Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1994"

The New Competitor Intelligence: The Complete Resource for Finding, Analyzing, and Using Information about Your Competitors

Abstract: Partial table of contents: LAYING THE FOUNDATION. Understanding Intelligence. Getting Started: The Basic Approaches and Techniques. FIND THE BASIC AND CREATIVE SOURCES. Federal, State, and Local Sources. Corporate Intelligence in Print. International Intelligence: Research Strategies and Sources. Creating Creative Sources. Building a Financial Statement. Let Your Fingers Do the Stalking: Using Yellow Pages and City Directories. Additional Creative Sources that Will Pay Off. ANALYSIS: THE ART AND THE DISCIPLINE. A Practical Approach to Analysis: Analytical Techniques and Cases. TAKE ACTION. How to Build Your Own Intelligence System: A Corporate Imperative. Security: The Flip Side. Appendix. Index.

Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy

Abstract: This readable book introduces students to the U.S. intelligence community, the functions of intelligence, and the mechanisms that are to provide public control of intelligence. Chapters on collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action describe the form and uses of each, and illuminate the choices and tradeoffs involved in making decisions about intelligence.

Command and Control Warfare. Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base

Abstract: : Command and control warfare (C2W) is the military strategy that implements information warfare (IW) on the battlefield. Its objective is to attack the command and control (C2) decision-making capabilities of an adversary while protecting friendly C2. C2W's focus is, sealing the eyes and ears of the enemy commander. It does this by disrupting and dominating the flow of information between the enemy's combat forces and their associated decision- making command elements. Ideally, through information dominance, friendly commanders will be able to work inside the enemy commander's decision-making cycle forcing him to be reactive and thus cede the initiative and advantage to friendly forces. In any conflict, from large scale transregional to small scale, localized counter-insurgency, a joint or coalition team drawn together from the capabilities of each service and orchestrated by the joint force or theater- level commander will execute the responses of the United States armed forces. Units should perform their specific roles in accordance with the doctrine and policies provided in joint publications. The training and execution of a unit's response and a commander's C2W actions should be based on doctrine, policies, and terminology provided in joint publications.

Preparing Future Coalition Commanders

Abstract: : This Nation has fought every conflict since World War II either unilaterally or as a member of an ad hoc coalition. No military action has been conducted as the combined effort of a standing alliance in which the United States was a member. Even though the United Nations played a major role in both the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, the forces that fought in those conflicts operated as ad hoc coalitions under U.N. authorization. There have been many other operations carried out by the United States as part of an ad hoc organization. Even the war on drugs has been prosecuted by a coalition. When America has been involved in multinational operations it has been as a member of ad hoc coalitions. What follows are some considerations intended to help coalition commanders of the future plan and execute operations in support of such coalitions.

Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History.

Abstract: HOW TO TALK LIKE A SPY BUSINESS INSIDER. INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR I AFIO. LIST OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE TERRIFYING THINGS YOU LEARN IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. ARROGANT ISRAELI SPY INFURIATES S AFRICA INTELLIGENCE. INTELLIGENCE MILITARY SCIENCE BRITANNICA. THE MULTIBILLION DOLLAR U S SPY AGENCY YOU HAVEN T HEARD. 53 BOOKS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE TO KEEP YOU FUELED REDDIT. INTELLIGENCE GOVERNMENT RATIONALWIKI. 5 SURPRISES ABOUT WORKING FOR THE INTELLIGENCE MUNITY. WHAT MILITARY BRANCH IS BEST FOR INTELLIGENCE MILITARY CHOW. 0275937089 GO SPY THE LAND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN. SPY SATELLITES ENTER NEW DIMENSION TECHNOLOGY AMP SCIENCE. GO SPY THE LAND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN. GO SPY THE LAND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN HISTORY ABEBOOKS. THE C I A S MADDENING RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN THE. CANADIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT ISSUED WARNING CBC. GO

Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope

Abstract: : On December 4, 1992 President Bush gave the order 'to move a substantial American force into Somalia.' Although Army forces contributed substantially to the Joint Task Force, the Army did not dominate the deployments to the degree it did during Operation Desert Storm. Still, by the end of January more than 10,000 Army personnel were on the ground in Somalia, helping tp provide security for relief operations and working to rebuild many of the basic elements of civil society. This report reviews the Army deployment operation. By almost any measure, the transportation of the Army to Somalia can be judged a successful operation. During the first 30 days, 82 percent of the peak U.S. personnel strength and more than half the Army equipment had been delivered. Nonetheless, many participants speak of difficulties and glitches in planning, coordinating and managing the deployments. In spite of these frictions, the nature of the humanitarian mission and the relatively small scale of the deployments (about five percent of Operation Desert Shield/Storm) allowed the deployments to go off without debilitating problems

Near-Real-Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield: The Requirement for a Combat Information System.

Abstract: : Timely intelligence has always been a requirement for the effective use of air power. Air Force doctrine and the Army's AirLand Operations doctrine recognize the need for faster and more accurate intelligence to support the unprecedented pace of modern warfare. In the future, there may be a need for support operations throughout the spectrum of conflict against a foe, using a combination of equipment, doctrine, and tactics acquired throughout the world. The author's research has come at an opportune time, with the reorganization of the United States Air Force and the creation of the Air Force Intelligence Command as a focal point for intelligence support to air combat operations. Past service rivalries and independent development of systems have led to a hodgepodge of collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. The intelligence challenge for the future is to present the tremendous volume of information that is collected to the right person, in the right format, at the right time. The author provides outstanding insights into the historical causes of today's intelligence shortfalls and the technical and procedural problems that must be overcome. He also proposes a combat information system that encompasses operations and intelligence information. The greatest value of this study is the combination of current and nearterm programs into a synergistic system that does not require major new acquisitions in a time of fiscal downsizing. These initial steps will help ensure that intelligence systems and organizations in the future are not stovepiped, but enjoy greater joint service commonality, cooperation and compatibility than ever before.

Information Security for Unmanned Systems

Abstract: : The primary mission of unmanned systems is to perform reconnaissance and gather electronic intelligence. Information gathered by these systems is most often sensitive and steps should be taken to ensure its security and integrity. This report will discuss the role of unmanned systems with respect to intelligence gathering and give an overview of methods which can be used to ensure the security and integrity of the intelligence data gathered by these systems. This will include an introduction to signal scrambling, encryption techniques, and tradeoffs involved in the use of these methods of information security.

French military intelligence and Czechoslovakia, 1938

Abstract: (1994). French military intelligence and Czechoslovakia, 1938. Diplomacy & Statecraft: Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 81-106.

Intelligence Preparation of the Future Operational Battlefield

Abstract: : The demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact left the United States with no single identifiable threat. The 'victory' of the Cold War has not provided the US with a significant 'peace dividend' as predicted, but instead presents an unstable and uncertain world. Future conflicts may present US forces with enemies which do not represent traditional nation-states but are instead formed from ethnic, religious, tribal, criminal, or corporate based groups. The current intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process provides a useful framework for organizing information required by future commanders. What is lacking, however, is an appreciation for all of the intangible factors which may influence that battlefield based on the potential disparity of actors involved.

A New Approach for Measuring the Operational Value of Intelligence for Military Operations

Abstract: : This report will be of particular interest to those who are involved in policy analysis for the Army's five-year program; in developing and applying methodology and models to assess military value, particularly the value of intelligence; and in comparing the potential contributions of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare/Target Acquisition (IEW/TA) systems, employment doctrine, and technologies in various military operations scenarios. The purpose of this project was to develop a methodology and one or more prototypes models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context; more specifically, the methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. The term prototype refers to a model that has been developed to the point that its usefulness has been demonstrated. The models can be used to help look for gaps and redundancies in current and proposed capabilities, help justify resource allocations, and seek desired mixes and employment strategies of IEW/TA assets and their communications network architectures to support operations. They were also used as tools for developing the methodology.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Operational Implications for the Joint Force Commander

