Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 2002"

Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning

Abstract: : Warning is a skill unto itself, requiring an understanding of the attitudes and disciplines of potential adversaries as well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and their biases. In an era of asymmetric warfare in which our national security and well being can be seriously threatened by hostile groups as well as nations, it is imperative that lessons from the past not be forgotten and the discipline of warning reinvigorated. Warning intelligence differs significantly from current intelligence and the preparation of long-range estimates. It accepts the presumption of surprise and incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to build the case for specific warning. Relationships among events or involving the players may not be readily evident at first and initial signs often consist of fragmentary evidence, conflicting reports, or an absence of something. It is not merely a compilation of facts. It is an abstraction, an intangible, a perception or a belief. While a specific methodology for developing warning may have been tailored to the needs of the Cold War, the same principles apply even to asymmetric conflict. This updated and revised edition of an earlier, classified publication is an excellent primer for both intelligence analysts and policymakers. Events have shown that accurate and timely warning has most often been produced by a minority viewpoint brought to the attention of decisionmakers in some way; it is not the product of a majority consensus. In the rush to build new intelligence mechanisms to combat terrorist attacks and to provide warning for the homeland as well as for forces deployed, the nation and the Intelligence Community would be well served by reviewing this book to gain an understanding of what constitutes warning and how it is arrived at. As the author points out, "warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, and ...he must know that he has been warned."

Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations

Abstract: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes

Intelligence Issues for Congress

Abstract: This report discusses the efforts currently underway to improve coordination and encourage better analysis amongst the various agencies within the U.S. Intelligence Community, especially with regard to the ongoing and prominent issue of international terrorism. In particular, this report addresses the false intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the current efforts in Iraq and Iran in general.

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning

Abstract: : A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These "post-mortem reports" have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenges of strategic warning. It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, "Tradecraft of Analysis," U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community's Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996).

Decision Making in the Information Age

Abstract: : In the age of instant communications and widespread access to sensors commanders in the field have unprecedented access to a wide range of information from the weather to the enemy order of battle As these devices become more sophisticated and soldiers' ability to manipulate them grows more refined, the Common Operational Picture displayed on computer screens will enable commanders to better focus their forces and seize fleeting opportunities to defeat enemy forces Despite this growing access to digital information devices in the Legacy and Interim Force the US Army's Military Decision Making Process, MDMP, has not changed Our current MDMP of seven steps; Receive the Mission, Mission Analysis, Course of Action Development, Course of Action Analysis, Course of Action Comparison, Course of Action Approval, and Orders Production, are tried and true having been executed on the tops of jeep hoods at training centers to overheated tents during the Gulf War Generations of officers know where to look in orders for their unit tasks, how to translate those tasks into guidance for their own subordinates, and where and when to accelerate the process when necessary The solid procedure of developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action for our operations can be translated into action in all of our units The use of these steps, taught in our service schools and reinforced by observer/controllers at our Training Centers has resulted in a widely recognized process that anyone can execute War plan development briefings include as the opening comment, "Sir we are this step in the process" In a world of paper maps and acetate graphical overlays, this process made absolute sense In the growing world of knowledge based warfare and digital information devices the analog procedure does not make sense

Lessons of 9/11

Abstract: : This testimony responds to a list of specific questions posed by the Joint Inquiry Staff to the author which are addressed in this statement for the record ad seriatim. This document is a report of the Lessons of 9/11.

Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973

Abstract: This article begins with a definition of the terms ‘early warning’ and ‘surprise’, and examines whether the failure of Israeli Intelligence to warn Israeli decision-makers in 1973 conforms to these definitions. After examining the conventions of Israeli military intelligence regarding anticipating a surprise, and the conceptions on which these were based, the article demonstrates how events in late 1973 indicated a possible Arab attack on Israel, but also the manner in which the Concept used to measure these warnings proved more resilient than the warnings. Discussions in the few days preceding war, when information was accumulating, are subjected to particular attention. The development of a sub-conception, with the original framework allowed and changed the forecast from ‘no war’ to ‘low probability' of war. The persistence of the Concept is attributed to both strategic intelligence and also to the doctrine of deterrence. Like deterrence, intelligence success is hard to measure. One can never be sure th...

