Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 2001"

Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts

Abstract: : This report gives a simple and comprehensive definition of strategic asymmetry reflecting the need for military doctrine which transcends today's specific issues. The authors assess the strategic situation of the United States in terms of positive and negative asymmetry and offer five strategic concepts as part of the response to asymmetry: maximum conceptual and organizational adaptability, focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full spectrum precision, and an integrated homeland security strategy

The use of marketing research and intelligence in strategic planning: key issues and future trends

Abstract: Many large companies in Asia are turning to market intelligence for input into their strategic management system and decision making. Conventional marketing research is increasingly viewed as being too narrowly focused on tactical and operational issues. It is characterized by an overriding concern with data rather than analysed information and the research is often conducted in response to an apparent market threat or opportunity rather than on an ongoing basis. This paper attempts to highlight the role of the Internet for market intelligence purposes. It proposes and demonstrates the marketing intelligence process, techniques and procedures, as illustrated by a case study on Creative Technology. Believes that the intelligent use of the Internet is strategically beneficial for both marketing research and intelligence.

A knowledge-based architecture for implementing military geographical intelligence system on Intranet

Abstract: Military geographical intelligence analysis in support of both tactical and strategic operation is a process that is associated with data gathering, processing, analyzing, and distribution. It is an important activity, carried out before the preparation of a military operation. A system that can assist in arranging support, exercise analysis training, and manage knowledge on military geographical intelligence have always been ultimate goals for both military intelligence units and intelligence officers alike. Therefore, it can be seen that research into the military geographical intelligence system is a critical and important research subject. This research investigates military geographical intelligence systems as a problem-solving procedure in terms of observing the military geographical intelligence operational procedure, generating situation analysis, and generating planning process. This paper intends to present a knowledge-based architecture that incorporates the function of case base, heuristic base, and rule base for implementing the military geographical intelligence system on Intranet.

Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries

Abstract: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal military patron of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, many have assumed that the armed forces of these states adopted Soviet military doctrine, and that this factor accounted for their generally lackluster battlefield performance. In fact, reliance on Soviet military doctrine varied considerably between these three militaries, and at times contributed to success when they adapted it to their own cultural predilections and operational requirements. On October 12, 1973, the Iraqi Army joined the October Arab-Israeli War. That afternoon, newly arrived tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) of the 12th Armored Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, lumbered into combat against the battle weary Israeli 240th Armored Division, as it threatened to outflank Syrian defenses on the northern Damascus plain. The Iraqis drove Soviet T-55 tanks. They advanced in two long columns under a heavy but indiscriminate supporting artillery barrage. To some of the Israelis lying in wait on the tels of southwestern Syria, the Iraqis looked liked the very model of the Soviet army on the attack.2 Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Though using Soviet equipment, the Iraqi army still employed a mostly British-based system, with an admixture of American, French, Soviet, and some indigenous Iraqi practices thrown in (a fact that Israeli military intelligence was well aware of). Although difficult for the Israelis to discern at the time, the Iraqi tanks and APCs were not moving to contact in a Soviet-style assault line, but rather were attempting to use British-style overwatch techniques.3 This, however, would not be the last time that some observers would mistake appearance for reality. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal military patron of the three most powerful Arab states: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. At the height of their military exertions-the 1973 Arab-Israeli war for Egypt and Syria, the 1991 Gulf War for Iraq-the armed forces of these states were equipped largely, if not almost exclusively, with Soviet arms. As a result, many military analysts assumed that the armed forces of these states also adopted Soviet doctrine4 and organizational forms wholesale, and that this factor largely accounted for their generally lackluster performance on the battlefield. For instance, Egyptian authors such as Anwar Abdel-Malek and Mahmud Hussein have argued that from the late 1950s onwards, "reliance on Russian weapons systems and the tactics which such systems necessarily implied," hindered Egyptian military operations.5 Likewise, one Western scholar writes that "Arab disadvantages were heightened by the application of Russian introduced tactical models that were ill-suited for the fluid situation created by Israeli deep penetration tactics."6 These assumptions, however, are incorrect. In these three Arab states, military doctrine and practice during the Cold War often diverged-sometimes dramatically-from Soviet norms. 7 The Syrian army most closely resembled the Red Army in its organization, tactics, and operations. The Egyptian military tended to employ Soviet organizational models, but borrowed from Soviet tactics-and to a much lesser extent Soviet operational thought-in accordance with lessons learned in past wars and their particular operational needs. The Iraqis tended toward eclecticismdespite the Soviet origin of much of their arms-adding Soviet, French, American, and indigenous Iraqi touches to their mostly British tactics. Moreover, in many cases-and contrary to conventional wisdom-Soviet practices often proved more a help than a hindrance to these Arab militaries. First, the Soviets brought a carefully thought-through and battle-tested doctrine. Second, Soviet practices were often better suited to the dominant cultural and organizational patterns of these Arab societies than alternative Western models. Nonetheless, the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi armed forces generally fared best in battle when they adopted, and adapted, those Soviet practices that were most compatible with Arab cultural and societal norms and the operational requirements of their armed forces, and were less successful when they failed to do so. …