Abstract: : The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is an extremely effective tool for the Operational Commander, with a broad range of possibilities which are just beginning to be explored. Although the UAV is considered primarily a tactical asset, history has taught us that tactical assets may be effectively utilized on the strategic and operational levels, as well as the tactical level. With the down-sizing of the military and the increasing need to do more with less, operational commanders will have to depend more and more on assets such as the UAV to collect intelligence, conduct Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), and possibly to carry other payloads which have traditionally been left to manned aircraft. Historically, the UAV has been utilized primarily for intelligence gathering, gunfire targeting, and, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, timely and safe battle damage assessment. Each service has operated their organic UAV assets independently and for their individual requirements. This paper will demonstrate that the UAV can and must be utilized more effectively and that the Joint Force Commander must be aware of its potential uses at the operational level in order to take full advantage of its possibilities,. Unmanned aerial vehicle, Development trends, Current capability, Performance, Lessons learned, Implications

Department of Defense Intelligence Information System.

Abstract: : The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the systems that comprise the DoDIIS are interoperable and whether oversight of acquisition management is adequate to assure that the development and procurement of DoDIIS components support the attainment of a seamless command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence architecture. The audit also determined whether the roles and responsibilities of the DoD intelligence community have been adequately defined with respect to management of national and tactical DoDIIS resources and data element standardization.

Challenging Joint Military Intelligence

Abstract: : Military intelligence was shaped over four decades by the Soviet threat, emerging weapons systems, and increasing defense budgets. A sea change began with the demise of the old Soviet empire, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and growing involvement in United Nations peace operations and humanitarian efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is adjusting to successor threats, including regional instability, low-intensity conflict, terrorism, counternarcotics operations, nuclear proliferation, and chemical and biological weapons -- all within a joint environment. DIA must adapt its collection. production, and dissemination cycle to a quickened operational pace with fewer resources. With technology now allowing intelligence to be treated as an integrated whole, the restructuring of DIA, and a focus on unified commands, the military intelligence community has gone back to basics while retaining the flexibility needed to underpin the support of joint warfighting into the next century.

Designing, Testing, and Using Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Systems: What Causes the Disconnects and What Can be Done About Them?

Abstract: : This work identifies and examines the disconnects in designing, testing, and using Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Systems, investigates their causes and effects, and determines what can be done about them. Experts involved with C4I system offered their thoughts on the subject in structured interviews. These experts represented the military, academic, and commercial C4I communities. The intent is to identify the main, overriding issues that dominate current thinking about C4I systems. The selective sample of experts and the literature review discovered eighteen major disconnects which are listed in the conclusions and discussed throughout the report. Command and control systems, Command, Control, Communications intelligence (C4I) systems, Design, Test, Use, Requirement Architecture, Standards, Automation, Measurement

New Russian Military Doctrine: Sign of the Times

Abstract: : United States political leaders have used the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the dramatic changes that have taken place within the Russian Republic to justify the complete restructuring and massive downsizing of US military forces. Analysts have sought to convince themselves and others that by dismantling that vestige of Soviet rule, the Red Army, the Russians effectively eliminated a major threat to peace. In June 1992, however, the Russians produced a draft military doctrine that significantly changed the doctrine of the Gorbachev era. The new doctrine could be seen as too offensively oriented, too overtly nuclear, and too nationalistic. Are these criticisms valid, or is the new doctrine an understandable reaction to the problems Russia faces today? Just two days prior to the split between Yeltsin and Rutskoi, I asked a Russian general what was to become of the proposed military doctrine. He told me that the Security Council had many things of greater importance to deal with and that eventually the doctrine would be addressed. On 3 November 1993, shortly after the military supported Yeltsin in his struggle with Parliament, major US newspapers reported that President Yeltsin had approved a doctrine that envisioned no potential enemies but which called for Russia to develop its armed forces in such a manner that would allow it to defend itself and its people. The Russian military now possesses the doctrine it has been waiting for. Recent changes in Russia, including the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections, have obvious implications for the perceived stability of the Russian Republic. The new military doctrine reflects the military's desire to establish a new set of national security objectives. This article examines the historical changes and security problems that have led to a more intimidating Russian military doctrine.