The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats

Abstract: : This monograph is the third in the Strategic Studies Institute's "Studies in Asymmetry" Series. In it, the author examines two paradigm shifts--one in relation to the threat and a second in relation to intelligence methods--while offering a new model for threat analysis and a new model for intelligence operations in support to policy, acquisition, and command engaged in nontraditional asymmetric warfare. He concludes with an examination of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.

11 September: Legitimizing Intelligence?

Abstract: Intelligence has evolved principally as the targeting of other states, and has thus posed its own security dilemma: the knowledge it produces encourages more responsible governmental behaviour, while its methods of secret collection reinforce inter-governmental antagonism or distrust. 11 September and the counter-terrorism following it have, however, accentuated the post-cold war trend to a new intelligence paradigm: targeting `non-state', `partial state' or `rogue state' entities rather than `decent' states; serving `good causes' rather than competitive national advantage; supporting multinational action in actions with international endorsement. As such it has gained increased legitimacy. More positive action is now needed to develop formal international intelligence machinery, not in collection but in analysis and assessment, as part of an extended security system; and to encourage objective intelligence as an input to national policy-making as a world standard of good governance. A necessary counterpo...

Situation/Threat Assessment Fusion System (STAFS)

Abstract: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is important in assessing situation and threat missions in military operations. However, existing systems for situation assessment and threat assessment provide insufficient information. In the real world, undiscovered and unidentified threat units, incomplete messages, and enemy deception may cause expert systems to infer unreliable products. Military decision-making systems may suffer from incomplete, inconsistent, and incorrect intelligence. In this paper, we propose a new framework of a knowledge-based system, STAFS, that is more suitable for military applications. STAFS will solve some of these problems using the assumption-based truth maintenance system (ATMS), spatio-temporal reasoning, and uncertainty processing technologies and provide enhanced products to commanders and intelligence staff. STAFS is a near real-time knowledge-based IPB automation system.

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process

Abstract: : A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These "post-mortem reports" have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analyst-policymaker relations. It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold (1996); (2) Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (3) Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996).

The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army's Elite Intelligence School

Abstract: In the history of the twentieth century, the role of the military intelligence services in the competition among nations is still murky. Among the world's foremost intelligence services, those of Imperial Japan remain the least known. Few stories are as compelling as those surrounding the Japanese Army's Nakano School. From 1938 to 1945, the Nakano School trained more than 2,000 men in intelligence gathering, propaganda, and irregular warfare. Working in the shadows, these dedicated warriors executed a range of missions, from gathering intelligence in Latin America to leading commando raids against American lines in Papua New Guinea, in the Philippines, and on Okinawa. They played major roles in operations to subvert British rule in India, and they organized Japanese civilians into guerrilla units that would have made the invasion of Japan a bloodbath. One graduate used his Nakano commando training to elude U.S. and Philippine military patrols until emerging from the jungle nearly thirty years after the war's end. In the decades after World War II, graduates of the school worked to obtain from the United States and Russia the release of imprisoned war criminals and the recovery of lost territory, including Okinawa. Based on archival research and the memoirs of Japanese veterans, "The Shadow Warriors of Nakano" shines a much-needed light into the shadows of World War II and postwar Japanese affairs. A former CIA analyst and Asia expert, Stephen C. Mercado lives in the Washington, D.C., area. His articles have appeared in Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, and Studies in Intelligence.

British intelligence and the middle east, 1900–1918: how much do we know?