Who Runs What in the Global Information Grid: Ways to Share Local and Global Responsibility

Abstract: Traditionally, information provided to warfighters only gave them broad situational awareness. Today, information from sensors and databases can help warfighters target past what they can see. This has prompted the Department of Defense (DoD) to build a military analog to the Internet, to be a font of warfighting information (and system services). But how should responsibility for providing information and services be shared between global external sources and organic local sources? Both will be necessary, and sensor characteristics matter. But sometimes the need for integrated battlespace pictures (e.g., the Recognized Air Picture) pushes responsibility higher. Thus, tools are needed to let commanders use whatever information from whatever sources fits their needs at a given time. A strong bias toward interoperability would foster universal access to information. Liberal distribution of unit-level sensors and connectivity should help warfighters develop and share operational information. And better technology is needed to marry local and global information sources more easily. Finally, some entity within DoD should review current information services and lay out a road map for filling in the blanks.

XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton's Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France

Abstract: : Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton's spectacularly successful drive across France in August-September 1944 as commander of the US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign. Many biographers have attributed Patton's achievements almost exclusively to his masterful employment of armor and to an innate sixth sense that enabled him to anticipate the moves of his opponents. Drawing heavlly on declassffied ULTRA intelligence reports, the records of XIX Tactical Air Command, and postwar interrogations of German commanders, Maj Bradford J. Shwedo's XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA: Patton's Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France sheds new light on Patton's generalship and suggests that Patton's penchant for risk and audacity may have been less the product of a sixth sense than of his confidence in ULTRA and tactical airpower. Timely and highly accurate ULTRA intelligence afforded Patton knowledge of German capabilities and enabled him to shape his operations to exploit mounting German weakness. Airpower provided top cover, punched through German concentrations, guarded Patton's right flank, and furnished crucial airlift support while disrupting enemy lines of communication. Whatever Patton's personal intuitive gifts, he deserves full marks for skillfully integrating the ground scheme of maneuver, airpower, and intelligence into the overall strategy of the Third Army. Major Shwedo shows in some detail how Patton used both ULTRA and conventional operational intelligence to identify German vulnerabilities and then coordinated ground maneuver forces and airpower to exploit those vulnerabilities and create new ones. The synergy between courageous leadership and airpower, highly mobile ground forces, and superb intelligence-each creating opportunities for the other-took the Third Army and XIX TAC from Normandy to within 50 miles of the German border in less than 45 days.

British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919-22

Abstract: Readers of Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp's article 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence', in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.) Intelligence and International Relations (University of Exeter, 1987), and Robin Denniston's Churchill's Secret War (Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 1997), might be excused for concluding that British intelligence regarding the Turkish national movement in Anatolia in the period of national struggle, 1919-22, was obtained almost entirely from intercepts of Turkish, Greek, French, Italian and other telegraphic and radio communications, decoded where necessary either by British Military Intelligence, Constantinople, or by the British Code and Cypher School (BCCS), set up in 1919, or its predecessors, Room 40, Old Building, Admiralty, and MI lb, War Office. Such was not the case. Throughout the period of national struggle MI lc, later known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the other, associated British intelligence services, in particular Naval Intelligence, provided a great deal of information about events in Anatolia, most of which was obtained, not from intercepts, but from the more traditional sources of information available at the time. These included Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Arab agents, locally recruited by MI Ic, Constantinople, and the various British intelligence services, operating in Syria and Mesopotamia; members of the Ottoman government, the Turkish national movement and the Greek Orthodox Church, friendly to Britain; employees of the Levant Consular Service; reports published in the local and foreign press (Journal d'Orient, Yeni Gun, Ileri, Hakimiet-i-Millie, Ankara Press Agency, Chicago Tribune and many others); contacts in the French, Italian and Greek intelligence services; and British control officers and other personnel posted at strategic points in Anatolia, until the spring of 1920, when following the Allied (British, French and Italian) occupation of Constantinople (the previous occupation had been unofficial), British personnel were either arrested or expelled from the area. Until the spring of 1920, therefore, information regarding events in Anatolia was more than plentiful. Only following the