Innovation in the 21ST Century: Reconciling Technological Expertise with Military Genius,

Abstract: : As the United States Army prepares for the 21st Century, few things are as certain as the tremendous influence that emerging technologies will have on military capability. The purpose of this monograph is to establish how you reconcile technological expertise with military genius. To resolve this question, the monograph begins by examining definitions and theories for genius, expertise, technology and innovation. This includes an investigation of the effects of technology on the battlefield, and a redefinition of tactical innovation. Next, the 'directed telescope'innovations of Field Marshal Montgomery and General George S Patton Jr. are analyzed. A comparative analysis examines the Army Battle Command System and the directed telescope. Finally, synthesis is achieved through formulation of a theoretical model that casts light on the innovative process of the battle commander in combat. 'The Battlefield 500' model parallels the battle commander in combat, exploiting opportunity through innovation. (MM)

Deja Vu All over Again? an Assessment of Iran's Military Buildup

Abstract: By virtue of geography, military strength, economic potential, demographics, and hegemonic aspirations, Iran poses the greatest long-term threat to peace and stability throughout (the region). General Joseph P. Hoar, U.S. CENTCOM 1993 Posture Statement (2) Iran has the potential of becoming the regional superpower, or minisuperpower, to replace Iraq in the Persian Gulf. Iran will realize that potential if left undisturbed. Major General Uri Sagi, Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, April 17, 1992 (3) In 1989, following a costly 8-year war with Iraq, Iran initiated a major military buildup intended to transform it into a regional power and rebuild its ravaged armed forces. Iran's buildup, coupled with indications of increased activism in its foreign policy--including efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process, unilaterally overturn the political and territorial status quo in the Gulf (it is engaged in disputes with Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar), and support subversive and radical Islamic opposition movements in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and among the Palestinians--raise disturbing questions about Iran's intentions, and the long-term implications of its growing military capabilities. There are a number of elements to Iran's military buildup: Iran is seeking nonconventional (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and the means to deliver them (missiles, bombers, and strike aircraft) to provide it with regional power status and the means to intimidate its neighbors and deter potential adversaries. Likewise, it is attempting to expand and modernize its conventional forces, with an emphasis on developing the air and naval capabilities needed to dominate the Gulf and defend Iranian airspace. It is doing this in accordance with lessons learned in two Gulf wars. This paper will examine Iran's military buildup in order to ascertain what it indicates about Iran's intentions. Iran's military intentions and capabilities--like those of any state--are inextricably linked. Although its intentions are often difficult to assess, they may be inferred from patterns of behavior, as well as official and non-official statements, speeches, and interviews. In addition, because its intentions shape its capabilities, intentions may also be inferred by analyzing Iran's military force structure and procurement decisions and military exercise scenarios. Finally, while it is important to understand intentions, it is equally important to understand how Iran's military capabilities create or foreclose policy options for its decisionmakers, and how this affects their likely course of action. Accordingly, we will attempt to piece together a coherent and (hopefully) accurate picture of Iran's intentions and options from an analysis of its capabilities. (4) IRAN'S MOTIVATIONS Iran's military buildup is motivated by its desire to become a major regional power, as well as its perception that ill the long-run it faces threats from Iraq, the USA, and Israel. This buildup is intended to accomplish several objectives, including: * Defend against the possibility of a resurgent Iraq. * Establish a capability to deter the United States from attacking Iran and hinder its ability to project force in the region. * Dominate the Gulf, press outstanding territorial claims against its Arab Gulf neighbors, and influence oil production levels and prices. * Have the capability to close the Strait of Hormuz during a crisis (through which about 20% of the world's oil flows) in order to enhance its political leverage. (5) * Deter Israel from attacking its nuclear infrastructure. The motivations underlying Iran's military buildup--its ambition to be a major regional power, its defensive concerns, and its perception that it currently is facing a strategic window of opportunity--are critical to understanding Iran's intentions and the potential implications of the buildup; these are analyzed below. …