Abstract: Primary sources available in British and Israeli archives (first and foremost – the Public Record Office) allow serious study of the British intelligence apparatus in the Middle East and its contribution to the military operations and diplomatic-political process there, prior to and during the First World War. Yet, existing knowledge focuses on military intelligence, as documentation on the Secret Service and the Security Service (both in the form of EMSIB) as well as on army and naval signal intelligence operations in the region is barely available – destroyed or still classified. Examination of hitherto unexplored foreign depositories may serve as an indirect approach to overcome this paucity of material, owing to the close wartime cooperation between British, French, Russian and Italian intelligence on the Ottoman Empire.

Surprise and Intelligence Failure

Abstract: : Surprise is as old as warfare itself The frequency of its occurrence in history, however, offers neither adequate warning nor consolation, especially when its effects can be so devastating The events of September 11, 2001 proved especially shocking both because they were so destructive and because they were so unexpected Yet, both the fact that the attack occurred and even the form it took should not have taken the United States completely unawares Familiarity with terrorist methods, repeated attacks against US facilities overseas, combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the terrorist target list might have alerted us that we were in peril of a significant attack And yet, for reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning The 9/11 attack on the Trade Towers has often been compared to that of the Japanese against Pearl Harbor as another infamous case of intelligence failure On both occasions, there was ample evidence that the enemy might be pushed to undertake a desperate act But the signs leading up to 9/11 were ignored for at least three of the same reasons that the Japanese were able to catch the US Pacific fleet at anchor on the morning of 7 December, 1941 -- good intelligence indicators lost in the "noise" of disinformation; a belief that the enemy lacked the technical capacity to undertake the action; finally, mirror imaging, the assumption on the part of the intelligence "consumer" that the action undertaken was unlikely because it was "illogical" It is now obvious that the inability of the CIA and the FBI to communicate at least contributed to the failure to detect the 9/11 attacks, as the failure of army and naval intelligence to cooperate aided the Pearl Harbor debacle

Fusion-Based Knowledge for the Objective Force

Abstract: : In sum, the volume and nature of information reported to analysts and decision-makers exceeds their capabilities to process it in a manner that satisfies the time-constraints and level of situational understanding desired for planning and acting within the adversaries decision cycle. The overall objective of this science and technology project is to develop an advanced knowledge generation and explanation capability (automated decision-support) for answering war fighting commanders' critical intelligence requirements in a timely manner. The scope of the project will address particular requirements and issues associated with intelligence analysis and decision-making conducted at the U.S. Army Division level today, as well as the Army's Future Combat System's Unit of Employment and Unit of Action. Clearly, the problems addressed by this project intersect with many of the critical problems characterizing the war against terrorism as well. This paper characterized the nature of the problems and challenges currently faced by Army analysts and the decision-makers they support. It identified issues and requirements associated with these problems and described our planned technical approach including: the technologies we plan to explore and how they may be utilized (e.g., ontologies, Bayesian belief networks, rule-based systems, and knowledge discovery); an initial candidate system architecture; metrics and methods for system evaluation; and the central role of cognitive engineering in our approach to human-computer system design. We also identified a number of key projects directly related to this one both within DARPA and the U.S. armed services that we believe provide an excellent opportunity for cross-fertilization and synergy.

Contemporary threats, future tasks: canadian intelligence and the challenges of global security