Transforming Warfare with Effects-Based Joint Operations

Abstract: : What used to be science fiction is becoming reality. Command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) technology has so progressed that it may soon be possible to direct warfare in real time from or through C2ISR platforms. Colonel Bingham introduces such a concept of effects-based joint operations that would give commanders in chief unprecedented control of the battle space and enable realistic training of command and battle staffs via something called advanced distributed simulation.

Method and system for performing an investigation

Abstract: The present invention relates generally to a method and system for performing an investigation to determine one or more hypotheses in different contexts including criminal trials, scientific inquiry and military intelligence. More specifically, the system comprises one or more tuples to represent the knowledge of one or more objects involved in the investigation wherein the tuples are exchanged among the objects to perform the investigation.

Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s

Abstract: : The UKs defense of Kuwait is chronicled in an extensive collection of documents, many only recently declassified These papers portray a responsive intelligence system, despite collection limitations and the amount of time it took to redirect assets The documents illustrate the difficulty of monitoring idiosyncratic leaders and UK frustration with human source intelligence and "bazaar rumors" that could not be corroborated by technical means Despite these problems, the record shows JIC Assessments to be well crafted and credible They appear to have had a compelling effect on UK contingency planning and force readiness posture against Iraq throughout the 1960s

Philosophy and methodology of military intelligence: Correspondence with Paul Feyerabend

Abstract: Introduction In 1989 I wrote a paper on the logic of estimate process in military intelligence. Since its central ideas were drawn from philosophy of science, I sent a draft to Professor Paul Feyerabend. I knew that my paper will intrigue him: after all, he is the one who wrote a book Against Method in science, and here I come and dare to claim that military intelligence would gain a lot by adopting the scientific method! Surprisingly enough, I have got a (relatively) positive response from him, and this had started a chain of letters, which lasted for some years. The main correspondence is given below. Before going to the correspondence itself, I think it would be beneficial for the reader to summarize, in a nutshell, the original paper I sent to Feyerabend.

Knowledge Base Formation Using Integrated Complex Information

Abstract: : An intelligence support system has been developed using open hypermedia architecture. This approach integrates information from distributed disparate sources into a knowledge base. A public interface supports access by external applications. Filtering and change detection functions have also been implemented. The approach has shown promise in multiple domains, indicating possible wide application. This paper discusses the principles of the hypermedia framework for this system and how these principles may influence command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems in general.

Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia

Abstract: : US participation in expeditionary operations after the end of the cold war, 1991,is indicative of a shift in national security strategy from containment to engagement. Participation is at best multinational, at its most challenging, coalition. Sharing intelligence in a coalition environment, especially a stability and support operation was a challenge by design. The intelligence systems used in Bosnia from 1995-1997 were developed for a different kind of conflict, for exploitation in a conventional war. The implementation of inoperable, stovepiped, technology was indicative of a mindset that prepared for unilateral operations as oppose to multinational stability operations. The NATO led Implementation Force IFOR, eventually became a 60,000 person, thirty-six- nation coalition force. The implementation force consisted of both Partnership for Peace nations as well as non-NATO countries. US intelligence sharing doctrine did not reflect the adjustments that professionals made on the ground to embrace the multinational composition of the division. This monograph examines intelligence sharing doctrine, practices, and challenges during Operation Joint Endeavor, the first out of area employment of NATO, particularly for the operational commander. The monograph shows how intelligence systems developed for the cold war are inadequate for the stability and support environment. Using intelligence principles for multinational operations it explores how effective the employment of intelligence sharing was in Bosnia from December 1995 to 1997. Sharing intelligence in a SASO environment is so inherently complex that cold war policies and systems adversely affect the quality of intelligence. This environment requires primacy of intelligence disciplines that were not the cold war focus.