The Role of Irish Military Intelligence during World War Two

Abstract: The object of this thesis is to examine some of the workings of Irish Military Intelligence (G2), during World War Two. In doing so it is hoped that the reader shall grasp something of the role of G2 during the years 1939-45, and evaluate their performance as an intelligence and security agency

Revamping the Korean Intelligence Services: A Viewpoint of the Agency for National Security Planning

Abstract: Korean intelligence services under the new civilian government continue to be deeply involved in the nation's domestic politics, to operate frequently outside the law, and to abuse peoples' rights in the conduct of investigations. The Korean people and members of the ruling class are demanding a revamping of Korean intelligence services. Reform of the intelligence services is long over due. The expenditures incurred for intelligence organizations should be reduced. The intelligence organizations' primary functions should be readjusted because military threats have diminished. The purpose of this article is to investigate particular problems associated with the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP). The paper describes the Korean intelligence community and discusses the origins, functions, and characteristics of the central Korean intelligence organization. The causes of the NSP's problems are addressed. Finally, suggestions are offered on the basis of the specific problems discussed to reform the Ko...

Mission Possible: Making United Nations Peace Operations More Effective

Abstract: : Opportunities to achieve operational art in United Nations peace operations are discussed in detail, ranging from currently evolving U.S. policy directives to possible improvements in U.N. peace operations structure, staffing, intelligence capabilities, communication and command and control. Some progress has been made on these issues but much more must be done. Wisely, the U.S. is moving toward committing its own troops and support only when important operational and political criteria have been met. This paper argues that, the U. S., after setting its own policies, should engage other nations in a discussion of the goals - and limits - of peace operations. At the same time, the U.S. could begin to lead an effort that it is uniquely qualified to do: help the U.N. upgrade its peace operations apparatus to a far higher level of proficiency and professionalism.

The Generation Gap: Open-Source Information, Intelligence, and the Government

Abstract: : One of the results of the end of the Cold War has been an increase in the quality and quantity of information available from open sources. The volume of data that is currently being collected presents the intelligence community with an opportunity to better focus increasingly scarce resources on that information, which is only available through those means. With that opportunity, however, comes the challenge to ensure that the collection and exploitation of all types of information is done as efficiently and effectively as possible. With information overload an increasing problem, the effective filtering, storage, and retrieval of relevant intelligence is critical to perceptive analysis and timely decision making. Particularly with respect to open-source information, more tightly integrated collection management and new modes of analysis must be developed. This paper describes the current generation gap between the government and open-source information. Information is intelligence and the government has not yet come to grips with the management, collection, and exploitation of this extremely valuable commodity. The author provides some current challenges for both the open-source community and the intelligence community, suggests some management techniques, and explains the importance of information knowledge. Finally, he suggests a strategy that will unite the government and private sector in a partnership. This partnership must be developed to provide decision makers with immediate, concise information to make appropriate decisions. As the United States copes with a rapidly changing world, there will be a need for immediate, expert analysis of whatever information is available in support of policy decisions, contingency planning, and humanitarian assistance. After all, U.S. National Security could rest on major decisions being made accurately and in a timely manner.