Abstract: Canada’s intelligence community consists of a complex web of functionally differentiated agencies for the collection, assessment and protection of security-relevant knowledge on behalf of this country’s foreign policy, security and defence establishment. There are, as well, specialized organizations with mandates for the oversight of the intelligence services so as to ensure compliance with law. It is convenient for analytical purposes to characterize Canadian intelligence requirements by scope and function in terms of two distinct spheres of operations: security intelligence and foreign intelligence (Auditor-General, 1996). Security intelligence relates to activities that could threaten Canada's domestic security, such as espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities or politically motivated violence, and is collected to help maintain public safety and protect national security. Foreign intelligence addresses the capabilities, activities or intentions of foreign countries, organizations or individuals, and is required to serve Canadian national interests, including its geo-strategic, economic, military, scientific/ technological, environmental and social policy objectives. Intelligence informs many spheres of government decision-making and policy analysis, however what distinguishes intelligence from other information resources is its sensitivity and intrusiveness, which precipitates collection by clandestine means as well as from open sources (Herman, 2001). In Canada, responsibility for security intelligence is assigned primarily to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), a civilian agency established under statute in 1984, which took over that function from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Canada does not have (and never has had) a dedicated foreign intelligence service of its own, unlike most other NATO members and similarly situated middle powers like Australia or Sweden. Rather, the Canadian role in foreign intelligence is confined mainly to signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), to certain CSIS activities abroad relating to Canada’s security, and to the defence intelligence function of the Canadian Forces. Canada’s own efforts in the domain of foreign intelligence are significantly augmented by exchanges of intelligence product with allies and partners under various international arrangements. The end of the Cold War yielded a peace dividend in terms of vastly reduced defence budgets and military establishments generally. Nevertheless, the past decade has witnessed a major upsurge in intelligence requirements and capabilities in response to a more challenging and more diffuse threat environment coupled with far-reaching technological advancements in information gathering and processing. The aftermath of the 11th September terrorist attacks on the United States prompted a sharply increased appropriation of resources, federal and even provincial, for security and intelligence. The study that follows examines the evolving role of the

The Reconnaissance Squadron and ISR Operations

Abstract: To guess at the intention of the enemy; to divine his opinion of yourself; to hide from both your intentions and opinions; to mislead him by feigned manoeuvres; to invoke ruses, as well as digested schemes, so as to fight under the best conditions-this is and will always be the art of war. -Napoleon AS THE U.S. ARMY continues to transform and until the Objective Force is finally realized, the Army has made great efforts to field an interim force-the interim brigade combat team (IBCT). This Transformation force will lead the Army into the future. The IBCT is a force-projection force that can rapidly deploy anywhere in the world to protect U.S. interests or serve the needs of the National Command Authority and regional commanders in chief Designed specifically to conduct small-scale contingency operations in complex terrain against asymmetric tactics, the IBCT will be capable of responding to the country's needs. The IBCT is a unique and lethal combined arms organization comprised of three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance (recce) squadron, a field artillery battalion, a brigade support battalion, an antitank company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, and various other combat support elements. But, what truly makes the IBCT a lethal and effective combat force is its ability to achieve information superiority. With all elements in the IBCT connected via the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), every echelon can gain and maintain situational awareness (SA), and can quickly pass and receive intelligence information and mission orders. There are several unique aspects of the IBCT, but the most important is its ability to gain and maintain situational understanding of the battlefield. The primary means of achieving situational understanding is through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. ISR is defined as "the integration and synchronization of all battlefield operating systems to collect and process information about the enemy and environment that produces relevant information to facilitate the commander's decisionmaking."1 By achieving situational understanding, the brigade commander can best employ lethal and nonlethal effects to defeat an enemy force. Emerging doctrine addresses an additional element of combat power-information. The IBCT's ability to gain information superiority and maintain information dominance will be critical to future military operations in an increasingly complex battlespace. In the future, the IBCT will conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict from major theater war to small-scale contingency operations to peacetime military engagements-facing adversaries that will range from conventional military forces, to paramilitary and guerrilla forces, to terrorists and organized crime groups. Additionally, as these threats attempt to gain an advantage over U.S. forces, the enemy will seek to attack U.S. forces using unconventional and asymmetric attacks while operating in varying types of terrain, including not only open, rolling terrain but also urban areas and severely restricted mountainous and heavily wooded terrain. To ensure success on the future battlefield, commanders must achieve information superiority, defined as "the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."2 The ability to rapidly collect, process, and disseminate information enhances a commander's ability to make better military decisions, and command and control his unit. Each subordinate element in the IBCT contributes to ISR operations. Intelligence is "(1) the product resulting from the collection, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning the threat or environment, or (2) information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. …

Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities

Abstract: : A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These "post-mortem reports" have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing priorities among competing uses of analytic resources (for example, current trend reporting vs. customized "action" analysis vs. in-depth studies). It reviews six post-mortem critiques: (1) Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold (1996); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community's Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (4) Independent Task force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (5) Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (6) Staff Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (1996).