The Logic of Military Intelligence Failures

Abstract: : This monograph addresses the research question: are military intelligence failures inevitable? If so, what are the causes and effects of intelligence failures and how can these causes and effects be mitigated or minimized in order to contain the degree of ramifications The desire to explore this research question is twofold: (1) understand the effects of consequences in which military intelligence failures create unfavorable conditions for the conduct of military operations and (2) identify remedies for military intelligence failures The methodology for this research consists of a thorough literature review on the characteristics of military intelligence failures as well as lessons learned from historical military intelligence failures, military blunders, or military misfortunes The Easter Offensive in Vietnam 1972 and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 served as case studies Analysis of available literature was sufficient for making generalizations of the causes and effects of military intelligence failures to provide recommendations on how to mitigate or reduce the variables of military intelligence failures The purpose is to provide objective analysis for policymakers/decisionmakers to take action

Medical Intelligence: A Theater Engagement Tool

Abstract: : Of all the intelligence challenges in the post-cold war world, medical issues are emerging as one of the most important. Increasingly our policymakers recognize that disease, environmental pollution, and health systems' failures threaten peace, stability, and economic progress throughout the developing world, shaping environments on terms other than ours and, at times, necessitating U.S. humanitarian and peacekeeping involvement. Medical intelligence is one tool that helps national policy makers, theater commanders and operational planners employ the medical instrument to best effect. To be properly employed, however, medical intelligence must be viewed as an intelligence function more than a medical function. Further, medical intelligence assets need to be distributed through the spectrum of intelligence support-strategic, operational, and tactical.

Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support [Updated October 17, 2001]

Abstract: In response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, a number of countries and organizations have pledged military and intelligence support of operations against the Al Queda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan. This report summarizes public and media statements concerning military and intelligence support; it does not track humanitarian or law enforcement assistance.

Distributed Collaborative Analysis: A New Approach for Intelligence Analysis

Abstract: : In the post Cold War environment, the threats to our National Security have grown more complex, dynamic, and uncertain. To further add to the complexity of the environment, the rapid growth in information age technologies continues to compress the dimensions of time and space significantly, while seeming to justify calls for resource reductions by the public. At the same time, the rapid pace of this growth has caused decision makers at all echelons - tactical to strategic - to challenge the Intelligence Community to become more responsive and agile in meeting their demands for intelligence. These strategic trends demand an Intelligence Community that can dominate the full spectrum of economic, political and military intelligence. Today's Intelligence Community, which evolved out of the necessity to contend with wars and technology, is a hierarchical structure that cannot compete in the information age. Recent advances in both the business and military intelligence communities indicate that success demands a change. One such change is to embrace a new method for analysis that is collaborative and distributed, facilitated by the Internet and its associated technologies. Although this approach requires improvements in interoperability of systems, security and a major cultural change within the Intelligence Community, doing so will significantly enhance its ability to deal with the effects of a more complex, dynamic and uncertain world, the information age, and the impact of limited resources.

Leveraging Operational Intelligence - The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes (1914)

Abstract: : A commander's ability to leverage operational intelligence remains a cornerstone for managing the uncertainty, fog, and friction of war in this era of seemingly endless advances in battlefield awareness and information dominance. Operational intelligence, properly understood and utilized, can become a force multiplier maximizing traditional operational art factors. The goal is information superiority thereby increasing the speed at which decisions are made, while preempting enemy choices and courses of action. The challenge for the intelligence practitioner is not new. Indeed, WWI provides insights into how contemporary military commanders resemble their counterparts from nearly a century ago. The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, Russia's 1914 thrust into east Prussia as an opening salvo of WWI, was a disastrous defeat for Moscow due to German masterful leveraging of operational intelligence. German exploitation of intelligence from Signals, Human, and Imagery vis-a-vis aircraft observation, enabled them to crush the Czar's forces. The story of Tannenberg is a showcase of German successes to gain intelligence about the enemy while denying the Russians the same opportunity. Moreover, German commanders remained receptive and flexible, rapidly incorporating operational intelligence into tactical decision making. The reverse was true for the Russians.

Projecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of the Interim Brigade Combat Team

Abstract: : The Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is a uniquely organized force capable of early entry to counter the threat. It is highly dependent on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to achieve dominant maneuver and precision engagement; essential concepts for Joint Vision 2020. Integrated ISR support is critical to the force's ability to conduct future global power projection operations. The United States will face a dynamic and ambiguous environment for the foreseeable future. The Army will employ the Interim Force, specifically the IBCT, to operate in this environment using technology overmatch and information dominance. This research paper examines how Army intelligence supports the IBCT. It describes the ISR structure in the IBCT and supporting military intelligence (MI) structures (Interim Division, Corps, and higher). The IBCT has MI units and platforms embedded to maximize its situational awareness and ensure the IBCT gains situational awareness before it is committed against a possible or identified threat. Based on strategic lift available to the IBCT, the attachment of force enhancement modules is limited. The necessity of the IBCT to operate virtually independent of additional combat units requires the Army intelligence system to equip the force and provide the right institutional support.

Space Power, The Revolution in Military Affairs

Abstract: : Space power is the true revolution in military affairs With the United States undisputed as the world leader in space, it is the responsibility of America's military to ensure we retain space superiority Just as space has matured into an essential venue for military operations, to include communications and intelligence, it is inevitable that space will become a future baffle ground though weaponization, due to increased competition for limited satellite orbits and the ability to place weapons in space to strike terrestrial targets In light of this, three things must occur for the United States to maintain its position as the world's preeminent space power: the idea of weapons in space should be recognized as inevitable; secondly, space should be recognized as a distinct and legitimate Area of Responsibility in the Unified Command Plan; and lastly, the Defense Department should create a separate Space Corps under the auspices of the Air Force

The Evolution of OPMS XXI: The Need to Specialize Military Intelligence Officers

Abstract: : OPMS XXI allows for the career progression of the Army's functional specialists. It facilitates the development of commissioned officer functional specialists to fill critical positions at the Major, LTC, and Colonel levels. This study argues that OPMS XXI needs to be revised. It argues that the current MI officer career development as a part of the Operations Career Field (CF) falls short of developing the intelligence expertise required of intelligence staff officers (S2/G2) at the tactical level. It fails to develop officers capable of confidently exercising the skills required to integrate at the tactical level all of the elements embedded in the Intelligence cycle---the planning and directing of IEW operations; IEW collection operations; the processing of information and data; the production of intelligence; and the dissemination of this intelligence. It argues that the Army needs to develop tactical military intelligence officers that specialize in the application of intelligence for a military based on force projection and capable of operating across the entire spectrum of conflict. Specifically, tactical military operations in the 21st century will require a much greater level of specialized expertise within the intelligence career field, and that assessment and specialized development of intelligence staff officers (S2/G2) should begin at the time of promotion to the grade of captain and attendance to the advance course. It will suggest a career model for military intelligence officers that may be applicable to other functional areas as well.

Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations

Abstract: : This publication: (1) Provides multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures focusing on the integrated employment of United States Army (USA) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) forces. (2) Provides various operational tools for commanders and joint planners in task-organizing Army and USMC forces. Our national military strategy recognizes today's uncertain world requires flexible and interoperable forces that can respond quickly to the multitude of potential crises that may threaten United States vital national interests. To respond to these crises, the nation's evolving force structure must be both capable and responsive to implement and enforce the strategy that will protect our national interests. The exact composition of a given force depends on the nature of the crisis and the prevailing strategic politico-military environment. Such 'adaptive force packaging' seeks to maximize the capabilities of operational execution. This publication focuses on one type of force packaging available to the joint warfighting community: the integrated employment of Army and USMC forces.

United Nations Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report

Abstract: : The purpose of this paper is to assess the Brahimi Report focused specifically on the question if the recommendations of the Panel will make the United Nations again a credible peace operations organization, given the challenges of the future. The scope of this research is the peacekeeping part of a nation building effort that is executed by military forces. The paper defines the future challenge as complex peacekeeping in failing or failed states. It discusses the Report's recommendations concerning peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, mission planning, including mandate, troop levels, unity of effort and communications with troop contributing nations, intelligence, quality of forces and readiness and UN Headquarters support. The analysis is done by comparing the recommendations with lessons learned in similar operations, and the U.S. and NATO Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations doctrines.

Building the Intelligence Foundation for Network Centric Warfare

Abstract: : The world is undergoing an information revolution with the rapid advance of information technologies. Undoubtedly, information operations is becoming more dynamic and essential to daily activities of the United States military services. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) many concepts have evolved which formulate utilizing the virtual information domain to support operations in the traditional physical domains of land, sea, air and space. One such concept, Network Centric Warfare (NCW), defines and describes how the US military should organize and fight in the information age. By incorporating an intelligence analysis grid, the concept of NCW will optimize the utility of available information and produce shared awareness.