Fighting a Televised War: Operational Command Relations With the Media During Conflict

Abstract: : The purpose of this paper is to explore the relations between the military operational commander and the media during conflict situations. The issues addressed are: to what extent can and should the warfighting CINCs and/or Joint Task Force commanders consider incorporation of the media into their war plans, and how should these plans be tailored in view of the numerous conflicting and confusing requirements encountered by field commanders during war. It is the thesis of this paper that military commanders must account for the full integration of the media into coverage of military operations and need to rethink operational plans and planning procedures to improve relations with all forms of the media in any future conflict scenario. The U.S. military is currently not properly organized, trained and equipped to deal with a thoroughly intrusive media during combat and several recommendations are provided to improve this condition.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1935-1965: Lost in Time

Abstract: : This study investigates the roles, missions, and functions of the infantry regiment's Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon. The investigation begins in 1935 and ends with the I&R platoon's disappearance from infantry force structure in 1965. The present infantry brigade remains the only tactical formation without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization. What were the reasons that it was removed from the infantry brigade force structure? Period I&R platoon doctrine, training, and tables of organization are compared and contrasted with first hand combat experiences from World War II and Korea. The impact of national security policy, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and intraservice rivalries about individual U.S. armed forces capabilities and missions during the Cold War are also examined. The study concludes that the I&R platoon's disappearance began with its tactical employment during the Korean War. Later during the PENTANA study in the late 1950s, the I&R platoon had lost so many personnel billets, that it was no longer a tactically effective organization. Intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, Brigade reconnaissance.

Preliminary Analysis of Army Aircrew Requirements for Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS): Human Performance Requirements and Job Demands

Abstract: : In response to a request from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Manager for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), the US Army Research Institute Field Office, now the Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) of the US Army Research Laboratory, located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, conducted an analysis of Army aircrew positions aboard the JSTARS E-8 aircraft The objective was to determine skills and abilities requirements, task demands, and implications of training and selection The analytical approach included using the job comparison and analysis tool (JCAT) by experts who had flown on JSTARS in Operation Desert Storm Data from these analyses indicate a significant cognitive (mental) demand for the three Army aircrew positions, a need for auditory attention ability at a midlevel experience range, and a strong emphasis on oral and written interpersonal communication skills Findings suggest that these positions must be filled by experience personnel Joint STARS, Abilities and skills, Job assessment, Military intelligence job requirement

The Aleutian Campaign: Lessons in Operational Design

Abstract: : Failures and successes relative to current theories on operational design and operational art are examined and critiqued from the U.S. perspective at the operational level. Emphasis is placed on examining the critical linkages between tactical and strategic objectives. The campaign is divided into three phases with the first centering on prewar plans, the second, on orientation and expansion within the theater and the third, on the counter offensive with the intention of linking tactical and operational objectives to the strategic goal. A convoluted command structure and personality clashes between senior leadership created significant problems through most of phase II. With the transfer of senior leadership late in phase II, a significant transformation occurs within the theater; operational objectives are accomplished through coordinated joint operations and Clausewitz's theory of Center of gravity is validated with the neutralization of the Japanese Northern Area Force. Phase III is dominated by the operations to retake Attu and Kiska and the failures in operational intelligence. Lessons are summarized to include interdependence of all elements of operational design, unity of command, physical dimensions, logistical sustainment and the far ranging effects of operational intelligence. The lessons remain valid for the contemporary student of operational art.

Intelligence Failure and Its Prevention

Abstract: : Intelligence failures often result from preventable conditions. These include poor understanding of intelligence methods and capabilities, poor coordination between intelligence and operations, and poor dissemination methods. The concept of the operations-intelligence marriage unites the two staff functions to provide pertinence to each other's work. A strong OPS-INTEL marriage helps alleviate some intelligence failures due to poor knowledge about intelligence and poor coordination between the two staffs. Intelligence failures due to poor dissemination depend on better intelligence intercourse between the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Each level must possess its own collection, analytical and dissemination means to preclude failure. C4I for the Warrior is only an improvement in dissemination means, not a resolution to subjective problem of what to disseminate. New mind set, training and coordination can alleviate some intelligence failures.