of new technolosies in wariare and the devlopment of innovative, evolutionary, or revolutionary forms of warfighting by our adversaries require that intelligence organizations keep pace with operational advances. Failure to do so could result in a repeat of intelligence organizational shortfalls similar in degree of those experienced during the two wars.

Measurement and Evaluation of Military Intelligence Performance

Abstract: : The report describes the first phase of a 3-year research effort to develop a method for measuring the effectiveness of military intelligence (MI). Although the Army uses a number of evaluation methods, there are no methods appropriate for assessing the effectiveness of specific MI tasks and processes. To develop appropriate methods, researchers collected data through interviews and multi-attribute utility assessment and developed profiles of effective MI outputs. The profiles form the basis for a measurement instrument. In the next phase of research, a fault diagnosis methodology will be developed to trace failures in the output to causes in the MI process. In the final phase, the methodologies will be validated. A supplemental report (Working Paper HUA 88-03) describes the project rationale and additional results of interest to the military community.

The End of the Second World War in Europe

Abstract: The Second World War brought me to the European theater of operations, where I was assigned to Special Troops of the First United States Army commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges. I was a first lieutenant and platoon leader in a reconnaissance troop. The specific task of our unit was the gathering of military data for the G-2 (military intelligence) of the 69th Division. According to the training manuals this meant moving out front with all due regard for stealth and developing information about the characteristics and location of enemy forces, particularly enemy armor. In reality, more often than not, it meant moving forward to the point of drawing enemy fire. In any event the objective was to gather useful information and pass it back for processing by G-2, thus providing a basis for action by the First Army’s air and ground forces.

Intelligence for the Division--A G2 Perspective

Abstract: : The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, has been serving American combat commanders for over fifty years. The duty is complex and demanding, and considered by many as the epitome of the tactical intelligence profession. Nevertheless, the military intelligence community has generated very little literature describing the G2 experience. Generations of new G2s have undertaken this duty armed with only their own experiences as preparation. This paper describes one G2's experience. It serves primarily to help the prospective G2 appreciate the issues and challenges that he may face, and secondarily as an historical record for future academic study. The G2's role is an important and difficult one. He provides a sizable share of the enemy, weather, and terrain information needed by a large tactical formation to execute modern combat operations. He helps to steer higher level intelligence efforts to support these large tactical formations, and thereby to win on the battlefield.

Sustaining the Military Arts

Abstract: I n another era, a crusty Texas ranger justified his six-gun with quiet eloquence: "Better to have it when you don't need it than to need it and not have it." In his own way, Captain Woodrow Call' understood the prudent link between deterrence and capability. Ifhe had to expand his views today, ranger Call would probably add: " ... and you better know how to shoot too." In a larger context, the logic of deterrence, military capability, and military art is enlightened by the same common sense that energized Call's epigram. Military capability isn't just a function of weapons and forces, it must also be underwritten by military art-the ability to apply theories and principles of usage. There are a host of programs under way today attempting to do just that, insure that military officers know how to use military forces effectively. Many of these efforts have been captured under the rubric of war fighting or warrior preparation. However, when the rhetoric is stripped away, too many of these programs are hollow. Fundamental obstacles to improved performance remain intact. This essay explores the origin of recent interest in warfighting, examines the obstacles, and suggests some new thinking on sustainability in the world of military ideas.

Engineering Geology and Military Operations: An Overview with Examples of Current Missions

Abstract: Geological investigations in support of military ground operations are intelligence functions which may be categorized as either combat or engineer , and which are related to either tactical or construction operations. Combat intelligence includes the evaluation of geological terrain data such as slope, relief, and soil/rock type, whereas engineer intelligence involves mobility and countermobility operations, sources of construction materials, water supply, camouflage and deception, and siting of facilities. In tactical situations, these intelligence functions are performed cooperatively by troops of two separate U.S. Army Branches, Military Intelligence (MI) and Corps of Engineer (EN) troops at the command echelon of Theater Army, and at its subordinate commands, Corps, and Division. Military Intelligence units have the capability to evaluate remote imagery such as panchromatic aerial photography, multispectral scanner, thermal infrared, and side-looking airborne radar, as well as data derived from passive battlefield geophysical sensors. These evaluations are generally directed toward locating enemy troop and weapons concentrations, as opposed to the analysis of geological data for construction purposes. Most geological information pertinent to both combat and engineer intelligence is collected and evaluated by Engineer troops in Terrain Teams which are part of Topographic Battalions. Engineer intelligence is generally presented to Engineer units in technical report format; combat intelligence, on the other hand, is delivered to tactical commanders in the semi-technical formats of map or photomosaic overlays. Most of the applied geoscience research activities are conducted at Corps of Engineer laboratories and include underground construction, tunnel detection, tactical hydrology, ground-water exploration, hazardous-waste site mitigation, and mobility and countermobility evaluations. All of these activities have civilian applications. As applied military research, the general goal is to increase the mobility and survivability of friendly forces and to decrease the effectiveness of numerically superior enemy forces. Considerable potential defensive advantages have been developed through innovative applied geoscience research. These advantages are largely untested during wartime conditions, but they remain in current American national defense strategy, and will continue so throughout the final quarter of the Twentieth Century.

To Predict or Not Predict: Crossroads for Tactical Intelligence?

Abstract: : This monograph discusses the nature of tactical intelligence prediction in military operations. Such prediction is extremely complex and involves a broad range of factors from traditional military ones such as terrain and doctrine to more non-traditional ones of human behavior and perceptual mechanisms. While the traditional factors are important, the non-traditional ones are no less so and often hinder accurate prediction. The monograph first examines the U.S. Army's doctrinal requirement for tactical intelligence prediction, both past and present. Next, it discusses and clarifies the concepts of 'capabilities,' 'enemy intent,' and 'prediction.' Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is then examined as a vehicle for intelligence prediction. The monograph then moves on to describe the behavioral aspects of prediction in terms of individual and organizational factors which inhibit objective analysis. Historical examples are provided. Keywords: Military intelligence; Tactical intelligence; Intelligence analysis; Decision making; Impact prediction.

Military intelligence—SPOT is not enough

Abstract: Commercial satellites may gather intelligence for relatively secure countries, but those who, like Israel, have serious worries and can afford to do so are putting up their own satellites.

Just Do It: Close the Collection Gap

Abstract: : This monograph examines the gap that exists between the intelligence collection missions of the division in the contingency corps and the capabilities to execute these collection requirements. Doctrine tells us that a division in a contingency corps must be able to perform at the same echelon of command as a forward deployed corps. A division's intelligence collection requirements, once it arrives in theater, are critical to the success of its mission. However, a division is not a corps especially in the force design of its intelligence collection assets. This study establishes the fundamental differences between a division and a corps by examining the theoretical underpinnings that distinguish the two. It proceeds to look at current doctrine concerning both division and corps operations. It examines the force structure for intelligence collection assets at division and corps with emphasis on the long-range surveillance (LRS) teams as a possible means to close the collection gap. It uses the Soviet experience with LRS type units as a guide for possible changes in the US force design. The monograph concludes that more is better at the division level. More LRS teams are needed in the division of the contingency corps. They can be acquired through the permanent reapportionment of corps assets. Keywords: Army corps of engineers; Theater level operations; Army intelligence.