British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War, 1854-1856 (review)

Abstract: SPRING 2001 schools respecting popular politics (sociological, empirical, and postmodern), contending that recent studies have failed to focus adequately on the relationship between political activists of all stripes and those they sought to, or claimed to, represent. Such a focus displaces analysis from what organisations do to what people do, and to how representation becomes the subject of continual negotiation, and a constant process of exclusion and denial as well as inclusion and recognition. This in turn aims to avoid an overly easy reliance on commonplace dualisms such as “high” versus “popular” politics, “elite” versus “popular” culture, and so on. Part Two focuses on a case study of popular politics in Wolverhampton, not because the location is “typical,” but in order to have one mass of evidence on which to test the general hypothesis. Here Lawrence argues that the Liberal predominance in Wolverhampton between 1832 and 1885 owed little to local Liberal leaders, whose principal anxiety seems to have been to secure their own positions of power, while the appeal of popular Toryism after 1885 was clearly indebted to the Conservative party’s willingness to combat Nonconformist attempts to regulate and tame popular leisure activities and working-class culture in general. The relative failure of Labour activism late in the century is explained by the tendency of the proffered politics to alienate both women and the urban poor, two vital Labour constituencies. Lawrence returns to the national arena in Part Three to argue that the socalled “triumph of party” and taming of popular politics before 1914 ignores the continuing vitality of rough-and-tumble public meetings in which an ebullient popular will could move in many directions. Chapter Eight looks at the attempt by Liberals between the Home Rule split of 1886 and the 1906 election victory to respond to the increasing effectiveness of popular Conservatism, and Liberal willingness to move away from a Nonconformist agenda in order to embrace a wider constituency. The work concludes by examining Labour’s ambiguity about narrow political ambitions and reforms, its hostility to party as such, and its slowness to exploit a “natural” relationship with the working classes. Here ideology seems, in Lawrence’s view, to have played a rather greater role in political mobilization than is evident, in relation to Liberalism and Conservatism, in the rest of the book. This is a fine study which will help to shape a growing debate about popular politics; my sole, and very minor, reservation about it is that it makes little effort to confront contemporary explanations of the most meaningful political shifts of the period, notably by Walter Bagehot, Albert Venn Dicey, and others. Gregory Claeys Royal Holloway, University of London

Understanding the Urban Battlespace: An Intelligence Challenge

Abstract: : Knowledge is the primary enabler for the Joint Force Commander to shape the urban Battlespace and win decisively. Therefore, the Joint Force Commander will have high expectations, and rightly so, for intelligence to facilitate knowledge superiority in the dynamic and complex urban environment. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) occur in the most difficult environment for proper Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB). Understanding the critical role of intelligence in formulating an intelligent operational plan seems intuitive, but this desired goal is elusive if the defense intelligence community is not focused on the problem. The military intelligence community needs to be prepared for what is likely to be its greatest challenge over the next 5-15 years. To ensure a timely, accurate and relevant urban JIPB, the issues of intelligence production responsibilities, procedure development, and prioritization of intelligence support to MOUT must be addressed. Without a solid plan of action, joint intelligence organizations may struggle in their attempts to clearly portray the modern urban Battlespace to the Joint Force Commander.

Know the Enemy: Expanded Use of Leadership and Cultural Profile Data in Operational Planning

Abstract: : The better one understands an enemy-especially how he thinks-the more effectively one can deter him from aggression or defeat him in armed conflict. The Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency produce analytical and psychological products that profile cultures and individuals. Profile data is not, however, readily available to operational planners or widely used in planning. Profile information on enemy cultures, civilian leaders, and military commanders should be fully incorporated into operational planning. This would assist commanders and planners in determining an enemy's center of gravity (COG), and would aid in development of a course of action (COA) that would leverage friendly assets against that COG and protect the friendly COG. Utilizing profile information, planners could formulate a more effective COA by optimizing the operational functions of command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection. Implementation of this concept should include employing on-site psychological and cultural expertise, educating operational planners on the application of profile data, and improving access to this information for planners.