Information Operations in the IBCT

Abstract: The guiding document for incorporating the IO section into the unit is the IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept... The IO section was created to facilitate incorporating nonlethal effects, providing planners for IO, CA, PSYOP, and electronic attack (EA). Additionally, a brigade operational law team provides legal support to all aspects of IO. We need to find new ways to deter new adversaries .... We need to make the leap into the information age, which is the critical foundation of our transformation efforts. -Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld THE FIRST OF SEVEN planned interim brigade combat teams (IBC-Ts) is fielded with its complement of interim armored vehicles (IAVs) and digitized command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. Using current off-the-shelf equipment combined with a unique organizational structure, the 3d IBCT, 2d Infantry Division, has capabilities unlike any other brigade combat team. In October 1999, the Army's leadership unveiled the Army Vision, outlining a need to transform the Army based on emerging security challenges and the requirement to respond more rapidly across the full spectrum of operations. IBCTs are designed as early entry forces capable of deploying within 96 hours to fight and win small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain. Keeping pace with the changing face of warfare, the IBCT employs both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The IBCTs provide the commander in chief with a new option of decisive contingency response. The IBCT cannot conduct forced-entry operations, but it does give the joint force commander an improved capability to arrive immediately behind forced-entry forces and to begin operations to shape the battlespace. The IBCT's major fighting components are three mechanized infantry battalions, which use highly mobile, medium-weight IAVs. The brigade's effectiveness is enhanced by a field artillery battalion; a robust reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron; military intelligence, antiarmor, engineer, and signal companies; and a brigade support battalion. These elements also use the IAV with variants for mobile gun systems; antiarmor carriers; 105-millimeter (mm) artillery; engineer mobility support vehicles; medical support vehicles; nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance; and command and control (C2) carriers. The field artillery has 155mm towed artillery assets. The IBCT headquarters staff closely mirrors that of a division, given the unit's enhanced organic capabilities. Beyond the coordinating staff group consisting of the S1, S2, S3, S4, and S6, there are several special staffs and staff groups in the IBCT, including-- * Medical personnel in the IBCT surgeon's section. * Military police and engineers in the maneuver support coordination cell. * Air defense artillery and aviation personnel in the air defense and air space management section. * Field artillery personnel in the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC). * Information operations (IO), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and legal personnel in the IO section. Although these special staff elements are at the brigade headquarters, the total number of personnel authorized has been kept to a minimum, 111 total, to facilitate deployability. The IBCT has the most advanced C4ISR technologies available. This technology gives commanders and their staffs a digital, fully dimensional common operating picture (COP) of the battlefield. This digital view enables commanders to locate and track critical targets precisely, conduct simultaneous operations with lethal and nonlethal means, operate with joint and multinational forces, and recognize and protect their own forces and other friendly forces. Each IBCT element is equipped with an appropriate type of Army Battle Command System (ABCS). …

The History of MIS-Y: U.S. Strategic Interrogation During World War II

Abstract: : As World War II unfolded, the strategic interrogation programs established by the British, German, and American forces evolved into robust collection entities that proved to be a unique source of critical intelligence. Decades after their closure, the spate of academic research into these programs has only recently begun to be addressed. Whereas researchers have made headway in chronicling the British and German programs, relatively little has been written about the U.S. program in operation during the same period. Using recently declassified material from the National Archives and Record Administration, this thesis seeks to capture the essence of the strategic interrogation program conducted under the auspices of the War Department's Military Intelligence Service (code-named MIS-Y) with the mission of bringing selected German POWs from the European Theater of Operations to the U.S. for the purpose of gathering vital intelligence in support of the Allied war effort. This study examines the key elements of MIS-Y, to include the events that led to its founding; the program's organization and facilities; the training it provided for its interrogation and operational support personnel; its methods for screening and selecting high value POWs; its process for interrogation and exploitation of captured documents; the Allied intelligence requirements that drove its operations; and the nature of the intelligence it produced and disseminated. A primary objective of this thesis is to add to the Intelligence Community's body of knowledge about the challenges and opportunities inherent in the strategic interrogation of POWs. It will also search this event in contemporary military history for timeless principles in the conduct of strategic level interrogation operations-principles that would guide a more effective intelligence program in support of future military operations.