Space Control Operations and the U.S. Army

Abstract: THE U.S. ARMY's ability to achieve battlefield dominance critically depends on global information dominance (ID), the free flow of information to and from our forces while denying the enemy that same free flow. In today's battlespace, space superiority is a key ingredient of ID. Space systems provide critical force multipliers needed to conduct successful full-dimensional operations. To achieve ID, the Army needs communications satellites; navigation satellites; and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) satellites. Achieving space superiority to protect space systems is of paramount importance to Army commanders. Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, Space Policy, states that "the degree of dominance in space of one force over another . . . without prohibitive interference by opposing force" is dominant space control (SC).1 Another document, Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Tactics. Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations, defines SC as "ensur[ing] freedom of action in space for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy."2 SC operations include space surveillance, prevention, protection, and negation. Effective SC actions help ensure the Army's ability to provide intelligence support to U.S. forces. It enhances a commander's situational awareness of the battlespace, ensures in-depth coverage of the battlefield, facilitates unit coordination and critical resource management, helps rapid force projection, and protects vital battle command functions. Effective SC also denies those same advantages to an enemy and helps create the foundation for swift victory. As with any military capability, the Army has a vested interest in mastering SC. A land component commander's (LCC's) strengths will be magnified and weaknesses lessened by effectively applying SC measures. Protecting and defending space systems requires various applications. Protective measures encompass everything from perimeter defense around a ground antenna or control station to jam-resistant communications and data streams. Likewise, denying an enemy's access to space might include destroying a ground station, jamming the data stream or destroying the satellite itself. Most likely, depending on the threat and theater, the commander will employ a combination of organic assets and nonorganic capabilities from other services and national agencies using reachback. If these assets are unavailable through reachback, the theater commander must have his own organic capability to perform these functions. According to U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-- 6, Information Operations, "Information is an essential foundation of knowledge-based warfare. When transformed into capabilities, information is the currency of victory."3 Space is today's high ground, and satellite systems provide critical information. The Army uses space systems to enhance force deployment, detect problems, provide early warning, fill information gaps, reduce vulnerability, and facilitate entry into a theater of operations. Space systems also provide assured communications, reliable intelligence and weather information, and dependable and accurate positional data. The connectivity provided by satellite communications systems enhances the flexibility, agility, and battle command of Army forces. Satellite systems provide Army units with imagery and meteorological data to support mission planning, terrain analysis, and mapping. Information-the currency of space operations-enables commanders to act before an enemy does and helps create conditions for victory. Unfortunately, similar data may be readily available to an adversary on the open world market, much of which can be used for military purposes. The United States' advantages in collecting, processing, and disseminating military data are steadily eroding. Other nations openly share their satellite products, and commercial products can be purchased over the Internet. …

MCWP 3-26, Air Reconnaissance

Abstract: : Air Reconnaissance is the acquisition of intelligence information by employing visual observation and/or sensors in air vehicles. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. It supports the intelligence warfighting function and is employed strategically, operationally, and tactically. Air reconnaissance is aviation's oldest mission area, dating back to the use of balloons to observe the adversary during the French Revolution. One of the first missions of the airplane was observation. Today, the means of observing are dramatically different from the days of the eyeball sensor. Sophisticated air reconnaissance sensor systems play a critical role in planning and executing military operations. Marine air reconnaissance assets collect information concerning the terrain, weather, hydrography, and enemy situation in areas of operations to provide commanders with real-time or near-real-time information. The proper use of manned and unmanned air reconnaissance assets enables commanders within the MAGTF to maximize their force's effectiveness by optimizing friendly strengths and exploiting enemy critical vulnerabilities.

Countering the Mobile Threat: Lessons for the Operational Commander

Abstract: : The combined operational reach and firepower of the joint forces of the United States military is unrivalled in the world today, but what if a future enemy opts to simply survive until the resolve of US and coalition forces fades? Foremost in this potential ability to survive is the use of concealment and relocation of both air defense missile systems and theater ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass effect. The threat to the Joint Force Commander is clear. A sustained enemy ability to place at risk US airpower and ground forces with rapidly relocateable missile systems will have a direct impact on the courses of action available to the JFC. Unfortunately, future JFCs cannot wait for the magic of Network Centric Warfare to solve this problem with total battlespace awareness and connectivity. A better solution is needed today based on current and near-term capability. No single technological advance will provide the answer, but improvements in IS% interoperability, C2 organization, and weapon system integration will provide the JFC with a more responsive and potent counter to an elusive threat.