Tannenberg: The First Use of Signals Intelligence in Modern Warfare

Abstract: : The battle of Tannenberg on 27-30 August 1914 led to a major German victory over Russian forces at the onset of World War I. Wireless radio was still a new technology. While many factors contributed to the Russians' disjointed invasion of Prussia, key to the German victory were intercepts of Russian communications to include detailed operational and tactical orders. This paper will review some of the events leading up to the battle then center on the battle itself examining the role of signals intelligence as a force multiplier. Relevant lessons learned that remain applicable to today's military will be highlighted.

Transforming the Intelligence Community

Abstract: : The United States is on a course to eradicate transnational terrorism. The U.S. Army will clearly play a major role in this effort at home and abroad. The Army has also begun to transform itself. The Army G-2, Lieutenant General Robert Noonan has developed an intelligence transformation plan that depends on the ability to reach back to access intelligence fused at the national level. Responsibility for providing this service belongs to the Intelligence Community. However, the American intelligence apparatus is still organized for the Cold War. The thirteen loosely grouped agencies of the Intelligence Community are not structured to effectively provide the intelligence necessary to support national decision makers, much less tactical commanders. The Central Intelligence Agency is central' in name only. It does little to effect an overall coordinated intelligence effort by the government's different agencies. Congress must act now reorganize an intelligence apparatus that can effectively and efficiently prioritize intelligence requirements, manage collection, conduct analyses and disseminate usable intelligence products in a timely manner. These functions must be capable of supporting leaders at all levels within an environment of diverse threats and complex U.S. responses.

Critical Incident Intelligence Gathering, Coordination and Analysis

Abstract: Critical incident response and management operations require an immediate and continuous flow of intelligence. The continuous flow of information becomes the lifeblood of a critical incident. All response elements whether on-scene or in a support role must have the ability to synchronize and contribute to the intelligence process. Crisis negotiators perform a vital function with intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, and intelligence coordination. Negotiators must have the training and ability to process information quickly and accurately in order to support a commander's decision-making process. Police administrators and line commanders must be proactive in critical incident response planning, preparation and the provision of training.

Intelligence Support to Homeland Security: Supporting the Supporting Effort

Abstract: : As the nation recovers from the shocking, tragic events of September 11, 2001, many talk openly about the operations that must follow. Intelligence operations are integral to the current and projected military operations, counter-terrorism operations, as well as the ongoing local, state, and federal crisis and consequence management of the terrorist attacks. Difficulties abound with collecting, processing analyzing, and employing the intelligence required for these operations. Coordination of intelligence is a central component of the evolving responsibilities of the new Presidential Homeland Security Advisor. Implied is a restructuring of the intelligence community. An appreciation of the complexities surrounding future intelligence support to homeland security begins with defining homeland security and understanding basic intelligence functions. Juxtaposed against the attributes, roles, and responsibilities of intelligence, a framework of functions, architectures, and capabilities emerges. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for understanding the complex requirements associated with intelligence support to homeland security. By examining capabilities and requirements, recommendations can be made for future restructuring of the intelligence community to meet the general and specific requirements of homeland security.

The Role of Intelligence Analysis in the War on Terrorism

Abstract: : The United States government must provide the intelligence community's analytical force with the necessary resources and capabilities in order to use intelligence analysis as an effective weapon in the War on Terrorism. Reviewing the studies and programs in place to improve analysis demonstrates acknowledgement of a shortfall in the analytical field and the need for improvement. The Director of Central Intelligence's Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis provided outstanding guidance for the analytic community, but from its inception was resource-constrained. The community recognizes a need to adopt new recruitment, hiring and staffing processes and more flexible personnel management policies to attract and retain the right work force. Some of the intelligence community's successful analytical training efforts include the Central Intelligence Agency's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence College, and Red Team Training. Equipping analysts with the right tools includes maximizing information sharing, collaborating with the scientific field, and investing in research and development of analytical tools. To be successful analyzing one of the most difficult targets, the intelligence community understands it needs the right people, training, and tools, all of which can best be accomplished with significant increases in resources.

The Operational Planning Factors of Culture and Religion

Abstract: : The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction will lead to cultural and religious conflicts. Operational commanders that do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Current joint doctrine does not provide operational commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process. Culture and religion are significant factors that operational commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of Joint Doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) will mitigate the potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning and execution.

Clairvoyant remote viewing: The US sponsored psychic spying

Abstract: ‘Remote Viewing,’ popularly known as Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) is the ability of human being to perceive information and imagery of remote geographical targets. Advanced practitioners of the Indian Yoga system were well acquainted with ‘Divya Drishti.’ This paper deals with experiments conducted in USA in which certain individuals were trained to acquire such ‘Remote Viewing’ capabilities for collecting military intelligence.

The Distributed Analysis and Control Element: An Attempt to Update the Threat Tactical Picture?

Abstract: : This monograph discusses how the U.S. Army and Army tactical military intelligence branch could utilize a distributed analysis and control element (ACE) to support the commander's operational picture (COP) and situational understanding. Recent exercises to include the Experimental Force rotation at the National Training Center (EXFOR), the Division Advanced Warfighting Exercise (DAWE), and Division Capstone Exercises Phase I and II (DCX I and II) have incorporated portions of a distributed ACE. The distributed ACE could ultimately provide the tactical commander a threat picture that supports an integrated COP, and situational understanding. This would provide the commander an enhanced capability to make more timely and accurate decisions on the battlefield. The study focuses on three areas: (1) The advancing technology to support the creation of a distributive ACE, (2) The need to update military intelligence doctrine, and (3) The training required to support a distributed ACE.

What the Joint Force Commander Needs to Know About CI and Humint Operations

Abstract: : Military Operations other than war (MOOTW) will continue to dominate the use of our military forces for the foreseeable future. Moreover, recent operations in Haiti, Posnia and Kosovo have acknowledged operational CI and HUMINT activities as paramount to satisfying the JFCs force protection and intelligence requirements. CI and HUMINT are complimentary efforts that work best in collaborative effort. At the JTF level their activities are coordinated by the J2X element which also coordinates collection requirements with CIA and SOF elements as well as providing collection focus to the theater level joint exploitation centers. Joint doctrine acknowledges their importance in successive peace operations but provides only superficial coverage insufficient to educate future JFCs and J2s. Success in future contingency operations, especially peace operations, requires that CINCs and JFCs familiarize themselves with CI and HUMINT operations and fully exploit the advantages they bring to the table. The CI and HUMINT triad at the theater level commands (CISO, HSE, and DCI Representative) must educate senior leaders on the value added of CI and HUMINT in support of joint operations.

Approaches to Enhance Sensemaking for Intelligence Analysis

Abstract: : This essay describes four approaches to enhance sensemaking for intelligence analysis Sensemaking refers to how individuals, groups, and organizations make sense out of their situation and environment The four approaches are to attack every problem as a Fermi problem, to build a strong vocabulary-with both English and foreign words, to cultivate a knack for reasoning through analogy and stories, and to apply persuasion skills to interact more productively with others Each approach is explained from a sensemaking perspective and linked to Richard Heuer's Psychology of Intelligence Analysis Examples from the World War II exploits of Reginald V Jones, the father of modern scientific and technical intelligence, are used to illustrate each approach Additional examples collected during interviews with six practicing intelligence analysts are also presented Ideas for how analysts can gain competence in using each approach are suggested Finally, some ideas for future research are recommended